




NEWGEN

ASSET MANAGEMENT

# NEWGEN CREDIT STRATEGIES FUND

Monthly Commentary

2023-25





**September 2025**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 0.67% on the Class F Units during the month of September. The Fund's compound annual return net of fees since inception is 13.4%. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 83%/104% versus 89%/105% at the end of August. We have ~35 core positions in the portfolio with a 45%/55% split between Canada/US. The Fund executed \$284mm/288 trades across an average AUM of ~\$215mm.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr   | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7%  | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8%  | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |
| 2025 | 0.7% | 0.3% | 0.1% | -0.9% | 1.7%  | 0.8% | 1.2% | 1.0% | 0.7% |       |      |      | 5.7%  |

### **Core Carry (~27% of NAV, 9 positions)**

#### *Bombardier 6.25% Perpetual Preferred Shares {BBD.PR.C}*

BBD's credit profile has improved sharply over the last few years leading to a compression in credit spreads, alongside a dramatic increase in the common share price. We erred by not seeing the transformation and by not buying the unsecured bonds, a *mistake of omission* or *missed opportunity* which does not explicitly show up in investment performance. Seeking to atone for this mistake, we took another look at BBD's capital structure and ended up buying the longest duration, highest convexity security which had lagged the move in other parts of the capital structure, the "perps". BBD's current debt structure is what is termed "negatively convex" or "call constrained" meaning the majority of bonds are trading above their call price and thus have little room left for capital appreciation. However, the perpetual preferred shares we bought during the year had plenty of convexity, as they had been trading between \$20.50 (82 cents in bond terms) and \$23.50 (94 cents in bond terms) versus a call price of \$25.00. The price of the preferred shares appreciated to our view of fair value and caught up with the rest of the capital structure, and we exited the position during the month.

### **Event-Driven (~53%, 19 positions)**

#### *Chemtrade Logistics Unsecured Convertible Debentures {CHEUCN 6.25% 08/27}*

CHE-U announced a cash tender offer at \$134 for our bonds as they approached what is called the "soft call" period. A "soft call" allows the issuer to force the conversion of the convertible bond into stock if the underlying stock trades 125% above the conversion price (\$10.00) for a set period. CHE-U wanted to avoid the dilution, so they offered a cash price at a premium to where parity was prior to the tender being announced. We ended up selling our entire position to a Convertible Arbitrager at \$135.125. This buyer was likely looking to squeak out the last bit of return and perhaps profit from a drop in stock price going into the tender close. In total, the position generated 38 bps of gross return for the Fund and a 31% IRR having first started to buy the bonds in January 2024 at ~100. We remain active across the remaining capital structure of CHE-U.

#### *Five Point Operating Companies Senior Unsecured Bonds {FPH 10.5% 01/28}*

We acquired this position at around \$102 in April/May with the thesis that FPH was going to refinance these bonds early, following 2025-Q2 results. The Company had more cash than debt, the 10.5% coupon was way off market, and FPH was

experiencing pressure from equity holders to get rid of this high-cost debt. As time past it became clear our original thesis was wrong and that FPH was going to wait until the next step down in the call price to \$100 in November 2025. We elected to hold the position, because, while the IRR was not our original underwritten IRR of 10.5% it was still attractive. During the month-end the Company took advantage of open market conditions to “make-whole” the bonds early @ ~100.86, somewhat of a compromise between refinancing earlier and waiting. Once the make-whole news came out, we took another bite at the apple and tripled our position as we had a finite date when the bonds would be refinanced. To hedge the risk of the US Treasury yield moving around before the make-whole calculation date, we simply shorted the notional equivalent US Treasury that underlie the make-whole calculation to lock in the spread.

#### *Shelf Drilling Senior Secured Bonds {SHLFDI 9.625% 04/29}*

We encountered a bout of mark-to-market volatility in the subject position during the month, as our position traded down from 104.50 to 101 on more than \$100 mm of volume. The sell-off occurred ahead of the shareholder vote to approve the takeover of Shelf by ADES. A number of rumours swirled on Wall Street causing a panic in the days leading up to the vote. Chatter was that someone had taken a large short position in the bonds against a long position in the common stock with the sole intent of voting against the deal to cause a drop in the bond’s value. The other notion was simply that common equity holders were willing to blow up the deal unless they received a “bump” to the equity price. We held the “white knuckler” position through the vote and were relieved when the news hit that ADES had bumped its offer ahead of the vote which led to the majority of shareholders to commit to support the deal. The bonds bounced back and we believe we will be called out of our position at 104.813 shortly, leading to a +10% IRR from where we bought them.

#### Liquidity Provision (~6%)

The Fund had as much as 30% of the portfolio intra-month in its liquidity pool. However, we drew down on our cash in the last week of the month to Fund several new Event-Driven trades. We expect between 20%-30% of our event-driven portfolio to liquify into cash in Q4.

#### Special Situations: Stressed Credit/Positive Convexity (~12%, 6 positions)

##### *Distressed Update*

Two relatively large companies collapsed during the month causing large losses to security holders. First, US subprime auto dealer/lender “Tricolor” filed for Chapter 7 and is being liquidated. Tricolor lent money to individuals in the US who often had no drivers license, no Social Security Number and no credit history (Appendix I). There is also an allegation that the Company engaged in fraud by “double pledging” the underlying used car collateral to multiple lenders. Fifth Third Bank out of Cincinnati disclosed a \$200mm write-down related to “fraudulent activity”. The second collapse was the Chapter 11 filing of First Brands, an auto parts supplier, who simply ran out of liquidity. Reports indicate that the Company, unbeknownst to its secured term loan lenders, had heavily “factored” its account receivables to private debt lenders and heavily “reverse factored” its accounts payable as well. The 1<sup>st</sup> lien term loan lenders apparently were unaware of over \$3 billion of off-balance sheet priority debt/supply chain financing ahead of them. There are also allegations in bankruptcy court that inventory had been commingled between lenders and the same accounts receivable factored twice. (See Appendix II – First Brands Chapter 11)

These two defaults failed to move credit spreads wider, even within their respective sectors, as investors chalked these situations up as “idiosyncratic one-off events”. To us, this highlights that there is a decent amount of sloppy underwriting in some corners of the credit markets. This ‘loose’ underwriting is likely driven by investors rushing to put money to work over the last few years. It begs the question: *If a large group of sophisticated investors missed the warning signs at Tricolor and First Brands, then what else is out there that has been missed?*

## Risk Overlay (-8%)

We added to our put option position on HYG during the month to protect the portfolio from potential drawdowns.

## Summary

This month was very busy with a steady stream of refinancing and corporate events occurring in the credit markets. We finished reducing our Core Carry strategy to close to 25% of NAV, the lowest it has ever been on account of tightening credit spreads. Evidence of poor credit underwriting is starting to reveal itself, but surprising to us it has yet to impact the overall valuation of most credit assets. We anticipate that more corporate defaults lie ahead, primarily in mid-market private credit, 2021-2023 Vintage LBOs and anything to do with Subprime Auto. However, what we cannot predict is how this will impact overall credit valuation levels in the areas we trade. Our exposure generally lies in areas that are tangential to where credit problems are now occurring.

Correlation remains very low, but we know from prior flare ups that correlation can increase quickly and turn into contagion. Our focus is on very idiosyncratic event-driven trades where prices get anchored to announced events complemented with “safe” carry from our Core Carry strategy. In doing so, we strive to keep the portfolio immune from what we think are increased credit losses going forward from corners of the credit markets we are not directly involved in.


## Appendix I – Subprime Auto Securitization

- 38% of obligors within Tricolour’s 2025-2 securitization tranche had no SIN or tax ID.
- Loan-to-values were routinely 130% with 100% of the collateral being used vehicles
- 62% of the obligors had no credit history and more than 50% of the obligors did not possess a driver’s licences
- AA-rated asset-backed security dropped from 100 to 74 cents
- Cumulative Net losses on the portfolio are routinely 20%

Collateral comparison(i)(ii) (cont.)

| Tricolor Auto Securitization Trust |        |             |             |             |             |              |
|------------------------------------|--------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
|                                    | 2025-2 | 2025-1(iii) | 2024-3(iii) | 2024-2(iii) | 2024-1(iii) | 2023-1 (iii) |
| >700                               | 2.76   | 3.74        | 2.49        | 2.73        | 0.37        | 1.97         |
| Propriety credit grades (%)        |        |             |             |             |             |              |
| A+                                 | 26.95  | 27.75       | 25.53       | 24.99       | 27.34       | 16.87        |
| A                                  | 34.39  | 33.34       | 34.21       | 33.72       | 47.50       | 42.76        |
| B                                  | 22.83  | 25.31       | 27.39       | 26.35       | 21.37       | 35.57        |
| C                                  | 12.43  | 11.83       | 11.89       | 13.94       | 3.59        | 4.64         |
| D                                  | 0.98   | 0.80        | 0.61        | 0.59        | 0.12        | 0.13         |
| E                                  | 2.37   | 0.96        | 0.38        | 0.40        | 0.09        | 0.03         |
| ID status (%)                      |        |             |             |             |             |              |
| SSN                                | 54.17  | NA          | NA          | NA          | NA          | NA           |
| ITIN                               | 7.38   | NA          | NA          | NA          | NA          | NA           |
| No SSN or ITIN                     | 38.45  | NA          | NA          | NA          | NA          | NA           |

TAST cumulative net loss by vintage




Collateral comparison(i)(ii)

| Tricolor Auto Securitization Trust |        |             |             |             |             |              |
|------------------------------------|--------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
|                                    | 2025-2 | 2025-1(iii) | 2024-3(iii) | 2024-2(iii) | 2024-1(iii) | 2023-1 (iii) |
| FICO score (%)                     |        |             |             |             |             |              |
| No score                           | 62.03  | 66.90       | 70.57       | 66.39       | 81.53       | 80.73        |
| <=600                              | 21.11  | 15.96       | 14.16       | 17.27       | 8.88        | 8.39         |
| 600-700                            | 16.86  | 13.38       | 12.79       | 13.63       | 9.22        | 8.92         |




## Appendix II – First Brands Chapter 11

It was revealed in the First Brands Chapter 11 Filing that the Company had \$2.3 billion of off-balance sheet financing arrangements and \$812mm in supply chain financing for Total Funded Debt obligations of \$9.3 billion. The Company's reported EBITDA was \$1.133 billion meaning Total Leverage was 8.2x. Annual debt services costs were over \$900mm before factoring in off-balance sheet obligations meaning Fixed Charge Coverage was likely < 1x. For context, Auto Parts companies often trade at between 4x-6x EV/EBITDA. The 1<sup>st</sup> Lien Term Loan gapped from the 90s to mid 30s and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Lien Term Loan is now what is called a “drill bit” security, meaning a price less than 10 cents on the dollar.



| Prepetition Indebtedness                                                    | Principal Amount Outstanding |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <b>ABL Obligations</b>                                                      |                              |
| ABL Loans/Letters of Credit Obligations                                     | \$226.9mm <sup>3</sup>       |
| ABL Supply Chain Financing/Cash Management                                  | \$369.4mm                    |
| <b>Total ABL Obligations</b>                                                | <b>\$596.3mm</b>             |
| <b>Term Loan Obligations<sup>4</sup></b>                                    |                              |
| First Lien L/C Facility                                                     | \$100mm                      |
| First Lien Term Loans (USD)                                                 | \$3,886.9mm                  |
| First Lien Term Loans (EUR)                                                 | \$763mm <sup>5</sup>         |
| Side Car Term Loans                                                         | \$250mm <sup>6</sup>         |
| Second Lien Term Loans                                                      | \$540mm                      |
| <b>Total Term Loan Obligations</b>                                          | <b>\$5,539.9mm</b>           |
| <b>Off-Balance Sheet Obligations (SPV Debtors' Obligations)<sup>7</sup></b> |                              |
| Aequum Facilities                                                           | \$77.8mm                     |
| CarVal Facilities                                                           | \$159.0mm                    |
| Evolution Facilities                                                        | \$230mm                      |
| Onset Lease                                                                 | \$1,880mm                    |
| <b>Total Off-Balance Sheet Obligations</b>                                  | <b>\$2,346.8mm</b>           |
| <b>Select Unsecured Obligations</b>                                         |                              |
| Supply Chain Financing Obligations                                          | \$812.4mm                    |
| <b>TOTAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS OF DEBTORS</b>                                    | <b>\$9,295.4mm</b>           |





## August 2025

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.0% on the Class F Units during the month of August. The Fund's compound annual return net of fees since inception is 13.7%. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 89%/105% versus 72%/118% at the end of July. We have ~34 core positions in the portfolio with a 57%/43% split between Canada/US. The Fund executed \$243mm/270 trades across an average AUM of ~\$205mm.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr   | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7%  | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8%  | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |
| 2025 | 0.7% | 0.3% | 0.1% | -0.9% | 1.7%  | 0.8% | 1.2% | 1.0% |      |       |      |      | 5.0%  |

### Core Carry (~32% of NAV, 12 positions)

We used the sharp rally in credit assets during the month to reduce the overall credit risk in our Core Carry strategy. Our aggregates declined from ~50% to ~32% as we trimmed our number of positions from 17 to 12. In addition, we increased our allocation to Investment Grade credit to 32% of the sub-strategy. A theme we are monitoring is the notion that Investment Grade credit, particularly intermediate duration BBB-rated bonds, look attractive to generic "BB" bonds based on where we are in the credit cycle. We continue to identify what are called "up in quality credit swaps" to improve the risk adjusted return of the portfolio. We highlight an example of an "up in quality" relative value swap we completed towards the tail end of the month in Appendix I. This highlights how we can dynamically adjust the portfolio in order to *trim risk*.

### Event-Driven (~49%, 16 positions)

#### *Argo Group International 7% Preferred Shares and Argo Group US 6.5% 09/42 Senior Unsecured Bonds*

We have had exposure to Argo since Brookfield acquired the Speciality Insurer in 2023. Our thesis was that the "implied" support of Brookfield was not priced into the two securities, and that both securities would be retired at the first available opportunity (September, 2025). The preferred share had little downside as the reset spread was 617 bps and was scheduled to reset at a dividend rate of close to 10%. During the month, Brookfield redeemed both securities and we earned a 17% capital gain on the unsecured bonds. We continue to monitor the Brookfield empire as the complexity and stream of corporate actions such as reorgs, take-privates, and spinouts creates trading opportunities.

#### *Dish/Echostar*

We have been following the DISH/EchoStar complex for awhile but have never had a position as we viewed the situation as being overly complex and fraught with binary political risk. This is a classic asset rich, cash flow poor situation. The Company is sitting on a massive amount of unused wireless spectrum, however they lacked the financial wherewithal to build out a wireless product offering to become the 4<sup>th</sup> major carrier in the USA. During the month, the Company finally threw in the towel and sold a large portion of its spectrum to AT&T for \$23 billion, thus averting insolvency. We immediately accumulated a position in the 1<sup>st</sup> Lien DISH Network 11.75% 27 bonds as we viewed them as the safest bond in the entire capital structure, as they have a clean first lien over a large portion of DISH's spectrum assets. Furthermore, the Company explicitly stated in the press release they will redeem the bonds upon closing the asset sale. Assuming a

closing date of between May and September 2026, we bought the bonds at a price where we think we can earn an IRR of 8%-9%.

### Liquidity Provision (~11%)

Intra-month, we had one of the largest cash balances since the inception of the Fund at ~35% but ended up drawing down a decent clip of capital towards the end of the month to fund several new event-driven trading opportunities.

### Special Situations: Stressed Credit/Positive Convexity (~11%, 6 positions)

We have added no new positions here. Our existing position in the convertible bonds of Cineplex appreciated in value after an activist investor [who owns 7% of CGX's common stock] revealed themselves. They intend to pressure CGX to divest assets, buyback shares and possibly even sell the entire Company. All of these aforementioned scenarios likely benefit our convertible position. We have now fully offset our convert position, which has a strike of \$10.29, by writing tranches of out-of-the money call options laddered by both *strike* and *time to expiry*. The volatility being priced in the listed options market is materially higher than the volatility being priced in the convertible bond, creating a nice opportunity to improve the probability distribution of outcomes for the position. We still benefit by receiving bonus shares on a Change of Control from the convertible, something one wouldn't get by simply holding call options outright. It's also our view that convertible arbitrageurs, who now own a decent chunk of the tranche, have an overly punitive view on credit risk of CGX. Despite the convert trading > 130, we still think there is the possibility of double-digit go forward returns from the 7.75% coupon in conjunction with the potential appreciation in shares from any number of permutations of corporate actions.

### Risk Overlay (-4%)

We hedged the market risk of our Core Carry portfolio as best we could in advance of the Jackson Hole Symposium as we were concerned about asymmetric downside for risk assets should the "Fed Speak" be hawkish. Over the course of the month, we converted our HYG ETF short position, a "linear hedge", into a put option position, a "non-linear hedge". We are long Dec. 2025 Puts with a 79 strike, which maps to a credit spread of ~400 bps and yield of 7.81%. Our protection kicks in should the high yield market trade down by more than 2% between now and mid-December.

Volatility can be inexpensively purchased on HYG currently. Part of the explanation is that option markets are pricing in traditional *negative correlation* between government bond yields and credit spreads. For high yield, if widening credit spreads are offset by lower government bond yields then the price effect can be muted. However, if that traditional relationship breaks and flips to *positive correlation*, meaning that both government bond yields and credit spreads move in the same direction, the asset class becomes much more volatile and thus more expensive to buy downside insurance. We think by buying downside protection on HYG at current historically low vol levels of say 4-6%, we are buying cheap insurance on the worrisome "stagflation scenario". Put differently, we are getting both an interest rate option and credit spread option for the price of one. *See Appendix III.*

### Summary

After a quiet July we aggressively repositioned the portfolio during the month of August. We are trying to avoid "generic" credit assets which are well offered via the new issue market. As cautious we are, we are cognizant of the counterpoint that corporate credit, partially intermediate duration credit, remains fairly attractive on an all-in yield basis even if credit spreads are historical tight. The anticipation of front-end cash rates declining plus a relatively expensive equity market is making corporate credit the cleanest shirt in an otherwise dirty closet. That said, if credit spreads continue to tighten you will see us further reduce our Core Carry bucket either outright or via "up in quality swaps" and redirect capital towards idiosyncratic Event-Driven trading. After sitting in nearly 35% cash at times during the month we deployed a significant amount of capital into event-driven situations towards month end. We believe these event driven trades have +9% IRRs.

## Appendix I – Credit Relative Value Trades

When we evaluate whether to swap out a position in our Core Fundamental Carry portfolio into another security its one of two reasons:

- Improve return profile for the same level of risk OR Improve risk profile for the same level of return

The chart below highlights the metrics by which we evaluate relative value swaps between credits:

| Obligor            | Ticker            | Yield | Credit Spread | Dollar Price | Maturity   | Credit Ratings        | Convexity | Tranche Size | BVAL Score |
|--------------------|-------------------|-------|---------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|-----------|--------------|------------|
| Boyd Group         | BYDCN 5.75% 09/33 | 5.46% | 241 bps       | 101.25       | 2033-09-04 | BB(H)                 | 0.220     | \$ 275       | 7          |
| Ford Credit Canada | F 5.582% 05/31    | 5.50% | 242 bps       | 100.23       | 2031-05-23 | BBB- / Ba1 / BBB(low) | 0.263     | \$ 400       | 9          |
|                    |                   | 0.04% | 1 bps         | -1 pts       | -2.3 yrs   | 1 notch               | 0.043     | \$ 125       | 2          |

### ✓ “Pick Up” Yield

Moving from a lower yielding bond to a higher yielding bond can improve the go-forward returns of the portfolio. *Ford has a higher yield than Boyd by ~4 bps.*

### ✓ Increase Credit Spread

Increasing the credit spread can improve go-forward returns of the portfolio. *Ford has a higher yield than Boyd by ~1 bps.*

### ✓ Take Out Points

Selling a higher dollar price bond and buying a lower dollar price bond frees up capital and lowers credit risk. *We took out ~1 pt of capital and lowered our dollar price exposure.*

### ✓ Retract Maturity

Shorter maturity performing bonds generally have less credit risk and interest rate risk. *We “retracted” our maturity by 2.3 years thus reducing risk*

### ✓ Improve Credit Quality

Most importantly, improving credit quality without giving up go-forward returns is a key aspect of a credit swap. BYD is only rated BB(h) by DBRS meaning it’s likely that S&P and/or Moody’s would have rated the Company 1 or 2 notches lower. Ford is considered investment grade by two rating agencies. *We believe we reduced our credit risk.*


### ✓ Increase Convexity

Investment grade bonds generally have more convexity than high yield bonds because they are bullet bonds, while high yield bonds are callable after a period of several years. BYD bond is callable at 102.875 in 2028, only 3 years, meaning that if something materially positive happens to the credit you will be called out of your bond and your upside neutered. F bond is non-callable. *We increased the convexity of the portfolio.*


### ✓ Improve Liquidity

The tranche size of a bond is often a good proxy for how liquid the bond is. Ford’s tranche size is \$400mm versus \$275mm on BYD. The Ford bond has a high Bloomberg Valuation Score of 9 versus 7. Bloomberg BVAL score is also a good proxy for liquidity as it’s an algorithm that captures actual trade points. *We increased the liquidity in the portfolio.*

## Appendix II – Credit Spread Differential between BBB and BB Bonds



Appendix III – Implied Put Volatility on HYG





**July 2025**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.2% on the Class F Units during the month of July. The Fund's compound annual return net of fees since inception is 13.6%. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 72%/118% versus 89%/109% at the end of June. We expect a portion of the portfolio to liquefy in August, bringing our gross exposure closer to 100%. We have ~35 core positions in the portfolio with a 54%/46% split between Canada/US. The Fund executed \$71mm/89 trades across an average AUM of ~\$194mm.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr   | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7%  | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8%  | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |
| 2025 | 0.7% | 0.3% | 0.1% | -0.9% | 1.7%  | 0.8% | 1.2% |      |      |       |      |      | 3.9%  |

### **Core Fundamental Carry (~50% of NAV, 17 positions)**

*TransCanada Pipelines {TRP 2.5% 10/31 Senior Unsecured USD Bonds}*

We think these investment grade bonds have an attractive 1-year holding period return compared to generic high yield risk. They have a few unique characteristics, which we think makes them one of the cheapest unsecured TRP bonds in the capital structure:

1. Dollar Price: The dollar price we bought them at was ~85.75, the lowest dollar price bond in TRP's unsecured debt structure.
2. Optionality: TRP already tendered for the entire \$1 billion issue in October 2024 at a credit spread of 35 bps! Astonishingly, \$261mm worth of investors neglected the tender offer and watched the bonds widen back out to 120 bps. Should TRP desire to reduce its debt again like it did in 2024, these bonds will likely be the priority target.
3. Relative Value: TRPCN 4.10% 04/30 which are 18 months shorter were trading at a spread of 80 bps while TRPCN 5.33% 05/32, a bond 13 months longer was trading with a credit spread of 105 bps....versus our bonds at 120 bps.

This is an example of a "Carry and Roll" trade, a tactic commonly deployed on investment grade bonds, and one we use selectively in the Fund. Roll-down is the capital gain created by the natural fall in a bond's yield as it drifts closer to maturity. Assuming the normal *upward sloping* nature of both Government Bond and Credit Spread curves, then all else equal, a bond's remaining cash flows 1-year from today will then be discounted at a lower yield. This can create a higher price in a year versus today...thus a capital gain. When we add the capital gain to the receipt of the coupon payments, we then have the total 1-year holding period return which can vary significantly from the yield-to-maturity of the bond.

Investors are often turned away from buying investment grade bonds because they simply calculate the yield to maturity and deem the return to be too low, in our case ~5.2%. However, one can skillfully select investment grade bonds with attractive "carry and roll" characteristics by identifying bonds that are positioned to benefit from steeply sloped or even "kinked" rate and credit curves. Given the current credit environment, we are actively scavenging the investment grade market for these types of 1-year holding period trades as a better risk adjusted alternative to outright high yield risk.

|                     |                                                                                          |
|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Total Return</b> | = Cash Carry + Pull to Par + Rate Roll Down + Credit Spread Roll Down                    |
|                     | = 2.92% + 2.33% + 0.61% + 1.25%                                                          |
|                     | = <b>~7.1%</b> with approximately 60% of the return coming in the form of a capital gain |

## Event-Driven (~32%, 14 positions)

### *Innergex Preferred Shares*

We were redeemed out of our INE preferred shares during the month after the Company's deal to be acquired by CDP closed. We received \$25.00 plus accrued dividends. We were perplexed at the trading prices of these prefs, as the IRRs available since the deal was announced in February were consistently above the IRRs available to risk arbitrageurs on the common stock. The first mispricing of this transaction occurred when some investors missed that one of the preferred shares was going to receive all its future dividends up to and including the next reset date. Thereby, investors would receive a "double" dividend on closing. The second mispricing occurred when pref investors priced in a much longer time to close. We had a view that the transaction was going to close earlier than expected, partially informed by the very tight gross spread exhibited on the common stock and the quick approval from FERC the market seemed to have glossed over. **Overall, we made an 8% IRR on our position and 13 bps of gross return for the Fund. The return was a combination of capital gains and eligible dividend income.**

### *Genworth Holdings {GNW 11/2036 Junior Subordinated Bonds}*

One aspect of our thesis around this position finally paid off and the debt rallied during the month leading to 15 bps of return. On July 25, a UK High Court finally ruled on a lawsuit emanating from the GFC in 2009 meaning the result of the resolution indicates that GNW is now entitled to a \$750mm legal judgement. <https://investor.genworth.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1041/genworth-issues-statement-on-favorable-ruling-for-axa-in-uk>

## Liquidity Provision (~28%)

We have our largest allocation to our Liquidity portfolio since October 2024. However, we often move our cash position up or down 20% intra-month and can easily deploy 5-10% capital on one day on event-driven trading.

## Special Situations: Stressed Credit/Positive Convexity (~16%, 9 positions)

### *Urban One {\$567mm UONE 7.375% 02/28 Senior Secured Bonds}*

UONE is the largest Black owned television network and distributor of digital urban content in North America. They own TV One Networks which is a media property focused on black culture and entertainment. They also own Radio One which is a portfolio of over 55 radio stations largely serving urban African-American communities. We acquired a position in the bonds in the low 50s having followed UONE for many years. The capital structure is unique in that they have one "mono tranche" of secured bond debt and excess cash on their balance sheet. They have been using this cash to retire debt at a discount. The business is in secular decline, but the Company still generates FCF and has some unique, valuable assets. The Company had been buying back bonds consistently over the last few quarters at prices as high as 89 cents. However, the Company would at times go into so called "black out" where they couldn't bid on bonds in the open market. This "black out" created an opportunity to acquire a position in the low 50s and then resell them later at ~60 cents.

### *RF Capital Group {RCG.PR.B Fixed Rate Reset Preferred Shares}*

We started accumulating these preferred shares in February in the \$14 dollar area. Our thesis was that at a proforma dividend rate of 9%-10%, which is a tax adjusted interest equivalent yield of 12%-13%, the prefs were simply fundamentally too cheap given the credit risk and asset coverage. We also viewed the prefs as having M&A optionality as on at least two prior occasions RCG had been subject to takeover offers. During the month, RF Capital agreed to be acquired by iA Financial in an all-cash transaction that would see our preferred shares redeemed at \$25.00 **The position generated a 75% simple return and 61 bps of Gross Return for the Fund since the inception of the position.**

## Risk Overlay (-20%)

We got assigned an HYG short position as designed through the writing of July \$80 calls. It feels to us that the rally in generic high yield indices has, to some degree, stalled out given tight credit spreads and increasingly unattractive new issue supply.

## Summary


Given where prices sit for some corporate credit assets, we are actively taking steps to preserve capital and reduce the market risk of the portfolio. Our risk management strategy largely revolves around security selection and portfolio construction rather than individual position hedging or fancy macro hedges. We have:

- Increased our liquidity provision in the Fund from 8% to 28%. We often need to draw down 5%-10% of our capital in one day to fund event-driven trades which are happening with increased regularity.
- Sold lower conviction, lower weight positions
- Increased our short positioning in liquid credit indices
- Traded up in quality (i.e. adding investment grade bonds as opposed to generic high yield risk)
- Shortening duration of the portfolio
- “Bar-belled” part of the portfolio by matching a larger allocation to less risky, lower return assets paired with riskier highly convex positions
- Avoiding the new issue market

Despite the current valuation of corporate credit assets, we are confident that we can continue to find either mispriced securities for our Core Carry portfolio, like companies trading with wide credit spreads despite having more cash than debt or simply new Event Driven trades. As an example, in the first week of August alone, we have found a new 3% position for our Core Carry portfolio where the Company has more cash than debt, yet the bonds are yielding close to 8%. On the Event Driven side as well we recently acquired a new healthy position in bonds associated with an M&A transaction with an expected IRR of 10%. The opportunity to skillfully and selectively deploy capital at high single digit return levels is still present despite current market conditions and the Fund has the capacity to deploy more capital going forward.

## Appendix I – TransCanada Pipeline USD Unsecured Credit Curve as of August 7, 2025

**Criteria for Attractive Investment Grade Bonds:** 1) Bond Trading at a Discount to Par (i.e. 85.75), 2) Kinked credit spread (105 bps versus 95 bps for longer bond or 80 bps for shorter bond), 3) Steep part of Government Bond curve (i.e. 4-7yr area) and, 4) Steep credit spread curve (i.e. 105 bps versus 80 bps on shorter bond).





**June 2025**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 0.82% on the Class F Units during the month of June. The Fund's compound annual return net of fees since inception is 13.5%. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 89%/109% versus 84%/104% at the end of May. We have ~35 core positions in the portfolio with a 50%/50% split between Canada/US. The Fund executed \$130mm/170 trades across an average AUM of ~\$180mm.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr   | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7%  | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8%  | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |
| 2025 | 0.7% | 0.3% | 0.1% | -0.9% | 1.7%  | 0.8% |      |      |      |       |      |      | 2.7%  |

### **Core Fundamental Carry (~49% of NAV, 16 positions)**

*BlueLinx {\$300mm BXC 6% 11/29 Senior Secured Bonds}*

We have owned these bonds, at various weights, since the inception of the Fund. During the month we increased our weight to 5%. We like BXC because of the \$449mm of cash on their balance sheet, against these lone \$300mm secured bonds. In addition, BXC's non-cash net working capital position is \$437mm, so ignoring the operating business, the bond is secured ~3x by its working capital. Interestingly, one of the unique properties of the *Building Products Distribution* industry is that while it is cyclical, as sales *decline* accounts receivable and inventory liquefy into to cash quickly, so a company can end up generating cash during a downturn.

These bonds also benefit from two options. First, there have been a handful of M&A transactions recently in the Building Products Distribution space. QXO is on a warpath to roll up the sector starting first with Beacon Roofing (which we benefited from early in the year) and Home Depot recently agreed to buy GMS (which we also have a position). We think there is a chance that BXC becomes a takeover target given the very low valuation the stock trades at. Secondly, the bond's call schedule steps down from 103 to 101.5 in November 2025. At some point, it does not make sense for BXC, who is set to earn less than 4% on its massive cash pile especially with the possibility of 2 Fed rate cuts, to pay 6% on the bonds. This is called "negative carry". At a price of 101.5, it would be advantageous to call at least a portion of the bond because the Company has plenty of liquidity with its undrawn ABL.

The *Building Products Distribution* industry continues to be one of the larger sources of positive return attribution for the Fund and we expect the beehive of activity around the sector to continue. In Appendix I, we provide some colour on the industries we have had positive and negative attribution on since inception.

### **Event-Driven (~32%, 14 positions)**

*Landsea Homes {LSEA 8.875% 04/29 \$300mm Senior Unsecured Bonds}*

This was as straightforward a risk arbitrage transaction as they get. We acquired the bonds in mid-May after the Company agreed to a take-private transaction by another homebuilder (New Home Co.) and then subsequently launched a debt tender offer at 104. The transaction closed on June 27th, and we received 104 plus accrued leading to an 8.74% IRR.

### *Latam Airlines Group {LTMCI 13.375% 10/29 \$700mm Senior Secured Bonds}*

LTMCI had pre-funded the repayment of this bond in the Fall 2024 but kept the cash on its balance sheet as the bonds were not callable until October 2025, unless the Company used its “make-whole” redemption privilege. Generally, a corporate bond is always callable at a price calculated using a very low spread to government yields (i.e. ~50 bps). We did the math and concluded it would be economically advantageous for the issuer to *make-whole* the bonds. By leaving these bonds outstanding the firm would continue to incur the very large, off-market 13.375% interest cost while only earning a small amount of interest on its invested cash. On June 27<sup>th</sup>, the make-whole privilege was used but instead of waiting for the cash we sold the bonds in the market as the go forward return was below our threshold. We netted an 11.2% IRR.

### *Dana Unsecured Bonds*

We have had positions across the entire Dana debt structure since they announced their intention to divest their off-highway truck business in 2024. We started buying the 2027s and 2028s under the assumption they would receive Par following a successful asset sale. We were uncomfortable going out longer into the 2030s and 2032s because we were unsure about the ultimate net proceeds from the asset sale. However, during the month it became clear that the asset sale would generate enough proceeds to essentially pay off all the debt at Dana. We have rotated out of the 2027s and 2028s and into the 2030s and 2032s under the assumption that both bonds will receive what is called a Par Asset Sale Offer. Appendix II highlights how we trade Asset Sale Offers using Dana as an example.

### Liquidity Provision (~11%)

If credit spreads continue to tighten you can expect the Fund to hold more cash going forward.

### Special Situations: Stressed Credit/Positive Convexity (~15%, 8 positions)

We are generally not looking to add more stressed credit exposure to the Fund. Credit deterioration is picking up with negative events occurring in *larger capital structures* now such as DISH, Warner Brothers, New Fortress Energy, Altice, Hertz, Michaels, Saks, Ardagh. Also, Private credit default rates are quickly approaching 5%.

### Risk Overlay (-8%)

Our Risk Overlay continues to be our main source of negative return attribution YTD. Our short positions in individual securities, in addition to our market hedges in liquid indices, have been the drag on returns this year as we attempt to limit the market risk of the Fund and protect investor capital.

### Summary

Corporate credit markets worked themselves up into a foamy lather in the latter part of June. On the supply side, Corporations of all shapes and sizes raced to take advantage of a wide-open primary market to issue new bonds. On the demand side, capital continues to flow into corporate credit on account of high absolute yields. Additionally, many investors who benchmark to indices have been caught underweight lower quality credit in H1. This has led to a mid-year chase for performance. Lower quality bonds such as Kohls 10% 30, Sizzling Platter 9.5% 32, and American Bath 9.75% 30 have appreciated 2-4 points after issuance as predominately long-only benchmark investors bid up risk to rebalance their portfolios. Of note were the 10% Unsecured PIK Toggle Notes issued by Sketchers, as part of an LBO, that went extremely well. We do not own any of these newly issued bonds because we worry, they will be the first things sold down when and if, the market turns. When the same buyers bidding up bond prices then turn into sellers there is usually a gap down in prices. A warning sign for us of how quickly a lower quality bond can decline in value from new issuance is the Saks SAGLEN 11% secured bonds which were issued at in December but are now shipwrecked at 38 cents. (see Appendix III)

## **Appendix I – Industry Return Attribution**

| <u>Positive Return Attribution: Top 25 Industries (no particular order)</u> | <u>Negative Return Attribution: Top 10 Industries (no particular order)</u> | <u>Industries where we have had limited or zero exposure:</u> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Theatres                                                                    | Beverages                                                                   | US Healthcare                                                 |
| Building Products Distribution                                              | Insurance Brokers                                                           | Homebuilding                                                  |
| Real Estate                                                                 | Theme Parks                                                                 | Media/Entertainment                                           |
| Restaurants                                                                 | Casinos                                                                     | Wireline                                                      |
| Software                                                                    | Perfume and Cosmetics                                                       | Pharma                                                        |
| Banks, Specialty Finance, Leasing                                           | Quarrying                                                                   | Satellites                                                    |
| Electricity Production                                                      | Electric Utility Machinery                                                  | Department Stores                                             |
| Coal Mining                                                                 | US Regional Banks                                                           | Technology                                                    |
| Water Utilities                                                             | Medium/Heavy-Duty Truck Manufacturing                                       | Supermarkets                                                  |
| Specialty Insurance, P&C Insurance                                          | Hotels                                                                      | Food Distribution                                             |
| Pipelines                                                                   |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Funeral Homes                                                               |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Retail Convenience Stores                                                   |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Tobacco/Rolling Papers                                                      |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Apparel Manufacturing                                                       |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Manufactured Housing                                                        |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Investment Management                                                       |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Airlines                                                                    |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Aerospace/Defense Equipment                                                 |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Energy and Energy Services                                                  |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Auto Parts                                                                  |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Rubber Tire Manufacturing                                                   |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Vitamins and Nutritional Products                                           |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Paper Consumer Products                                                     |                                                                             |                                                               |
| Retail Apparel – Shoes                                                      |                                                                             |                                                               |

## **Appendix II – Asset Sale Offers**

A common event-driven trade in the Fund is investing in bonds from Companies that are in various stages of selling a material asset. These trades are similar to trading Change of Control transactions which we highlighted using Beacon Roofing bonds as an example in our prior commentary. Normally when a high yield company sells a material asset, it is required to run the net cash proceeds received through what is called an *Asset Sale Waterfall*. This bond indenture covenant usually stipulates that the Corporation has x days to either reinvest the asset sale proceeds in the business and/or permanently retire any secured debt. Then the Company is required to take the residual cash proceeds and offer unsecured bond holders Par. If the bonds subject to an asset sale offer are trading below Par, one can accumulate a position and possibly make a capital again.

### **1. Identify Possible Asset Sale**

On November 25, 2025, Dana issued a press release stating the following:

*Dana today also announced it has engaged financial advisors Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC to sell its Off-Highway business, which the Board believes will unlock substantial value for shareholders... Proceeds from a potential sale will enable Dana to strengthen its balance sheet through substantially reduced leverage, and to return capital to shareholders. While the Company and its advisors believe there is strong interest in the Off-Highway business, there can be no assurance that the sale process for Off-Highway will result in a transaction. There is no timeframe for the conclusion of the process, and the Company does not intend to comment further regarding this matter unless and until further disclosure is determined to be appropriate.*

Further colour was provided at an Investment Dealer Conference on December 4<sup>th</sup> which increased our conviction.

### **2. Conduct a Legal Analysis of the Bond Indenture**

#### **SECTION 4.05. Limitation on Asset Sales**

(3) upon the consummation of an Asset Sale, the Company shall apply, or cause such Restricted Subsidiary to apply, the Net Cash Proceeds relating to such Asset Sale within 365 days after receipt thereof either (A) to prepay any secured Indebtedness of the Company or a Restricted Subsidiary and, in the case of any such Indebtedness under any revolving credit facility, effect a permanent reduction in the availability under such revolving credit facility (or effect a permanent reduction in availability under such revolving credit facility, regardless of the fact that no prepayment is required), (B) to permanently reduce Obligations under the Notes, (C) to permanently reduce Obligations

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under any unsecured Indebtedness of the Company or any Restricted Subsidiary so long as Obligations under the Notes are reduced equally and ratably, (D) to permanently reduce Obligations under Indebtedness of a Restricted Subsidiary that is not a Subsidiary Guarantor, (E) to acquire Replacement Assets or (F) a combination of prepayment and investment permitted by the foregoing clauses (3)(A), (B), (C), (D) and (E);

Dana has 365 days to use any asset sale proceeds to permanently reduce its revolving credit facility and/or reinvest in the business otherwise it needs to offer unsecured bondholders 100 on a pari-passu basis.

### **3. Estimate net proceeds from the asset sale and the expected timing**

On June 11<sup>th</sup>, Dana issued a press release announcing the sale of its off-highway division to Allison Transmission:

*The transaction, which is subject to customary regulatory approvals and closing conditions, is projected to close late in the fourth quarter of 2025. ....Following the successful close of the transaction, Dana expects to generate \$2.4 billion of net cash proceeds after tax, other transaction expenses, and assumed liabilities. Dana plans to repay approximately \$2 billion of debt to achieve target net leverage of approximately 1x over the business cycle.*

### **4. Run the asset waterfall to calculate the quantum of the Par Offer and calculate the potential IRR**

We believe under a complicated set of assumptions on how the proceeds will be used, there will be sufficient proceeds to be able to offer 2030/2032 bondholders par. We accumulated positions in the 2030 and 2032 bonds at between ~97.25 and ~98.25 under the assumption that we will receive Par in January 2026. If we are correct in our analysis, the IRR on the investment could be between 7.50%-9.50% with the downside being a muted low single digit positive return.

## Appendix III - Case Study: Saks Global SAGLEN 11% 12/29

1. Bond issued @ Par on December 10, 2024. 100s of Investors look at the new issue and more than +150 participate. The new issue was 2x oversubscribed and the Company upsized the bond by \$200mm on account of excess demand.
2. The Bond traded at or above Par on heavy volume for several days following the issuance but closed the year down 4 pts at 96. For most of January and February, the bond drifted from 96 to under 92 cents.
3. On February 15<sup>th</sup> Saks communicated a new payment scheme to its Vendors saying they will be paid in 90 days on new orders from receipt of inventory compared to the previous practice of paying “net 30” and that all past due invoices would be paid in 12 installments beginning in July 2025. **This sparked outrage amongst some Vendors supplying goods to the Department Store operator.**
4. Chatter began to circulate in April and May that Saks’ was running out of liquidity and needed new capital. Some Vendors stopped shipping goods, leaving Saks with less merchandise to sell, and putting at risk the very first coupon payment on the bonds which was due June 30. A bond not paying its first coupon payment is very rare. The last time we have seen this is when the American Eagle Energy AMZG 11% 2019 missed its first coupon payment in March 2015.
5. In late June, Saks raised \$600mm of new capital from a group of existing bondholders with reports that those bondholders who did not participate in the new financing will now get an offer to swap their bonds into new bonds at a discount to Par. Alas, the June 30<sup>th</sup> coupon was made.
6. The existing bonds are now quoted at 38 cents a 62% loss of principal in only 6 months.

The case study highlights three valuable lessons trading credit: a) how quickly things can change with a highly levered company, especially in retail, b) one cannot rely on the “comfort of the crowd” when participating in primary issuance, and, c) no amount of coupon can compensate you enough for potential loss of principal when a company is distressed.





**May 2025**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.7% on the Class F Units during the month of May. The Fund's compound annual return net of fees since inception is 13.6%. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 84%/104% versus 89%/115% at the end of April. We have ~38 core positions in the portfolio with a 58%/42% split between Canada/US. The Fund executed \$95mm/164 trades across an average AUM of ~\$169mm.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr   | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7%  | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8%  | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |
| 2025 | 0.7% | 0.3% | 0.1% | -0.9% | 1.7%  |      |      |      |      |       |      |      | 1.9%  |

### **Core Fundamental Carry (~47% of NAV, 15 positions)**

*Foot Locker {\$400mm FL 4% 10/2029 Senior Unsecured Bonds}*

The FL bonds we acquired last month benefited from what we call a “Blue Bird”. A Blue Bird is a culturally significant symbol representing good fortune, but in the context of investing it refers to a lucrative, unexpected opportunity that lands on your doorstep without much effort. On May 15, Dick's Sport Goods (“DKS”) announced an all-cash acquisition of FL. DKS is an IG credit, trading materially tighter than FL. Following the announcement, our position traded up to \$95.25, under the assumption that FL's bonds would be exchanged into the higher quality DKS obligor. *To be clear, our original thesis did not contemplate this event...we got lucky... but as we describe in Appendix I – good things tend happen to really low dollar price bonds.* We sold our entire position the day of the news, taking advantage of what we viewed as a mild short squeeze. The **~4% weighted position netted the Fund 62 bps of gross return**, our first Blue Bird of 2025.

### **Event-Driven (~32%, 13 positions)**

*H&E Equipment Services {HEES 3.875% 12/28 Senior Unsecured Bonds}*

Recall from February 2025, the Fund had a position in these bonds alongside a small, short position in the equity. That pairing caused us to crystallize losses, as we mistakenly did not anticipate an “overbid” by Herc Rentals. We re-entered the bonds in late-April/early-May just before the expiration of the waiting period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Act (a key “gating” item for M&A transactions). We anticipated no anti-trust issues given the fragmented nature of the equipment rental business, so we looked at this situation as a short-term trade to “absorb” the event risk premium, similar to our Boeing trade last year. We acquired the bonds at an average price of \$99.75 and sold them 2.5 weeks later at a price of \$100.77, clipping a 1.18% simple return.

*Nationstar Mortgage Holdings {COOP 5.75% 11/31 Senior Unsecured Bonds}*

We exited these bonds after the forward return profile *drifted below our minimum return threshold*. The Company is subject to a takeover by Rocket Mortgage, and these bonds will likely need to be called on an anticipated Q4 closing. The position netted us a 1.84% return, or 15.7% IRR over a 1.5-month holding period.

### **Liquidity Provision (~16%)**

We were able to pick up a handful of ~30-day hard called bonds to boost the return on our cash during the month.

## Special Situations: Stressed Credit/Positive Convexity (~13%, 10 positions)

### *Brookfield Office Properties Preferred Shares*

The Fund has held a healthy position in the BPO preferred share complex since inception. Our original thesis was as follows:

- BPO is supported not just by office assets but the near entirety of Brookfield Property Partners (“BPY”) real estate assets
- BPY finances itself largely on an asset-by-asset, non-recourse basis, meaning that it can withstand a prolonged real estate recession by defaulting on individual properties without impacting corporate level debt
- The go-forward return profile on the prefs was arguably better than much of BPO’s actual assets, meaning BPY was motivated to buy the prefs in the market rather than reinvest capital in the business
- Should BPO turn off the dividend, they “cumulate”, and eventually pref holders would get board seats
- The market was pricing in an overly draconian view of the office market on account of WFH
- The preferred shares were a small, immaterial part of their overall capital structure

We made the decision to exit the position and redeploy the capital, largely due to price and go forward return potential. Our BPO exposure generated ~250 bps of gross return for the Fund since inception, mainly across long positions in Series N/P/R/X. We would gladly re-enter the position at lower prices in the future.

### *Comcast Corporation {CMCSA 2.65% 08/62 Senior Unsecured Bonds}*

We acquired a new position in the deeply discounted unsecured long bonds of Comcast. Recall we have been trading in and out of a “Blue Chip” long duration, low dollar price IG bond basket all year, albeit a very small weight in the Fund. We entered the month flat but recently accumulated a new position in what **we believe is the lowest dollar price benchmark investment-grade corporate bond in North American at ~50 cents**. The vast majority of our portfolio is composed of shorter-duration assets. However, the recent move in global bond yields, especially in the long-end, has made extremely low dollar price ‘A’-rated investment grade bonds look attractive to us, relative to, say the ‘BB’ high yield sector, which is currently yielding only 6.8% in USD (and even less than that in CAD). Extremely low dollar price, long duration investment grade corporate bonds have some *seductive actuarial properties* and *asymmetric upside*, as we reiterate in Appendix I.

## Risk Overlay (-9%)

We continue to roll our near costless covered call plus put spread strategy. We are selling away our upside from high yield bonds rallying beyond a certain threshold (i.e. 7.17% or ~319 bps credit spread) while protecting a *portion* of the portfolio from an increase in yields of over 100 bps to the 8.0%-8.40% range.

## Summary

The Fund has recouped all the mark-to-market losses incurred in April. We also crystallized some gains by flipping out of risk we accumulated mid-April – positions we topped up at lower prices during that period. Our Foot Locker and Comcast trades highlight how we layer in the concept of *positive convexity* in our portfolio construction process. On its own, corporate bond investing and event-driven investing is actuarial in nature, as we can often calculate the return we will achieve if we are correct – *what you see is what you get*. However, what is hard to anticipate is when so called “blue birds” occur. Positive convexity arises from: a) bonds bought at a significant discount to par, like our FL position, b) balanced convertibles, like our Cineplex position or, c) Short positions in companies we believe are going bankrupt. It is these highly convex trades, when properly sized in the Fund, that are required to achieve double digit returns in corporate credit. We cannot anticipate when they will come, but so far there has been a shortage of them this year. Nevertheless, we are hopeful a few more blue birds will land in our lap before year-end.

## **Appendix I – Low Dollar Price Bonds**

### **1. Higher Recovery, Lower Loss Given Default**

A bond has a Par claim against a Company in a restructuring event. Low dollar price bonds can end up with higher recovery values as a percentage of original invested capital should the Company restructure by virtue of them being purchased below the Par claim value.

### **2. Positive Convexity**

Mathematically, the very basic convex price-yield relationship that exists in fixed income is in your favour. If a bond is trading at a discount to Par, the bond's price will increase by more when market yields fall, than it will decrease when market yields rise by the same amount. The upside potential is higher than the downside risk from a change in prevailing market yields.

### **3. Bond Tenders and Open Market Purchases**

Should a Company decide to reduce its bond debt, and it does not have available callable debt in its structure, then it will often do a Priority Bond Tender or simply purchase bonds in the open market. Corporations will often target the lowest dollar price bond in the capital structure as it gives them the best “bang for the buck” in using a fixed amount of cash for deleveraging. Bond tenders and open market purchase can lead to capital gains.

### **4. Historical Performance and Lower Price Volatility**

Historical data going back decades shows that lower dollar price bonds outperform higher dollar price bonds in periods of stress in the corporate credit markets. This concept is interrelated to other properties of lower dollar priced bonds but is particularly related to Point 1, especially as prices hit what is called the “Recovery Floor”.

### **5. Preferential Tax Treatment**

Bonds at a discount to par have a higher *after-tax* return as a portion of their returns are treated as capital gains, while the coupon is taxed as income. Many bond investors ignore this difference because they are not compensated on after-tax returns, or they manage assets on behalf of non-taxable investors such as endowments or pension plans. This lack of care for after-tax returns creates an opportunity to earn excess return for fully taxable investors.

### **6. Mergers and Acquisitions**

When a corporation is subject to a take-over offer, the closing of the transaction can often require the Successor entity to offer to redeem bondholders at a price of 101 as part of common Change of Control clause within the bond indenture. To the extent a bond is trading below 101, the holder can benefit from a capital gain.

### **7. Asset Sale**

Often when a Company sells a material asset or subsidiary it is required to offer to retire their bonds with the cash proceeds at 100 within say 270 and 450 days. Any bonds trading below par then can benefit from a capital gain.

### **Summary**

There are many ways to benefit from holding corporate bonds that have a market value below their Par Notional. We often see situations where a corporation could be subject to a corporate event and the “optionality” or convexity is mispriced, meaning a permutation of points 1 thru 7 above can be acquired for a very low cost. While not a big part of the Fund, we remain intrigued by a very small subset of the longer tenor USD investment grade bond market trading near 50 cents on the dollar simply because of the stark move higher in underlying Government interest rates.



**April 2025**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of (0.87%) on the Class F Units during the month of April. The Fund's compound annual return net of fees since inception is 13.5%. Our net/gross exposure at month-end was 89%/115% versus 86%/105% at the end of March. We have ~32 core positions in the portfolio with a 56%/44% split between Canada/US. The Fund executed \$115mm/173 trades across an average AUM of ~\$158mm.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr   | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7%  | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8%  | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |
| 2025 | 0.7% | 0.3% | 0.1% | -0.9% |       |      |      |      |      |       |      |      | 0.2%  |

### **Core Fundamental Carry (~47% of NAV, 14 positions)**

*Foot Locker {\$400mm FL 4% 10/2029 Senior Unsecured Bonds}*

We added a new position when the lone \$400mm unsecured bond from Foot Locker ("FL") dropped ~7 pts after Tariff Liberation Day. While FL is a challenged business on multiple fronts, including tariff policy, it has a reasonable balance sheet and decent financial flexibility. This led us to conclude the bonds were mispriced at ~80 cents to yield ~9.7%. Specifically, FL has:

- More cash than debt on its balance sheet and has consistently been free cash flow positive throughout its history
- \$600mm undrawn revolver availability
- +\$700mm of non-cash net working capital which could get marked up if tariffs raise overall prices
- No debt maturities until 2029 with only \$16mm of interest expense emanating from this bond
- Equity market capitalization is ~3x the size of the bond tranche
- Conservative real estate lease maturity structure with leases rolling off steadily over ~5 years
- Strong experienced management team. FL has been around for +50 years.

There is an old saying in corporate credit investing about the Retail Sector..."*retail...not now, not then, not ever*". The Fund has generally operated with zero net exposure to Retail for most of its existence having witnessed a long list of retailers spontaneously combust over the years. However, we felt the risk/reward in these bonds attractive in this specific situation.

### **Event-Driven (~37%, 11 positions)**

*Five Point Operating Companies {\$523mm FPH 10.50% Unsecured Bonds}*

We purchased these bonds during the month's selloff. FPH is one of the largest owners and developers of mixed used communities in coastal California. They own a large portfolio of land in LA Country, San Francisco County and Orange County. Their core business is to use their attractive land position to partner with homebuilders on the development of residential communities. Most importantly, FPH has more cash than debt and own \$2.3 billion of real estate inventory, putting them in a position to refinance early.

## Liquidity Provision (~11%)

The Fund continues to maintain high cash balances given the uncertainty around general credit conditions.

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~14%, 7 positions)

*Longridge Energy {\$600mm LONRID 8.75% 02/32 1<sup>st</sup> Lien Senior Secured Bonds}*

LONRID is non-recourse wholly owned subsidiary of the public company, Fortress Infrastructure Partners ("FIP"). The Company holds only one material asset being a brand-new 485 MW power plant located in Ohio that sells into the PJM electricity grid. The new plant is one of the most efficient natural gas plants in the United States. The bonds have a 1<sup>st</sup> lien over the plant and the pari-passu Term Loan has forced debt amortization via an Excess Cash Flow sweep. The covenant also prevents material capital from being "up-streamed" from LONRID to the Holding Company, which we ultimately think will strain FIP's ability to service its own debt. We shorted a small amount of common stock in FIP to capture the relative value between the two securities. LONRID is fully levered with limited equity value at the outset of the financing but the bonds yields +10% with significant downside protection from contractual cash flows. The risk/return profile is better than many power producer common equities that struggle to achieve +10% returns and have significant downside.

## Risk Overlay (-9%)

We took the opportunity to add what we think is a decent asymmetric hedge to protect the portfolio from a tail event in 2025. The very first batch of Canadian Bank LRCN debt is set to reset this Fall. The debt was issued 5 years ago and, depending on the Bank, their coupons reset at 5-year Government bond yield plus a spread of ~400 bps. They are interesting instruments because depending on whether the current reset spread in the market is above OR below the reset spread on the instrument, they could be priced as a very short 6 months piece of paper that will be called by the Bank at Par OR they could be priced as a 55-year instrument that matures in 2080. This creates a massive amount of negative convexity for the holder. As we know from option theory, an option is very volatile as the spot asset price hovers around the strike price and gets more volatile as you approach the expiry date of the option. This is the situation these 2080 LRCNs find themselves in and the binary risk profile of the instrument only grows as we get closer to the reset date. You can short the suite of bonds at ~99.5 and pay around 125 bps of negative carry versus the risk-free rate over the next 6 months for a total cost of ~1.75%. If new issue reset spreads widen to say 475 bps during the reset period, the securities could have a significant capital loss if they are not called. Perhaps as much as 10 bond points leading to an "up-down" 6:1 asymmetric payoff profile. In summary, we think the market is mispricing the optionality and ignoring the asymmetric downside in these securities leading us to be able to buy tail-risk very cheaply.

As a reminder, the goal of our Risk Overlay is to scour the market for cheap asymmetric downside protection.

## Summary

The month was a disappointing one for the Fund, our second material monthly drawdown in the Funds first 28 months. Most of the negative performance is mark-to-market on our larger positions but we did crystalize some losses on positions we felt uncomfortable holding given the new credit environment post Liberation Day. New information and data means new probabilities and thus new prices. While we started to add risk mid-month, the "snap back" rally at month end pushed us to the sidelines on continuing to en bloc add. We are cautious because we don't think the ramifications of the trade policy has yet to filter through to the broader economy and corporate cash flows.

This month's turbulence has changed how credit analysis should be prioritized going forward. Near-term liquidity and debt maturity structure now figures more prominently in our credit analysis versus simple metrics such as leverage. Bonds from corporations who have no near-term financing needs, plenty of liquidity and extra debt capacity will likely perform better than those with near term financing needs despite perhaps equal too or even lower leverage. We now have 5 positions and over 10% of NAV in bonds yielding a significant risk premium where the obligor has more cash than debt.



**March 2025**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 0.13% on the Class F Units during the month of March. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 86%/105% versus 86%/119% at the end of February. We have ~38 core positions in the portfolio with a 64%/36% split between Canada/US.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |
| 2025 | 0.7% | 0.3% | 0.1% |      |       |      |      |      |      |       |      |      | 1.1%  |

We were active during the month with \$208mm of trading volume across 249 trades and an average AUM of ~\$150mm

#### **Core Corporate Carry (~47% of NAV, 14 positions)**

##### *Cable One {CABO 1.125% 03/28 Unsecured Busted Convertibles}*

We are back involved in CABO bonds after a several month hiatus. We have been in and out of these bonds several times over the last few years and the complex has been a decent contributor to returns. While by no means apples-to-apples, we bought these bonds with a yield of 9.75%, the majority of which is capital gain. This is almost 3x the yield compared to low coupon 2028 Canadian Cable/Telco bonds. Canadian Cable/Telco credits have similar leverage levels as Cable One but are still investment grade despite deteriorating credit fundamentals. BCE and Telus also both have negative FCF after common dividends are paid versus positive FCF at Cable One and RCI is now 5x levered. All three Canadian companies are selling assets and raising subordinated capital/structured equity to avoid being downgraded to Junk. Our bonds are also 20 points lower in dollar price, meaning much higher positive convexity, and we think the Company is committed to deleveraging.

##### *General Positioning*

The risk in our Core Corporate Carry portfolio was significantly reduced in the first couple months of the year on account of tight credit spreads and compressed yields. We have now fully built back up the portfolio mainly by adding to existing names at lower prices. For the first time in several quarters, we have found decent value in parts of the credit market and continue to sift through the rubble left behind by March's volatility.

#### **Event-Driven (~26%, 13 positions)**

##### *Beacon Roofing {BECN 4.125% 05/29 Unsecured}*

Our thesis around Beacon Roofing played out exactly as we anticipated, as the Company agreed to a friendly takeover by QXO at a very modest 10 cent "bump" to the purchase price. As a result, the bonds we had owned at an average price of ~97 since January will be taken out shortly at a price of 101. However, the go forward IRR of holding the bonds to final redemption was too low, so we sold them at a price of 100.625 right after the deal went "definitive". We outlined the probabilistic way we look at event-driven credit with Beacon as an example in the January Newsletter. We further expand on how we trade event-driven situations by again using Beacon Roofing as an example in Appendix I. **The position generated 19 bps gross return and 33% IRR for the Fund and had been one of the largest weights in the portfolio this year at 5%.**

### Liquidity Provision (~14%)

We continue to hold ample liquidity in the Fund having build up as much as 25% cash at the beginning of March. We deployed a decent amount of capital during the month.

### Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~16%, 11 positions)

We remain relatively quiet in this part of the portfolio. A brisk stream of distressed/stressed situations is occurring now with increased regularity. This has not necessarily manifested itself into index data because, for the most part, distressed situations have often been smaller one-off idiosyncratic opportunities. However, we believe there has been a material shift in sentiment this month as we are seeing larger, crowded, more liquid debt complexes experience distress. Topical names in the US market during the month are Hertz, Staples, Saks, New Fortress Energy, Community Health. In the case of Hertz, the capital structure experienced a rapid decline in price over a very short period, often referred to as a “plotz” in bond trading circles. Loose documentation and “Game of Thrones” style liability management exercises are impacting the market’s recovery analysis, which in turn means investors need a higher credit spread for compensation.

*Chegg {CHGG 0% 09/26 Busted Senior Unsecured Convertible}*

CHGG is an online educational platform that offers online homework help via a subscription. The Company’s enterprise value got as high as \$12 billion during the Covid period because many students were forced to school from home. However, the business model has now been heavily disrupted by ChatGPT and other AI platforms that can “help” students with their homework. The EV of CHGG is now under \$100mm. However, despite a rapidly declining business, CHGG has had more cash on its balance sheet than debt recently. We follow every company in North America that has more cash than debt in its capital structure. This screen often reveals possible trade ideas. We assessed the situation and accumulated a position in the 2026 bonds at 82 cents or a ~13% yield to maturity. However, we knew that the Company wanted to reduce debt at a discount using its cash, having done several open market bond repurchases over the last year. We called up the Company’s advisors and sold our bonds back to CHGG at 88 cents. **The Fund pocketed a 23-bps return and a 20.6% IRR on the trade.**

### Risk Overlay (-4%)


#### Summary

Corporate credit held in very well over the course February, and early March in the face of a significant drawdown in the equity markets. However, mid-month the credit markets finally “re-priced”. On March 13, we saw a significant sentiment shift in corporate credit that was long overdue, given how much we lagged the equity correction. The day started early in the morning with dealers liquidating inventory. The selling accelerated late-morning, and what drove the downward price action in high yield was an unseemly amount of put option buying in HYG, such that the open interest in puts exploded to the highest level ever. As puts get bought for portfolio insurance, the underlying ETF needs to be shorted or sold. This, in turn, causes the HYG ETF to start to trade below its intraday “snapshot” NAV. This then triggers index arbitrageurs and market makers to come in and buy the ETF and sell the underlying cash bonds into the market to collapse the spread. The forced selling of cash bonds into a downward trending thin tape creates “down prints” in less liquid, often lower quality bonds. Once down prints filter through the risk management function, shoulders are tapped, which triggers more forced selling. There are many multi-manager or “pod” hedge funds who use large amounts of leverage AND have low tolerance for mark-to-market losses, so they use stop losses as part of their risk management process. This created the downward spiral in prices for the last two weeks of March.

Our risk overlay, short positions in companies with stressed balance sheets and large cash balance, helped the Fund neutralize some of the market risk during this mid-month sell off and avoid a negative return while generic high yield was down over 1%. **We are better positioned to deploy capital going forward into what appears to be a rapidly growing opportunity set, one of the best we have seen since early-2023.**

## Appendix I – Beacon Roofing BECN 4.125% 05/29 Unsecured Bonds

### Evolution of Event-Driven Trades



| Phase | Generic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Beacon Roofing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| I     | Bonds trade almost purely based on its fundamental credit quality and are correlated to overall credit markets and company specific fundamental. A Corporate Event is generally not priced into the security.                                                                                                                                                                              | <i>We never had a fundamental view on Beacon Roofing nor followed the Company because there was no Corporate Event. While the Company is a solid credit in a generally high-quality industry, Roofing Building products distribution, there was never a reason to own the bonds in the Fund on a fundamental basis.</i>                                                                                                    |
| II    | News is leaked to the press or trade journals about a possible corporate event which causes an initial <i>short squeeze</i> . Once the short squeeze subsides then you have what's called a fade or drift back to where speculators (not arbitrageurs) start to get long speculating on a take-over. Long-only fundamental investors not interesting in the event-risk sell into the bids. | <p>11/18/24 <b>Building-Products Distributor QXO Makes Bid for Beacon Roofing</b><br/>The Wall Street Journal</p> <p><i>Initial leak to the Wall Street Journal stated that “a deal could be clinched before the end of the year” but “talks could fall apart.”</i></p>                                                                                                                                                    |
| III   | A hard event is finally disclosed publicly but the corporate event is not “definitive”. This “non-definitive” nature of the event keeps levered risk arbitrageurs on the sidelines leading to opportunity for unlevered event-driven investors like us to acquire positions.                                                                                                               | <p>01/15/25 <b>Beacon Roofing Supply Stock Rises as QXO Proposes \$11 Billion Cash Takeover</b><br/>Barron's</p> <p><i>BECN discloses that it received a formal unsolicited \$124.25 all-cash bid from QXO. The Board evaluated the bid and rejected it.</i></p>                                                                                                                                                           |
| IV    | The credit event becomes more definitive, and the bond now attracts pure risk arbitrageurs who made not have been following the situation but whose sole mandate is to simply buy “definitive” transactions. Usually, in this phase buyers use large amount of leverage and purchase the bonds with a low gross spread and expected IRR but get their return through using leverage.       | <p>03/19/25 <b>Building-Products Distributor QXO Clinches Deal for Beacon Roofing</b><br/>The Wall Street Journal</p> <p><i>BECN and QXO sign a definitive merger agreement which QXO will acquire BECN for \$124.35 per share. The closing of the merger will trigger a Change of Control in the bond indenture which will require the merged entity to offer 101 to bondholders shortly after the merger closes.</i></p> |

### Summary

Our generic approach to event-driven credit is to initiate a position AFTER a hard event has been announced, but before it becomes more definitive, and then exit once the Event becomes 100% definitive. Our thesis is that the best risk-adjusted returns occur during this Phase III, where we can earn high single-digit returns without using leverage while also minimizing downside risk. While waiting for the Definitive Phase means a higher likelihood of being correct on the event, leverage is often needed to boost returns but also the asymmetry of the trade gets more heavily skewed to the downside. Finally, entering a trade purely based on speculation where the event is often 50%/50% binary payoff profile while it can lead to a higher expected return, the variance in outcomes is far greater.



**February 2025**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 0.28% on the Class F Units during the month of February. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 86%/119% versus 77%/107% at the end of 1January. We have ~35 core positions in the portfolio with a 69%/31% split between Canada/US.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |
| 2025 | 0.7% | 0.3% |      |      |       |      |      |      |      |       |      |      | 1.0%  |

We have been very active repositioning the portfolio this year to prepare for what appears to be a negative sentiment shift regarding the economy and broader financial conditions. Credit markets remain volatile, but very liquid. We completed 466 discrete trades and close to \$427mm of aggregate notional trading so far in 2025. We have turned over the average capital base of the portfolio **3.4 times** in the last two months and think we are now better prepared to add risk at lower prices to boost go forward returns.

### **Core Corporate Carry (~41% of NAV or ~22% Net of Risk Overlay, 12 positions)**

*Genworth Holdings Inc. {GNW Floating Rate Junior Subordinated Notes due 2036}*

We now have a full weight in the subject bonds. GNW is an insurance holding company with three distinct assets. The bonds carry at 7.9% and have a fixed-equivalent yield of 8.84%. See Appendix I for further details.

*Dye and Durham {DNDCN 6.50% 28 Senior Unsecured Busted Convertible Bonds}*

We have been rotating around the capital structure of DND since mid-2023. We started with a large position in the 2026 Busted Convertibles that we began accumulating in the 70s. We trimmed that position and rotated into the senior secured bonds in 2024. Recently, we exited the secured bonds in favour of a healthy long position in the legacy 2028 Busted Convertibles. We now believe these bonds are the most attractive risk-adjusted security in the Company's capital structure, and we have been buying the bonds as low as 91 cents. The bond benefits from being the next maturity in the debt structure and is trading at a discount to par which means we could benefit from a Change of Control or Asset Sale. It is also the highest yielding bond in the stack. We believe, given the cash flow profile and relatively small size of the issue, the Company will have sufficient secured debt capacity at maturity to refinance the bond on a secured basis. Appendix II highlights a type of capital structure relative value trading strategy we employ in the Fund.

### **Event-Driven (~29%, 14 positions)**

*Getty Images {ABEGT 9.75% 2027 Unsecured Bonds}*

Getty is a visual media company and supplier of stock images, editorial photography, video, and music for business and consumers, with a library of over 477 million assets. We have had a longstanding position in the \$300mm unsecured bonds as they fit many of our criteria. Specifically, this credit is a small, non-index tranche in a niche industry we believe to be misunderstood. When Getty announced a merger with Shutterstock, we added to the position as the proforma Company would generate a material uptick in the credit profile. Additionally, as part of the Merger Agreement, these bonds will need to be refinanced as a condition to closing the merger. We would collect a 9.75% coupon and then receive Par on closing. However, we quickly exited the longstanding position above Par after the Company refinanced its 1<sup>st</sup> Lien Term Loan. As part of the First Lien Term Loan Credit documentation, the Company did not retain its ability to issue additional secured debt to refinance the subject bonds meaning they have become riskier proforma the refinancing. The situation now

depends on the Getty/Shutterstock deal closing because if it doesn't then it may prove difficult to refinance these bonds with like unsecured debt. We are happy to get back involved once the key event risk of the merger closing occurs but otherwise the credit is deteriorating on a standalone basis. The bond earned us an IRR of 10% and 39 bps of return.

#### *H&E Equipment Services {HEES}*

We made a mistake in this risk arbitrage situation by misjudging the probability of an "over-bid". HEES agreed to a friendly takeover at a massive premium by United Rental Service ("URI") which is generally known as the largest and best buyer of equipment rental assets. We acquired a position in the HEES Unsecured bonds under the thesis they would receive 101 on closing and then shorted a very small amount of HEES common stock to hedge the downside of a deal break. Out of the blue, and as a surprise to even URI, HERC Rentals "over-bid" and URI walked away. As a result, the stock traded up to the new bid price. We unwound the position quickly and crystallized a 3.6 bps loss for the Fund. This experience demonstrates the importance of being mindful of the probability of an overbid, even when at the surface it appears improbable.

#### *B Riley {RILY 6.375% 02/28/25 Senior Unsecured Bonds}*

Our position in the subject bonds was refinanced out during the month leading to an 11.3% IRR.

#### *Cenovus {CVE.PR.E Fixed Rate Reset Preferred Shares}*

Our 5% position in the security was redeemed as expected at \$25 leading to an 13.3% IRR and 21 bps of return.

### **Liquidity Provision (~17%)**

We continue to hold ample liquidity in the Fund and have build up additional cash so far during the month of March as several event-driven positions have run-off, or are set to run-off, later this month.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~18%, 11 positions)**

We added three new positions during the month, all of which are being underwritten to double digit return profiles. One is a near term busted convertible, another is a 1<sup>st</sup> lien bond tied to a high-quality power asset and the 3<sup>rd</sup> is a preferred share with a ~10% cash yield. These are the first material additions to this sub-strategy in months.

### **Risk Overlay (-19%)**

We continue with our program of using near costless collar option structures. This month we executed a near costless put spread collar on HYG to limit the market risk in our Core Corporate Carry portfolio. Hedging market risk remains a drag on returns, but we want to continue to have some downside protection given valuation levels in the on-the-run credit markets.

### **Summary**

Corporate credit largely avoided the sell-off in risk assets in February, mainly due to the rally in underlying interest rates and lack of new issue supply. The YTD total return on many corporate credit asset classes is almost entirely attributable to underlying interest rates NOT the tightening of credit spreads. In fact, during February USD High Yield credit spreads actually widened ~20 bps. Our modest underperformance YTD relative to liquid indices can be attributed to our lower duration, high cash balance and some modest negative attribution associated with a couple of idiosyncratic positions. So far during the month of March, our conservatism has paid off as the Fund is flat while many risk assets have experienced material drawdowns. Inflows into the asset class remain strong so it remains to be seen whether corporate credit eventually experiences the "de-risking" and volatility that has inflicted the broader equity markets. Market conditions remain conducive to credit outperforming equities on a relative basis. We see the potential to rebuild our Core Carry portfolio at higher go-forward returns and could see a shift back in focus from our Event-driven sleeve.

## Appendix I – Capital Structure Relative Value Trading

A common strategy or theme within the Fund is the trading of various parts of a Company's capital structure as we have done with Dye & Durham, NorthWest Health Care, Brookfield, Cineplex and other positions. When looking at each security within a Company's capital structure we can generally say we have three discrete choices to invest:

- a) Long
- b) Flat or Do Nothing
- c) Short

A Company with only two layers in its capital structure, typically common equity and debt, would then have " $3 \times 3 = 9$ " possible permutations of possible trades. A Company with three layers in its capital structure, typically common equity, secured debt and unsecured debt would then have " $3 \times 3 \times 3 = 27$ " possible permutations and so on. As a general rule, Company's that have multi-layered capital structures tend to trade at a discount to fair value because of *complexity*. The more layers in a Company's capital structure means the more likely a security becomes mispriced. This is because of the friction associated with consistently repricing each layer of the capital structure in real time across many siloed asset/investor classes. The Fund actively seeks out companies with complex capital structures because they often result in either, a) one security being outright mispriced, or b) two securities being mispriced *relative* to each other. The chart below highlights various trade construct we use in capital structure trading:

|                                  |                                                             |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Compression:</b>              | Long Unsecured Debt, Short Secured Debt                     |
| <b>Decompression:</b>            | Long Secured Debt, Short Unsecured Debt                     |
| <b>Synthetic Convertible</b>     | Long Debt, Long Small % of Common Stock                     |
| <b>Steepener:</b>                | Long Near-term Maturity Debt, Short Long-term Maturity Debt |
| <b>Flattener:</b>                | Long Long-term Maturity Debt, Short Near-term Maturity Debt |
| <b>Financial Stress:</b>         | Long Debt, Short Equity or Short Debt, Long Equity          |
| <b>Structural Subordination:</b> | Long Opco Debt, Short Holdco debt and vice versa            |
| <b>Convertible Covered Call</b>  | Long Convertible, Sell Out-of-the-Money Call Options        |
| <b>Capital Structure Hedge</b>   | Long each portion of the capital structure                  |

Our general strategy is to either "trade up" or "trade down" the capital structure depending on whether the credit is improving or deteriorating. If a credit is improving and the enterprise value is expanding, then we tend to "move down" in the capital structure by rank priority. Example, sell or short secured debt and rotate into unsecured debt. If the enterprise value is deteriorating, then we tend to "move up" in the capital structure by rank priority. Example, buy the Company's debt and short the equity. If we generally like the Company's assets but its not clear where the relative value will shift between the various layers of the capital structure upon an event, then we might own a little bit of each part of the Company's capital structure.

## Appendix II – Genworth Holdings Inc.

Genworth ("GNW") owns ~123mm shares of a public company, Enact ("ACT") worth ~\$4.1 billion as well as equity interest in two insurance operating businesses, Life and Long-Term Care. They also have a ~\$300mm of cash either unrestricted or cash earmarked to be up-streamed from Enact to the Holding Company. The total debt balance is \$819mm implying the Loan-to-Value for our Junior Subordinated Bond position is ~14% or ~7x asset coverage. In addition, we have a catalyst as the Company has been slowly buying back both its unsecured debt and the bond we own in the open market. They bought back \$31mm of bonds last quarter alone. Covenants in the debt structure that give us additional comfort:

- a) Unsecured bonds limit the ability of GNW to sell down its ACT equity position to beyond 20% unless the Use of Proceeds is for debt retirement. The practical implication is the ACT asset value is trapped within the debt structure with limited ability for value to leak out to equity holders or the insurance subsidiaries
- b) For every \$1 dollar of unsecured buys back in the open market they are allowed to buy back \$2.00 of our junior subordinated bonds which are more expensive capital

The risk to the position is how the Holding company handles its two operating insurance companies which are struggling and possibly undercapitalized. Those two businesses are non-recourse to the Holding Company meaning that GNW is under no legal obligation to support them, and they are independently capitalized. This is a common structure in insurance and its common for insurance holding company to put operating entities into run-off or even allow them to become insolvent. There is a risk that GNW begins to downstream capital to support them thus degrading the asset coverage but in all the public disclosure, GNW has been explicit about not dropping down additional capital into the operating subsidiaries and the various covenants given us additional comfort.

### Genworth Holdings

|                                   |    |                    |
|-----------------------------------|----|--------------------|
| Holding Company Unrestricted Cash | \$ | 294,000,000        |
| Advanced Cash Payments from Enact | \$ | 186,000,000        |
| Net Cash                          | \$ | <b>108,000,000</b> |

|                              |    |               |
|------------------------------|----|---------------|
| Enact Holdings Share Price   | \$ | 33.71         |
| # of Shares Held by Genworth |    | 122,751,166   |
|                              |    | 4,137,941,806 |

|                   |               |
|-------------------|---------------|
| Total Asset Value | 4,245,941,806 |
|-------------------|---------------|

#### Debt

|                                         |    |             |
|-----------------------------------------|----|-------------|
| 6.50% Senior Unsecured Notes            | \$ | 247,072,000 |
| Floating Rate Junior Subordinated Notes | \$ | 546,158,000 |
|                                         | \$ | 793,230,000 |

|                                    |               |
|------------------------------------|---------------|
| Residual Net Asset Value of Equity | 3,452,711,806 |
|------------------------------------|---------------|

|                              |               |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| <b>Loan-to-Value ("LTV")</b> | <b>13.66%</b> |
| <b>Asset Coverage</b>        | <b>7.3 x</b>  |



**January 2025**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 0.67% on the Class F Units during the month of January. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 77%/107% versus 80%/107% at the end of December. We have 36 core positions in the portfolio with a 43%/57% split between Canada/US.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |
| 2025 | 0.7% |      |      |      |       |      |      |      |      |       |      |      | 0.7%  |

### **Core Corporate Carry (~32% of NAV, 10 positions)**

Excluding our tactical low dollar price long high-grade corporate basket, and a position we anticipate will be refinanced next month, our Core Corporate Carry portfolio represents ~25% of the Fund's NAV across 9 positions.

We added another name to the basket this month. We bought 'AAA'-rated Johnson & Johnson {JNJ 2.45% 09/60} in the low 50s. We are pleased with how the basket performed during the AI-related sell off during the month as the basket appreciated in value during the risk-off period, providing a ballast to other parts of the portfolio as designed. Additionally, the Fund had a positive return during the handful of negative risk-off days associated with the DeepSeek sell-off.

Below is a breakdown by asset class along with current yield metrics:

| High Yield (USD) | High Yield (CAD) | High Grade (USD) | Preferreds (USD) | Preferreds (CAD) | Closed End Credit Funds | Total |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------------|-------|
| 58.5%            | 5.5%             | 7.1%             | 2.2%             | 15.0%            | 8.4%                    | 100%  |

|                            | Duration | Cash Yield | Yield-to-Worst |
|----------------------------|----------|------------|----------------|
| Core Corporate Carry       | 3.01 yrs | 8.49%      | 8.55%          |
| Excluding Long Bond Basket | 1.87 yrs | 8.77%      | 8.79%          |

### **Event-Driven (~39%, 18 positions)**

*Beacon Roofing Senior Unsecured Bonds {BECN 4.125% 05/29}*

We aggressively accumulated a position in the unsecured bonds of Beacon Roofing below 97 cents after another public Company {QXO} sent a Bear Hug letter to the Board, and then launched an all-cash hostile take-over bid. BECN is one of the largest distributors of roofing supplies in the USA. Our analysis of the situation is that there is unlikely to be a white knight, but if there is, it is most likely Lowe's. The LBO math doesn't make sense as a sponsor would have to pay ~12x EV/EBITDA and could only put 6x of leverage at most on the business. Home Depot is already tied up with its \$18 billion acquisition of distributor SRS in 2024. We are indifferent, other than timing, to whether QXO or Lowe's or anybody else acquires BECN because the bonds we bought have a clean Change of Control. This means the Company is required to offer us 101 for our bonds within 30 days of closing. Hostile takeovers are a lot like poker games...you can bluff and slow play all you want, but eventually you must show your cards, and we are not sure Beacon has a good hand to play.

A quick summary of how we look at credit-event trading using Beacon as an example is shown in the Appendix.

## Liquidity Provision (~23%)

We continue to carry ample liquidity in the Fund primarily to take advantage of short-term trading opportunities.

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~12%, 8 positions)

There is no shortage of stressed credit situations out there right now, but they are largely concentrated in pockets of the credit markets we are avoiding:

- *Levered Loan Market:* Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) now make up ~70% of loan defaults and the default rate in the levered loan market is now running close to ~5% (back to where it was during peak Covid). With more than 90% of all levered loans “covenant lite” we expect elevated credit losses in the asset class.
- *2021/22 Vintage LBO High Yield debt:* Many private equity sponsors overpaid for assets and over-levered businesses during the Covid period, and this vintage is now experiencing elevated defaults.
- *Sectors:* Telecommunications, Technology, and Healthcare sectors remain under pressure, but bond prices seem rich relative to the credit risk.

LME is just a fancy term for “amend and pretend”, “pray and delay” or “kicking the can down the road”. The data on LMEs is starting to show that while they can increase recovery values, they often simply delay payment defaults a few years. We are watching from the sidelines and not actively looking to trade these situations. Documentation is becoming so weak in private equity sponsored financings that sponsors are now slipping in clauses that limit voting rights to creditors to 20%, no matter what position size they own. In addition, sponsors are also inserting clauses to limit co-operation agreements. These are agreements signed amongst creditors to stay as a cohesive group during a restructuring. Lending to private equity sponsored companies with no board of directors or public company oversight under weak creditor documentation at elevated leverage levels based on goosed up Adjusted EBITDA numbers, to earn a little extra yield is, in our opinion, one of the worst risk/return propositions in the corporate credit markets right now. This is likely where upticks in defaults occur going forward both in the private and public credit markets.

## Risk Overlay (-6%)

Based on current market conditions, we are happy to sell away some upside from corporate credit rallying in return for protecting our downside. This view lends itself to a *collar* option structure which we have implemented. We were able to put this on at near zero cost after factoring in that spot levels on HYG, and the time we implemented the hedge, were at a nice premium to NAV. HYG has chronically traded at a premium to its NAV on large inflow days, often between 15 and 35 bps. We look to capture this premium to NAV in our hedging regime to lower the implied cost of purchasing downside protection.


## Summary

Corporate credit as an asset class was resilient in the face of negative headlines related to DeepSeek/AI and Tariffs during January. The muted reaction is logical as many high yield issuers are lower growth, mature, US domiciled companies that sell their products in the US. The QQQ selloff was more about a readjustment of the “g”, growth variable, in the stock valuation equation and affected more large cap companies. If AI competition and trade wars continue to be negative narratives, it is reasonable to conclude that corporate credit could outperform equities in 2025. Within the Fund, we do not have an educated view on either topic, nor are we positioned in any one way as it relates to AI or Tariffs. We summarize the correlation of the Fund to various asset classes below for reference. So far, the Fund’s daily returns have been very weakly correlated with other asset classes while generic credit indices have exhibited reasonably high correlation to equities. We actively seek to minimize our correlation by keeping our duration short, limiting exposure to bonds contained in indices/ETFs, avoidance of primary issuance and focus on event-driven situations like Beacon Roofing whose returns are “anchored” to an idiosyncratic event, rather than simply owning securities that have a tendency to twist in the wind as markets move.


The below matrix shows the correlation of the Fund's daily returns to various asset classes including equities, rates, high yield and investment grade.

| Security           | NEWGEN CREDIT STRATEGIES-C | S&P/TSX COMPOSITE INDEX | ISHARES IBOXX HIGH YLD CORP | S&P 500 INDEX | RUSSELL 2000 INDEX | NASDAQ 100 STOCK INDEX | LQD US Equity | XCB CN Equity | TLT US Equity |
|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 11) NEWGEN CRED... | 1.000                      | 0.225                   | 0.202                       | 0.149         | 0.191              | 0.101                  | 0.148         | 0.111         | 0.111         |
| 12) S&P/TSX COM... | 0.225                      | 1.000                   | 0.598                       | 0.727         | 0.749              | 0.556                  | 0.314         | 0.230         | 0.161         |
| 13) ISHARES IBO... | 0.202                      | 0.598                   | 1.000                       | 0.643         | 0.633              | 0.560                  | 0.724         | 0.497         | 0.526         |
| 14) S&P 500 IND... | 0.149                      | 0.727                   | 0.643                       | 1.000         | 0.761              | 0.931                  | 0.297         | 0.165         | 0.113         |
| 15) RUSSELL 200... | 0.191                      | 0.749                   | 0.633                       | 0.761         | 1.000              | 0.602                  | 0.314         | 0.198         | 0.149         |
| 16) NASDAQ 100 ... | 0.101                      | 0.556                   | 0.560                       | 0.931         | 0.602              | 1.000                  | 0.263         | 0.156         | 0.099         |
| 17) LQD US Equity  | 0.148                      | 0.314                   | 0.724                       | 0.297         | 0.314              | 0.263                  | 1.000         | 0.763         | 0.922         |
| 18) XCB CN Equity  | 0.111                      | 0.230                   | 0.497                       | 0.165         | 0.198              | 0.156                  | 0.763         | 1.000         | 0.762         |
| 19) TLT US Equity  | 0.111                      | 0.161                   | 0.526                       | 0.113         | 0.149              | 0.099                  | 0.922         | 0.762         | 1.000         |


This chart shows the daily returns of the Fund versus the Nasdaq Composite index. The correlation is very small.



This chart shows the daily returns of the Fund versus the High Yield Index (HYG ETF). The correlation is very small.



The chart shows the correlation between the Nasdaq and the High Yield index. The correlation is relatively high.



## Appendix I – Example Event Driven Trade

### Beacon Roofing - Credit Event



| Summary           |                         |
|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Target            | Beacon Roofing ("BECN") |
| Acquirier         | GXO Logistics ("GXO")   |
| Subject Bond      | BECN 4.125% 05/29       |
| CUSIP             | 073685AH2               |
| Status            | Hostile Cash Takeover   |
| Estimated Closing | 30-Jun-25               |

- 1) Spot Price -  $S_0$
- 2) Probability Event Occurs -  $P(C)$
- 3) Terminal Outcome -  $S_t$
- 4) Timing -  $t$

|                                |                  |
|--------------------------------|------------------|
| Acquisition Price (cash)       | \$ 124.25        |
| Current Market Price           | \$ 118.52        |
| Estimated Break Price          | <b>\$ 105.00</b> |
| Implied Deal Close Probability | <b>70.23%</b>    |

Acquisition Closes  
 $P(C) = 70.23\%$

| Px Given Close |               |
|----------------|---------------|
| Price          | <b>101.00</b> |
| IRR            | <b>14.79%</b> |

| Spot Bond Price |       |
|-----------------|-------|
| Price           | 96.91 |

Acquisition Break  
 $P(C^c) = 29.77\%$





| Px Given Break |               |
|----------------|---------------|
| Price          | 93.00         |
| IRR            | <b>-5.73%</b> |

| Break Price Estimate |              |              |
|----------------------|--------------|--------------|
|                      | Yield        | Price        |
| Selected             | <b>6.00%</b> | 93.01        |
| Pre-Rumour           | <b>6.00%</b> | <b>93.00</b> |
| Pre-Hostile Offer    | <b>5.44%</b> | <b>95.00</b> |
| Comparables          |              | Yield        |
| BXC 6% 29            |              | 6.83%        |
| ABCSUP 3.875% 29     |              | 5.71%        |
| GMS 4.625% 29        |              | 5.98%        |
| BLDR 5% 2030         |              | 5.97%        |
| SBPLLC 7.75% 29      |              | 7.01%        |

| Scenario       | Price  | IRR    |
|----------------|--------|--------|
| Downside       | 93.00  | -5.73% |
| Expected Value | 98.62  | 8.69%  |
| Upside         | 101.00 | 14.79% |

Up/Down 2.6 x

### Return Sensitivity





**December 2024**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 0.58% on the Class F Units during the month of December. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 80%/107% versus 79%/104% at the end of December. We have ~35 core positions in the portfolio with a 50/50 split between Canada/US.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% | 0.6% | 16.9% |

It was a squishy month for corporate credit with most sectors of the market down. Specifically, USD High Yield was down 43 bps and USD Investment Grade down almost 2%. The Fund outperformed during the month for the following reasons:

- Healthy liquidity position of ~20%
- Duration of our Core Corporate Carry portfolio (ex our *Long Corporate Basket*) is a relatively short ~2 years
- Our short position in 'BB' bonds combined with our HYG options hedge reduced some MTM losses
- Gains from very idiosyncratic positions such as our short in the security of a Company that filed for Bankruptcy
- Focus on securities subject to near-term events whose prices tend to get "anchored" to a terminal outcome
- Lack of exposure to high beta bonds such as new issues and bonds contained within indices and ETFs

### **Core Corporate Carry (~35% of NAV, 11 positions)**

#### *Low Dollar Price, USD Investment Grade Long Bonds*

We sold our long corporate basket intra month for a realized gain but then reloaded at better prices towards month-end. We eliminated United Health and replaced it with Coca Cola. Long corporates can take wild swings in price over short periods of time as evidenced by 3 time series' we show in the Appendix. However, what the +150 years of data shows is that the upside/downside of buying high grade blue-chip long corporates at 58 cents on the dollar is actuarially in our favour. Our goal is to try and harvest the volatility from the positive convexity inherent in these low dollar price instruments while also using the unique return profile of these bonds as part of our broader portfolio construction. We can see some scenarios where underlying interest rates rally substantially more than high-grade credit spreads widen, leading to positive performance from the position during a risk-off period. This is the exact opposite of what will likely happen to a good portion of the high yield market should we get into a traditional risk-off environment in 2025.

| Credit        | Bond             | Dur.<br>(years) | Credit Rating | Leverage    | LTV@<br>Market | Dollar Price | Cash<br>Yield |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|
| Home Depot    | HD 2.375% 03/51  | 16.8            | A2/A          | 2.5x        | 7%             | 57.4         | 4.13%         |
| Verizon       | VZ 3.00% 11/60   | 17.7            | Baa1/BBB+     | 3.5x        | 25%            | 58.4         | 5.14%         |
| Amazon        | AMZN 2.70% 06/60 | 18.1            | A1/AA         | 1.2x        | 0%             | 57.8         | 4.67%         |
| Merck         | MRK 2.90% 12/61  | 17.9            | A1/A+         | 1.8x        | 3%             | 57.8         | 5.01%         |
| Union Pacific | UNP 2.973% 09/62 | 18.0            | A3/A-         | 2.7x        | 10%            | 58.2         | 5.11%         |
| Coca Cola     | KO 2.75% 06/60   | 18.1            | A1/A+         | 3.1x        | 9%             | 59.0         | 4.66%         |
|               |                  | <b>17.8</b>     | <b>A1/A+</b>  | <b>2.5x</b> | <b>9%</b>      | <b>58.1</b>  | <b>4.79%</b>  |

## Event-Driven (~38%, 15 positions)

### *Lamb Weston Senior Unsecured Bonds {LW 4.375% 01/32}*

We were short the bonds of LW on the view that its business fundamentals were deteriorating, and the bonds are overvalued relative to the credit risk. The Company sources potatoes, cuts them up, freezes them and then sells them to companies like McDonalds. The industry is in overcapacity and both volumes and prices are declining. We got a great entry point on the trade in late-October after the bonds rallied {Price=93.75, Yield= 5.43%, Spread= 134 bps} following a report that an activist investor was pushing for a sale process. Our analysis of the industry, and possible buyers, led us to conclude that the probability of an en bloc buyer was low. We have now flipped the trade into a capital structure relative value position where we are short the bonds and long the common stock on a “light” delta/ratio after the common stock collapsed following earnings. We stand to benefit from potential shareholder friendly but bondholder unfriendly actions in 2025 and the natural positive convexity/asymmetric upside to the long common-short debt trade construct.

### *Dana Inc. Senior Unsecured Bonds {DAN 5.625% 06/28}*

We took a full-sized position in the bonds of Dana Corp on the thesis that they will successfully sell their “off-highway” business for a healthy price and use the sale proceeds to call the 2027 and 2028 bonds at Par. On November 26, the Company disclosed a sales process and then at an investor conference on December 6, the Company made very clear statements about the prospects of the sale including timing, proforma leverage targets and use of proceeds. While DAN has six different bonds all at varying prices, our analysis concluded that the best risk-adjusted return was on the 2028s based on our view of whether or not they implement the required “Asset Sale Offer” under the bond indentures or use a workaround to allow them to leave the lower coupon 2030/2032 maturity bonds in their capital structure.

## Liquidity Provision (~20%)

One trade we did to enhance the return on our idle capital is invest in what is called a “Euro-Flex” options structure. We took advantage of tightening in short-term funding markets because of the global banking system’s year end. We bought common stock in a mega cap company and then sold calls and bought puts at the exact same strike price. The package has zero risk. We earned close to 6% return, or +150 bps spread versus 30-day secured overnight financing rates.

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~13%, 8 positions)

### *Bankruptcy Shorts*

We were short the security of a Company that ran out of liquidity and filed for bankruptcy during the month. The value of the security went to near zero. This is the second bankruptcy short that paid off for us this year. We have two other short positions in companies that we think will ultimately file for bankruptcy in 2025. Short selling is becoming more of a focus for the Fund. We are monitoring credits along the entire automotive supply chain for potential shorts given the macro backdrop and dramatic increase in Chinese market share. Also, we are monitoring businesses and sectors that have been subsidized with government money as this can often be a source for short ideas.




## Risk Overlay (-7%)

Recall from last month, we had on a 77/79 HYG Put Spread designed to hedge our market risk around the US Election. This expired worthless and we elected not to roll the structure. However, we implemented what is called a “collar” option structure out to January to protect against a possible retracement in the high yield market towards year-end and/or beginning of January. This structure is designed to “fence” the return on our Core Corporate Carry portfolio. We are happy to sell away the upside from high yield bond yields rallying below 7.22% and then using the premium to prevent any losses should yields blow out beyond 7.81%. The overlay puts the Fund in a better position to add risk if yields go beyond 8%.

|                        | Strike Price | Implied Index Yield | Implied Index Spread |
|------------------------|--------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Short HYG Call Options | 79           | 7.22%               | 275 bps              |
| Spot HYG at Initiation | 78.5         | 7.53%               | 306 bps              |
| Long HYG Put Options   | 78           | 7.81%               | 334 bps              |

## Summary


The Fund returned ~16.94% net of fees for the 2024 Calendar Year with no negative months of performance. The year-over-year improvements in the return profile can be attributed to our heightened focus on event-driven trades that have muted market risk, combined with us improving how we size our positions. As an example, oversizing higher conviction long positions such as our position in Cineplex's Convertibles has led to material positive performance. It is an example of a trade we had both *high conviction* and *the security had an asymmetric payoff profile*. On the other hand, during the year we sized down some of our more *asymmetrical downside* trades such as risk arbitrage such that when we were wrong it didn't cost the Fund a material amount of performance. Even further, generic long duration high yield index bonds look to have asymmetric downside at this point. We have low conviction they will have material capital appreciation from here, so we have just avoided that part of the market entirely. By classifying the risk profile of our positions and sizing trades properly along the matrix, we think this can lead to better risk adjusted returns for the Fund over the fullness of time. Below is a simple chart which provides a basic methodology of sizing:

| Portfolio Weightings |                                                                                     |                                                                                     |                                                                                      |            |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Payoff Profile       |                                                                                     |                                                                                     |                                                                                      |            |
| Conviction Level     | Asymmetric<br>Upside                                                                | Symmetric                                                                           | Asymmetric<br>Downside                                                               |            |
|                      |  |  |  |            |
|                      | High                                                                                | 5%                                                                                  | 3-4%                                                                                 | 2%         |
|                      | Medium                                                                              | 2-3%                                                                                | 1%                                                                                   | 0%         |
|                      | Low                                                                                 | 0.25%-1%                                                                            | Market Risk/<br>Beta                                                                 | Do Nothing |


We caution that the credit markets exhibited relatively low volatility in 2024 as credit spreads "grinded" tighter for most of the year. The major volatility in fixed income has really been in Rates NOT Credit and we could see this continue. At some point its inevitable that volatility in the credit markets picks up but why and when is less certain. The return profile of credit is "*up the escalator and down the elevator*" but it is never certain the duration of either leg. The Fund is positioned such that we are taking advantage of the positive carry inherent in the asset class but doing so with the goal of being able to reinvest the Fund's capital at lower prices in the future. It is worth remembering the paradox of investing in credit is that the tighter credit spreads get, the riskier the asset class becomes, and the wider credit spreads get the less risky the asset class is even though it "feels" the opposite. We will endeavour to remind ourselves routinely of this axiom in 2025.

## Historical Examples of Long Bond Prices


US Government Bond prices traded as high as 120 before the Civil War then dropped to as low as 83.25 following the Bombardment of Fort Sumter and the subsequent secession of several states in the Summer of 1861. Bonds rallied to 110 following the end of the Civil War. Over the span of a 10-year period bonds went down ~37 points then up ~27 points across 3 recessions.



Generic American Railroad bonds traded between 50 cents and 130 dollars for the 80 years between 1857 and 1937. Routinely you would see 20-point peak-to-trough moves over a 5-year period. However, bonds never traded much below 60 cents even during the post-Civil War Railroad construction boom which ended with the Panic of 1873 where prices bottomed at 61.6 cents. There were 19 recessions and 1 depression during this period.



The Barclays US Long Corporate Index bond prices since 1994. The Index got down to a bond price of 81 during the GFC, rallied to 123 during the implementation of QE then back down to 72.5 during the inflation induced bear market plus credit risk-off in the fall of 2023 which caused the 30-year treasury to trade just above 5%. This period spans numerous monetary & economic cycles, a dozen or so crises, mini-panics and risk on/off periods.





**November 2024**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.53% on the Class F Units during the month of November. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 79%/104% versus 59%/95% at the end of October. We have ~30 core positions in the portfolio with a 70/30 split between Canada/US.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  | 1.5% |      | 16.3% |

### **Fundamental Corporate Credit (~34% of NAV, 10 positions)**

#### *Low Dollar Price, USD Investment Grade Long Bonds*

We made our first significant investment into longer duration credit assets during the month. The 30-year US Treasury yield went from a local low of 3.93% in mid-September to 4.64% in mid-November, an almost 75 bps peak/trough move over the course of 2 months. This violent price action was largely driven by fear that a new Trump Administration's tariff policies would re-stoke inflation. The underlying move in bond yields caused the dollar prices of low coupon, longer duration high quality investment grade bonds to plummet in value. We saw a tactical trade with an asymmetric return profile and purchased a basket of a six high grade USD 30-yr corporate bonds representing ~4% of the Fund. We realized a gain of 9 bps for the Fund and now have a more refined framework by which to tactically trade long corporates. We outline the math and rationale for the trade in the Appendix.

*Cable One {CABO 4% 11/30}* – we exited the remainder of our position during the month and pocketed a gain of 15 bps.

### **Event-Driven (~38%, 15 positions)**

#### *Cenovus Series C & Series E Preferred Shares*

We had a high conviction ~5% position in the subject preferreds with the thesis CVE would be redeem both prefs on their next reset date. Our rationale: a) legacy capital that was were inherited only after CVE's acquisition of Husky, b) CVE is over-capitalized, c) credit rating agencies confirmed to us that the redemption would not impact credit ratings, and d) when factoring in the Part 6.1.c tax and the non-deductibility of dividend expense, the capital is expensive. At month-end, CVE announced the redemption of its Series C preferred, and they traded up to 25.20 and we sold the entire position as the IRR to the December reset rate was well below our return hurdle. We kept the Series E position under the assumption that those preferreds, which have a ~40 bps higher reset spread, are redeemed in March 2025.

*Spirit Aerosystems {SPR 9.375% 11/29 1<sup>st</sup> Liens}* – we lost conviction in the position and exited during the month.

#### *Financial Corporation – Capital Structure Arbitrage*

We unwound most of our long-standing capital structure arbitrage trade in a small financial corporation. We were long the debt of the corporation and short the common shares. To hedge the tail risk of the enterprise value declining to below the par notional on the debt, we bought put options with strikes that lined up with the notional value and maturity of the debt. In addition, to hedge the tail risk that the enterprise value climbed materially, we bought call options to hedge the

common stock short. The combined package fully hedged any change in the underlying value of the corporation such that we were indifferent as to where the enterprise value was at anytime over most of 2024. The combined package, we think, created a pure arbitrage yield of over 10% and in aggregate added 169 bps of performance to the Fund (see below).

| Position           | Gross Return   |
|--------------------|----------------|
| Long Debt          | 212 bps        |
| Short Common Stock | (35 bps)       |
| Long Call Options  | 2 bps          |
| Long Put Options   | (10 bps)       |
| <b>Total</b>       | <b>169 bps</b> |

### Liquidity Provision (~21%)

The Fund is maintaining high levels of cash in anticipation of a pickup in event-driven trades in 2025 following the political regime change in the United States. Our high liquidity also reflects our desire for patience in deploying capital given the current market back drop.

### Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~15%, 13 positions)

#### *Credit Sensitive Shorts*

We made ~10 bps on a 25 bps NAV position shorting the security of a company that by our math is simply going to run out of money. We now have 4 short positions in securities issued by corporations that we think may ultimately be worth zero. The common characteristic of our credit sensitive shorts are capital structures with insurmountable debt levels where the Company is at risk of simply running out of cash and have limited avenues to raise additional capital. We continue to spend time on trying to find companies to short where they are either already in, or on the verge of, what's called a *d-e-b-t spiral*. A *debt spiral* is when a company takes on debt to fund growth but is unable to increase cash flow to pay back the debt before it's due. After which, the company has no option other than to borrow more money, often at higher rates, to pay off existing debt, which leads to further deterioration in the credit profile. Our positions are being sized small given the asymmetric nature of short selling, but we are actively looking to build breadth in this part of the portfolio.

### Risk Overlay (-9%)

Our \$79/\$77 HYG Put Spread expired worthless during the month as spot closed at 79.23 but “tickled” the top strike at the beginning of the month. We elected not to roll the structure. The hedge cost the Fund 9 bps of performance but we think it would have protected a large portion of our Core Carry portfolio from a mark-to-market decline should the outcome of the US election been contested or otherwise less decisive.

### Summary

Corporate credit spreads are now at historically very tight levels. We continue to shift our focus to finding tactical trading opportunities like our 30-yr IG basket, setting up short positions in companies we think could go bankrupt in the near-term as well as event-driven trades. Corporate events such as asset sales, M&A, regulatory changes and refinancing likely pick up materially in 2025 under the new US political regime and hopefully insolvencies will as well. We caution that outsized gains are unlikely to come from holding generic B/BB/BBB bonds either outright or on a spread basis on the assumption of further yield/spread compression. Risk management, caution, skepticism and patience shall remain paramount.

## Low Dollar Price High Quality USD Investment Grade Long Bonds


Low dollar price corporate bonds have far less credit risk than par or premium bonds because your par claim value is significantly above the market price bond. The price of the bond at say 40-60 cents can often sit at, or below the actual “recovery floor” of the bond. Our data analysis going back decades also indicates that low dollar price investment grade bonds can significantly outperform high dollar price investment grade bonds during times of credit stress. Finally, the price/yield functional relationship is such that lower dollar price bonds can be very positively convex and during risk-off environment government bond yields can often decrease more than “A-rated” corporate credit spreads can widen.

We purchased the basket outlined below following the blow out in yields after the Trump election victory:

| Credit        | Bond             | Dur.<br>(years) | Credit<br>Rating | Leverage    | LTV@<br>Market | Dollar Price | Cash<br>Yield |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|
| Home Depot    | HD 2.375% 03/51  | 16.8            | A2/A             | 2.5x        | 7%             | 58.1         | 4.10%         |
| Verizon       | VZ 3.00% 11/60   | 17.7            | Baa1/BBB+        | 3.5x        | 25%            | 59.8         | 5.02%         |
| Amazon        | AMZN 3.25% 05/61 | 17.9            | A1/AA            | 1.2x        | 0%             | 68.9         | 4.72%         |
| Merck         | MRK 2.90% 12/61  | 17.9            | A1/A+            | 1.8x        | 3%             | 60.9         | 4.76%         |
| Union Pacific | UNP 2.973% 09/62 | 18.0            | A3/A-            | 2.7x        | 10%            | 60.0         | 4.96%         |
| United Health | UNH 3.125% 05/60 | 17.5            | A2/A+            | 2.1x        | 4%             | 62.7         | 4.98%         |
|               |                  | <b>17.6 yrs</b> | <b>A1/A</b>      | <b>2.3x</b> | <b>8.2%</b>    | <b>61.7</b>  | <b>4.76%</b>  |

This basket of long duration corporate bonds has a Loan-to-Enterprise Value (“LTV”) at market of 8.2%, net leverage of 2.3x and a median credit rating of A. The basket was bought at price of 61.7 cents with a cash-on-cash yield of 4.76%. We viewed these bonds to essentially have little to no default risk in the short and medium term but some nice positive convexity from mean reversion of yields following a major election related blowout. If we were wrong, we felt our downside was 0% to (5%) while the upside was > 10% and the position was additive to our overall portfolio construction.

This chart highlights the relationship between price and yield for our basket. We also highlight various points on the convex curve where the basket has traded over the last several years. As you can see, the “convexity” is positive. This means that the change in price for a given decrease in yield is greater than the change in price for similar increase in yield. We simply did the math and given that the basket would carry at 4.76% over the next 12 months that yields would have to back up more than 25 bps for us to have a 1-year negative return. On the flip side, a 25-50 bps rally in yields would mean a 9%-14% 1-year holding period return.



| Yield        | 4.50%     | 4.75%    | 5.00%    | 5.25%    | 5.50%  | 5.75%   | 6.00%   | 6.25%   | 6.50%    |
|--------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|--------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| Change       | (100 bps) | (75 bps) | (50 bps) | (25 bps) | 0 bps  | +25 bps | +50 bps | +75 bps | +100 bps |
| Dollar Price | 72.59     | 69.22    | 66.07    | 63.13    | 60.375 | 57.81   | 55.40   | 53.15   | 51.03    |
| 1-yr Return  | 25.0%     | 19.4%    | 14.2%    | 9.31%    | 4.75%  | 0.50%   | (3.5%)  | (7.2%)  | (10.7%)  |
| Up/Down      | 2.5x      | 2.7x     | 4.0x     | 18.9x    | 1x     | 18.9x   | 4.0x    | 2.7x    | 2.5x     |



**October 2024**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.2% on the Class F Units during the month of October. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 59%/95% versus 77%/108% at the end of September. Both our net and gross exposures are at historic lows. We have ~30 core positions in the portfolio.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2%  |      |      | 14.5% |

### **Fundamental Corporate Credit (~30% of NAV, 8 positions)**

We made few changes to our Core Carry portfolio during the month. Our position in American Coastal Insurance {ACIC 6.25% 12/27} survived the dual impact of Hurricane Helene/Milton which validated our thesis that the Company has far less hurricane catastrophe risk than implied by the market due to its reinsurance hedging regime.

### **Event-Driven (~35%, 17 positions)**

#### *Atlantica Senior Unsecured Bonds {AY 4.125% 06/28}*

We made an investment error purchasing these bonds. AY is being acquired by a private equity firm and the bond indenture states that AY is required to make a Change of Control offer at 101 if the deal is consummated AND the bond's credit rating is downgraded below BB+. The acquirer is a private equity firm that intends on using leverage. Our thesis was that the bonds would get downgraded and thus trigger repayment. In October, the Company launched the acquisition financing and did a slick maneuver we have not seen before to prevent the bonds from being downgraded. By doing so, the bonds could stay outstanding and not have to be refinanced at a higher coupon. AY took a portion of its power assets and pledged them to the bond so the credit rating agencies would not downgrade the bonds and thus they would stay outstanding. We realized we had it wrong here and we were the first sell tickets in what we expected to be a decent liquidation of arbitrageur positions. All told we lost 3 bps for the Fund in total, 13 bps in October but learned a valuable lesson to consider whether a Company can secure a bond to avoid a downgrade trigger on a Change of Control.

#### *Vista Outdoors Unsecured Bonds {VSTO 4.50% 03/29}*

This file took more twist and turns than an Agatha Christie novel. The saga started with VSTO deciding to separate its Sporting Goods business from its Ammunition business in May 2023. Then in October 2023, they decided to sell the ammunition business to the Czechoslovak Group. After which in November 2023, VSTO received and subsequently rejected an unsolicited takeover offer from Colt CZ. All along several activists investors were pushing the Board of VSTO to seek out a better deal. In March 2024, a third buyer emerged with an even higher bid. Finally, in October 2024 the drama ended with VSTO selling its Sporting Goods business to a private equity firm for cash, and then closing on the original ammunition deal, albeit at heavily modified terms. We decided to exit the position rather than wait for the bonds to be called on closing. This trade is what we call an "odyssey trade", a long and eventful or adventurous journey or experience usually stretching beyond 1 year. While we made a 7.33% IRR and 39 bps of return, the duration of the trade was too long and took too many twists. This experience was a reminder to us that event-driven credit trades ALWAYS, ALWAYS take longer than you expect.

### *Boeing Long Bonds {BA 7.008% 05/64}*

We did a classic “buy the rumour, sell the news” trade in Boeing (“BA”) long bonds during the month. It had been widely reported for most of the month that BA was going to raise a significant amount of common equity, but BA bonds were only pricing in a roughly 50/50 chance of an equity raise. This probability we derived by a comparison between the regular BA bonds and another group of BA bonds where the coupons “step-up” should BA be downgraded. We had high conviction that Boeing was going to raise equity to avoid a credit rating downgrade for the following reasons:

1. New CEO likely motivated to reset the balance sheet
2. BA needs to be a strong counterparty to its many suppliers and customers because of the duration of its contracts
3. Projections showed BA’s cash dipping below its own self-imposed \$10 billion threshold
4. High yield would increase the Company’s cost of capital substantially as BA would be the largest fallen angel ever

We bought the longest bond in the Company’s debt stack at the beginning of the month and sold it at a tighter credit spread the day of the giant common equity raise. The trade highlights how the event-driven transfer of risk works. The investor who sold us the bonds was likely a fundamental long-only investor who knows a lot about BA but didn’t want to take the “event-risk” because its not their expertise or doesn’t fit their risk profile. They elected to sell the bonds to us at a discount to fair value. We on the other hand, have a limited fundamental view on BA but had a strong view on the event so we absorbed the “event” risk premium from the seller. Ultimately, the same long-only buyer may have in fact bought our bonds back *after* the event was known (equity capital raise and downgrade avoided). This basic mechanism highlights how event-driven risk premia shifts around in the credit markets.

### **Liquidity Provision (~31%)**

The Fund continues to hold an ample amount of short duration risk-free securities.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~13%, 7 positions)**

#### *Dye and Durham Subordinated Busted Convertibles {DNDCN 6.50% 11/28}*

We bought these bonds, and then subsequently sold them after a press release was issued stating that DND is expanding the scope of its prior strategic review to include a possible sale. The shorter DNDCN 3.75% 26 bonds remain the best risk-adjusted manner to play a possible Change of Control as they are risk-free bonds collateralized with cash but receive Par early on an en bloc sale. We continue to have a large position in these DNDCN 3.75% 26 bonds.

#### *Thames Water Senior Secured Class A Bonds*

The Fund made a significant profit from a long/short curve trade in the bonds of Thames Water. We have been trading the Thames Water complex for 4 months but once the debt restructuring proposal was released, we decided to exit our position. The debt restructuring at Thames is setting up to be the most complex we have ever seen and the timeline to implement it could be as long as 2 years. Things that are complex and long duration tend to trade at a large discount to fair value. In addition, Thames Water is quickly becoming a major political issue in England with significant uncertainty as to the final outcome and ultimate recovery of the bonds. *A summary of the trade is illustrated in the Appendix and should give Fund holders an overview of how we approach event-driven/special situations.*

### **Risk Overlay (-10%)**

During the month we became concerned with the sharp increase in government bonds yields and the binary risk associated with the US election. 50/50 short term binary events are by statistical definition the highest vol events. We have hedged

out a lot of our Fundamental Corporate market risk. We purchased a Put Spread on the HYG ETF that expires November 15<sup>th</sup> with a top strike of \$79 and bottom strike of \$77 when spot was \$79.61.

## Summary

The USD high yield market had a negative return of **0.54%** for the month, while the USD investment grade bond index was down **2.3%**, driven largely by the backup in underlying interest rates. We are maintaining our posture that now is not the right time to buy longer duration credit assets. We have 20% of the Fund's capital in "defeased", "hard called" or "tendered bonds". These unique situational positions are yielding in aggregate ~7%, almost 100 bps more than the 'BB' index itself and are risk free. While dilutive to the Fund's returns, they are very accretive to the Fund's risk profile, and we consider the yield spread to T-bills to be near pure alpha. These positions will be sold or matured as we come across more attractive opportunities but provide a low-risk stream of return to the Fund in the meantime.

## Appendix – Thames Water Stressed Curve Trade



- |                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>1) Monitor Investment Universe</b>       | Thames showed up in our investment universe because they had one Canadian Dollar Maple bond {THAMES 2.875% 12/24}. In addition, the LBO sponsor group contained several Canadian pensions plans. We began closely following the Company's results and started reading British newspapers in early 2024.                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| <b>2) Identify the Event</b>                | The Event we identified was Thames running out of cash before year-end which would trigger either the UK government placing the Company into "Special Administration" or the Company implementing a comprehensive private market recapitalization and restructuring.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <b>3) Develop Event Thesis</b>              | The Event would cause all the bonds to trade at the same dollar price as they are pari-passu claims. However, because of timing, it was possible that one or more of the near-term maturities could be paid Par.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| <b>4) Select Security and Execute Trade</b> | <p>Long the lowest coupon lowest dollar price bonds {THAMES 2.375% 2040} at 64.75 cents and then short the Canadian Dollar {THAMES 2.875% 12/24} at 95.5.</p> <p>The clearing event was a Canadian Bank as well as Canadian government agency selling down their loan positions at between 60-70 cents on the dollar. Once this risk cleared, we knew it was time to implement the trade as a big risk overhang was removed from the market and the long bonds were bound to bounce.</p> |
| <b>5) Event Realization</b>                 | Thames got downgraded to CCC+ in September and then warned it was running out of liquidity. The CAD THAMES 2.875% 24 gapped down into the low 80s. The Company announced a restructure plan and a liquidity backstop in October which removed some uncertainty about the overall situation.                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| <b>6) Monetization</b>                      | Our long bonds traded up from 64.75 to 75.5 and we liquidated the position. We covered our short in the CAD bonds at ~82 and then flipped and went long. We now expect that the Canadian Dollar bond will receive Par on December 12 because Thames has run out of time to implement a restructuring ahead of that maturity. A default on that maturity is possible but would cross-default other parts of the capital structure.                                                        |
| <b>7) Measure Outcome</b>                   | <b>The position earned ~90 bps of gross return for the Fund.</b> The economic capital at risk we think was ~5 pct on the CAD short and ~5 points on the long bonds (bonds gap down to 60 cents). Based on our sizing, we think we put less than 20 bps of economic capital at risk to make 90 bps.                                                                                                                                                                                       |



**September 2024**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.2% on the Class F Units during the month of September. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 77%/108% versus 71%/104% at the end of August.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 1.2% |       |      |      | 13.1% |

### **Fundamental Corporate Credit (~29% of NAV, 10 positions)**

*Matthews International Corp. – Senior Secured 2<sup>nd</sup> Lien Bonds {MATW 8.625% 10/27}*

We did something rare by acquiring a new core position via the primary market. New issues are often efficiently priced, as the entire market gets the opportunity to evaluate the bond and the book building process usually finds the optimal pricing on the security. New issue outperformance is often mistaken for “alpha” when in fact, it is often “beta”, which we try to avoid. However, in the case of the MATW bonds we found the new issue truly mispriced such that we decided to take a core position. MATW is a unique Company that has been around since 1850 and operates three distinct businesses. The core business is providing deathcare products. They have the #1 market share in Cemetery Memorials, #2 in Casket Making and #1 in Cremation Equipment. This bond fits into our strategy as the Company is underfollowed with near zero equity research coverage. Additionally, it operates in a niche, mature cash flowing industry and the bond is secured, short duration and non-index. MATW is also a conglomerate which equity holders generally view as a negative. However, as a credit investor we like conglomerates as they are a collection of discreet businesses with diversified cash flows. If needed individual businesses can often be sold off to de-lever and reduce the overall debt burden. We think MATW deathcare business, while low growth and uninteresting, covers the entire debt in MATW’s capital structure. The other two business can likely be sold en bloc if needed to lower the debt load of the Company or simply to refinance these bonds.

*Cable One – Senior Unsecured “Busted” Convertible Bonds {CABO 1.125% 03/28}*

We exited this position in September as the price of the bonds rose from our original purchase price of 73.5 in May to 80.625. The chase for yield has caused some investors to take on additional risk and reach into the beleaguered USD High Yield TMT sector as it remains one of the higher yielding parts of the credit market right now. This position generated a ~10% gross total return, almost all capital gains. We still remain cautious on adding US TMT credit risk.

### **Event-Driven (~44%, 18 positions)**

*Vector Group Senior Secured Bonds {VGR 5.75% 02/29}*

VGR agreed to be acquired by Japan Tobacco in August, and we acquired our position at 101.625 after the deal was announced. Recall from prior letters, we had a fundamental carry position in the bonds for much of 2023 but sold them on valuation concerns, so we knew VGR very well prior to the deal. The transaction is likely to close before the end of the calendar year and, as a result, the bonds could be called at 102.875 making for an attractive 4–5-month IRR. If the transaction closing is delayed, depending on how the acquirer intends to redeem the bonds, then our downside is a 101 Change of Control Offer, or the bonds will be called at 101.4380 on February 1, 2025.

## *Canadian Bank Fixed Rate Reset Preferreds*

TD Bank surprised the market by not redeeming its TD.PF.A preferred share. Speculators had bid up this near-term reset preferred to \$24.50 with the thesis that TD would redeem them. As we described in our April 2024 letter, fixed rate reset preferreds and LRCN are negatively convex fixed income instruments. While we took advantage of 5 or so obvious redemptions in the first half of the year, we felt the market had bid up near-term reset prefs to levels that were bad risk-reward, so we have had a zero allocation to near-term reset bank preferreds recently. Those who bought the TD.PF.A preferreds at \$24.50 hoping for a quick 2% gross return are now left nursing (7%) losses.

## Liquidity Provision (~23%)

The Fund continues to hold an ample amount of short duration risk-free securities.

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~16%, 9 positions)

### *Ascent Resources Senior Unsecured Bonds {ASCRES 9% 11/27}*

We acquired a small position in these bonds because of the unique embedded option they contain called a Contingent Value Right ("CVR"). If Ascent is either IPO'd or merges with another company then the bond's CVR pays out an extra ~25 bond points. At the price of 120 the Fund would receive 9 pts of coupon per year and 25 pts if the event occurs. If nothing happens, the IRR of the position is ~0%. There has been a decent amount of consolidation in the US energy space over the last two years, so we like the upside downside pay off profile of these bonds and the credit is solid.

### *Leisure Travel Company – Short*

We are now short the security of a Company tied to the leisure travel business that we think has a high probability of going insolvent in the next 6 months. The amount of debt the Company has feels insurmountable to us and we are beginning to see signs of slowing leisure travel.


## Risk Overlay (-12%)

We made very few changes to our Risk Overlay during the month.

## Summary

It is often said that *more people have died chasing yield than by the barrel of a gun*. A theme in the financial markets recently has been the reach for yield due to the expectation of declining interest rates. There has been a steady rise in prices for "yieldy" assets as capital flows out of cash and into riskier assets such as corporate credit. We see this with private credit where large amounts of capital are being put to work in "anything that pays SOFR + 600 bps" regardless of credit quality or creditor documentation. Good credit risk management is avoiding eating the candy when the bowl is put right in front of you. What we are trying to do in our Core Corporate Carry strategy, given this macro backdrop, is maximize "Excess Spread" not *Yield* or *Absolute Credit Spread*. Excess Spread is the difference between a corporate bond's *Perceived Credit Risk*, as measure by the market credit spread, and the *Actual Credit Risk* as measure by realized credit losses. As an example, on one end, you can invest purely in Investment Grade bonds which have a credit spread of say 145 bps on average and are unlikely to experience significant credit losses, but the return profile is not attractive. On the other end of the spectrum, you can invest in 'CCC' bonds or Private Credit and earn headline credit spreads of 650 bps but may end up bearing credit losses of 1%-3% or more on the investment with significant volatility. Our focus is in a sweet spot between the two book ends and despite falling yields, we think we can continue to find unique credits that offer outsized "Excess Spread". This chart shows our estimate of the Excess Spread for the USD high yield market going back to 2016.

Excess Spread = Perceived Credit Risk – Actual Credit Risk  
 Excess Spread = Market Credit Spread – Credit Losses



**Comment:** While credit spreads are historically tight and in the lower quartile of their historical range, credit losses remain fairly low and have declined over the last few months. Excess Spread we estimate is roughly 235 bps using our estimate of trailing 12-month credit losses. This metric is closer to the USD High Yield historical average or median.



**August 2024**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.2% on the Class F Units during the month of August. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 71%/104% versus 80%/116% at the end of July. The YTD return is comprised of 77% capital gains, 13% dividend income and 10% interest income. *This breakdown is after the netting of management fees and performance fees from interest income. Please see below for our returns since inception.*

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.2% |      |       |      |      | 11.8% |

### **Fundamental Corporate Credit (~28% of NAV, 10 positions)**

*American Coastal Insurance Company – Senior Unsecured Bonds {ACIC 7.25% 2027}*

We felt like a kid who couldn't wait to unbox, and play with, a shiny new toy when we found and purchased these bonds for our core carry portfolio. ACIC is a very niche speciality insurer whose sole business is writing commercial property insurance to mainly low-rise garden-style condo boards in Florida. Insurance against the risk of a condo's roof getting ripped off, or windows smashed during a hurricane, is mandatory for condo boards located in Florida. For a variety of factors, many mainline insurance writers have stopped writing premiums in Florida, and as a result ACIC has a 48% market share in its core segment. As the only steady provider of this type of insurance, ACIC has built a competitive advantage in this sector via the years of data and knowledge they've gathered on the individual property risk characteristics in Florida. Our due diligence, and meetings with management, led us to conclude that ACIC has a rigorous risk framework combined with a conservative reinsurance program to offload a decent amount of catastrophic hurricane risk to 3<sup>rd</sup> parties. The risk to this position is a very bad hurricane season, with 4 or more major hurricanes causing ACIC to blow through both its own large surplus plus the multiple layers of purchased reinsurance. It is important to note that ACIC does not write personal property insurance nor flood insurance which has inflicted terrible losses on the Florida P&C industry. See Appendix for more details on how this bond fits into our strategy.

### **Event-Driven (~43%, 20 positions)**

*Hawaiian Airlines Merger with Alaska Air* - Our combined long bond/short stock position benefited the Fund to the tune of ~10 bps of return during the month. As we expected, the DOJ moved on from their review of the HA/ALK merger. The capital gain on the bonds was offset modestly by the capital loss on the short position in the stock. However, a major hurdle to the merger has been overcome, so we will now sit and collect an 11% coupon until the deal closes.

*Neiman Marcus - Senior Secured Bonds {NMG 7.125% 2026}* - We participated in an exchange offer to allow for NMG to close its merger with Saks Fifth Avenue. We anticipate receiving 101.781 on closing, while we purchased these bonds at an average price of 99.83 in late-June/early-July.

*Parklawn Corporation – Senior Unsecured Bonds {PLCCN 5.75% 12/25}* -The bonds were redeemed during the month at 102.875. We bought a large position around 102.25 around a month earlier than the redemption.

**Liquidity Provision (~29%)** - We placed some of the Fund's liquidity during the month into "hard redeemed" preferred shares that are being retired within 30 days (by the end of September).

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~14%, 8 positions)

### *Cineplex {CGXCN 7.75% 2030 Subordinated Convertibles}*

The Fund continues to benefit from our position in Cineplex convertibles. The bonds are now priced at ~124 but we continue to think they are cheap with several near-term catalysts on the horizon. As part of our risk management strategy, instead of trimming our position we elected to go into the listed options market and *transform the distribution* of future outcomes associated with the position. We have neutered our potential upside by selling out-of-the money call options, and with the premium earned used to reduce the potential downside risk between the current price and our estimate of the “bond floor”. The net result is a tighter more credit-like return distribution, and we think better risk adjusted return profile. Based on a reasonable set of assumptions the convertible we think could have a valuation of close to 140 if our investment thesis is correct. (see Appendix).

### *Tidewater Infrastructure {TWN CN 8% 06/29 Subordinated Convertibles}*

We made an investment mistake purchasing the subject bonds and only realized it after seeing the Provinces of BC’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (“LCFS”) credit program trade at the low end of regulatory minimums and then go “no bid” in August. The bonds dropped in value after TWN’s majority owned subsidiary, Tidewater Renewables, almost became insolvent during the month of August and required a “bail-out” from its Parent only 2 months after the bond was issued. There is now \$175mm of secured debt moving from Renewables to Midstream, effectively priming the recently issued bonds. What did we do about this self-imposed mishap? We reduced our position by 25% before the quarter, shorted the common stock to hedge our risk and then aggressively sold the remaining position after the Company reported. The damage was minor as we crystalized a ~11 bps loss on the position. We now think that either entity could suffer from financial distress if the LCFS credit market in BC doesn’t recover and/or crack spreads at TWM’s Prince George refinery decline.

### *Materials Short*

We picked up ~25 bps of gross return and ~100% IRR shorting a security from a Company that became insolvent during Q3, and the value of the security went to near zero. We are ramping up the time we spend on short ideas as some companies begin to hit the wall. We are looking for companies that have near-term liabilities, are burning cash and require near-term access to capital. Short selling credit sensitive securities with the thesis they are worth zero is tricky but when you can get them right, they are profitable trades. We are excited about a few potential shorts we are watching closely.

## Risk Overlay (-14%)

We made very few changes to our Risk Overlay during the month.

## Summary

A recent theme has been capital moving out of money market & cash-like instruments into riskier assets, in particular yield sensitive assets. This hunt for yield is beginning and is a natural response to what now appears to be the start of a central bank easing cycle. Investors have benefitted handsomely from holding T-Bills, GICs, HISAs and short maturity discount bonds over the last two of years as Central Banks repeatedly hiked rates to tame inflation. Now with economic demand weakening, especially in the consumer, investors are cheering on more rate cuts as good for risk assets. The problem we see is that based on where we are in the credit cycle and where credit spreads/yields are, corporate credit is likely just a carry trade from here. Declines in government bond yields will be driven by rate cuts which will be driven by poor economic data. Poor economic data should put a floor under how tight credit spreads can go meaning that underlying declines in risk-free rates may be offset by spread widening. Given this backdrop we are being extra careful and patient when deploying capital and making sure we get paid for the risks we take. One of the advantages of the Fund is its size as we are small enough to make quick shifts in positioning and take advantage of unique opportunities in as they arise.



## ***ACIC 6.25% 12/15/27 Senior Unsecured Bonds***

|                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Niche/Orphan Industry</b>        | Condominium boards are required by to purchase property insurance to protect against damage to the shell of their building(s) in the state of Florida.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| <b>Niche/Orphan Company</b>         | No other public company looks like ACIC. It has a unique business model.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <b>Non-Index Eligible Bond</b>      | Bond is not contained in any credit indices or ETFs. Small \$150mm issue size not followed by traditional credit portfolio managers because of investment constraints.                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| <b>No Mainstream Credit Ratings</b> | Only rated by Kroll Bond Rating Agency. No rating from S&P/Moody's/Fitch. A bond only having a Kroll Credit rating precludes many investors from owning it.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| <b>Public Company</b>               | Public-listed Company with +\$500mm market cap beneath the bonds. Insurance subsidiary is a regulated entity in the State of Florida.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <b>Target Return</b>                | +9.1% yield-to-maturity with no call provisions other than a make-whole call. 550 bps of credit spread is well in excess of any reasonable sub-index proxy and well in excess of where comparable insurance bonds trade.                                                                                                                                                     |
| <b>Deeply Seasoned</b>              | Issued in 2017, the bond has been "seasoned" for 7 years. We estimate the bond has turned over 1x over its life and migrated into "strong hands".                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| <b>Strong Covenant Package</b>      | Financial covenant limiting the ability for the Company to incur additional debt if it would have a debt-to-capital ratio above 30% (currently ~42%). The Company currently cannot incur any additional debt beyond the \$150mm bond in its capital structure.                                                                                                               |
| <b>Underfollowed</b>                | Company is only covered by one equity research analyst based in St. Petersburg Florida                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| <b>Short Duration</b>               | Duration of 2.7 years or ~3.25 years to maturity.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| <b>Catalysts</b>                    | Upcoming Rating Review in October where Kroll Bond Rating Agency could move to Investment Grade. Mild hurricane season so far will continue to bolster surplus capital position. The Atlantic Ocean has had no named storm formations since Ernesto on August 12. The last time that the Atlantic had no named storm formations between August 13 - September 3 was in 1968. |
| <b>Discount to Par</b>              | Bond price of 95 allows for 5 dollars or 1.67 bond points per year to be accounted for as capital gains and not interest income.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| <b>Strengthening Credit Profile</b> | +\$200mm surplus. Loss ratio of only 18%. Combined ratio of 52%. Company could have more unencumbered cash than debt before the maturity of the bond.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <b>Low Market Correlation</b>       | Bond performance will be driven by factors unrelated to general economic activity namely the frequency and severity of storms in Florida. This lack of correlation provides diversification benefits to our portfolio                                                                                                                                                        |

## Cineplex CGXCN 7.75% 03/30 Subordinated Convertibles


|                                    |                |                          |                   |
|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| CGXCN 7 5/8 03/31/29               | ↑104.063       | + .000                   | 103.625 / 104.500 |
| CGXCN 7 5/8 03/31/29 Corp          | At 7:00        | -- X --                  |                   |
| Settings ▾                         |                |                          |                   |
| 1) Yield & Spread                  | 2) Graphs      | 3) Pricing               | 4) Descri         |
| CGXCN 7 5/8 03/31/29 ( 172454AH3 ) |                |                          |                   |
| Spread                             | 337.73 bp vs   | CAN 3 1/4 09/01/28 ▾     |                   |
| Price                              | 104            | 101.2335 09:04:14        |                   |
| Yield                              | 6.297424 Wst ▾ | 2.920094 S/A ▾           |                   |
| Wkout                              | 01/31/2028 @   | 100.00 Consensus Yld 6.6 |                   |
| Settle                             | 09/05/24       | 09/05/24                 |                   |
| Spreads Yield Calculations         |                |                          |                   |
| 11) G-Sprd                         | 335.0          | Street Convention        | 6.297424          |
| 12) I-Sprd                         | 340.5          | Equiv 1 ▾ /Yr            | 6.396568          |
| Basis                              | N.A.           | Mmkt (Act/365 ▾)         |                   |
| 14) Z-Sprd                         | 338.7          | True Yield ▾             | 6.294355          |
| 15) ASW                            | 348.6          | Bank of Canada           | 6.297424          |
| 16) OAS                            | 328.3          | Current Yield            | 7.332             |

Senior Unsecured Bonds trade with a credit spread of ~335 bps...a strengthening credit profile could mean the senior unsecured/subordinated spread could narrow to 75 bps

|                      |                     |                        |                      |
|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| CGXCN 7 5/8 03/01/30 | 9/8 Actions ▾       | 9/8 Settings ▾         |                      |
| Bond BK4408302       | Stock CGX CN Equity |                        |                      |
| 10 Pricing Analysis  | 10 Cash Tender      | 13 Historical Analysis | 14 Scenario Analysis |
| 10 Analysis          | 10 IR Curve         | 13 Credit Curve        | 13 Dividends         |
| Market Price         | 124.620             | Spread (OAS)           | 410.000              |
| BVAL (07:00)         |                     | Volatility             | 30.00                |
| Trade Date           | 09/04/2024          | Settle Date            | 09/05/2024           |
| Fair Value           | 139.196             | Bond Floor             | 103.402              |
| Cheapness (%)        | 10.477              | Option Value           | 35.794               |
| Implied Spread       | 2.048M              | Parity                 | 121.477              |
| Implied Vol          | N.A.                | Premium (pts)          | 3.143                |
| Delta (%)            | 91.015              | Premium (%)            | 2.587                |
| Effective Trig       | 138%/14             | Vega                   | 0.198                |
| Unit Prc             | 1.392M              | Theta                  | 0.020                |
| Hedge Ratio          | 8.845               | Exp Life (Fugl)        | 2.163                |
| Description          | CAD                 | Conv Prc               | 10.2900              |
| Bond CUR             | CAD                 | Conv Ratio             | 97.1817              |
| Stock CUR            | CGX CN              | Prog Conv Ratio        | 97.1817              |
| Coupon               | 172454AC4           | Int Prc (%)            | 27.50                |
| Collateral           | SUBORDINATED        | Coupon                 | 7.75% FIXED          |
| Par Amount           | 1000.00             | Opn Freq               | Semi-Annual          |
| ISIN                 | CA172454AC48        | First Coupon           | 09/30/20             |
| Common               | 222947359           | Next Coupon            | 03/01/25             |
| Wtrtpaper            | A280Y8              | CoCo Trig (%)          | N.A.                 |
| Moody's Rating       | N.A.                | Inc Share              | N.A.                 |
| S&P Rating           | N.A.                | Curr Conv Ratio        | 97.1817              |
| Fitch Rating         | N.A.                | Market                 | CANADIAN             |
| Div Protection       | Yes                 | Div Carry Fwd          | None                 |
| Div Thresh           | None                | Call Prot (yrs)        | 2.487                |
| Ex Code              | TOR/NTD             | Yearly Div             | .00                  |
| Issue Amt            | 316.25MM            | Next Call Date         | 03/01/29             |
| Amort Out            | 216.25MM            | Next Put Date          | None                 |
| Issue Date           | 07/15/20            | Next Call Price        | 100.00               |
| Maturity             | 03/01/30            | Next Put Price         | None                 |
| Conv From            | 07/15/20            | Prov Trig              | 125%/12.862          |
| Conv Until           | 02/22/30            | Prov Start             | 03/01/27             |
| Day Count            | ACT/365             | Prov Addl Points       | None                 |
| Lead Mgr             | SCOTIA              | BEST Est LT Gwth       | None                 |
| Market Cap           | 690MM               | BEST EPS 1Y/2Y         | .190/None            |
| Ind Group            | Entertain...        | BEST P/E 1Y/2Y         | 21.6/No...           |
| Consumer...          |                     | BEST PEG 1Y/2Y         | None/NL...           |
| Prc vs 52W Hi        | None/None           | Prc vs 52W Low         | -1.724               |
| Series               |                     |                        | 52.535               |

| Firm                   | Recommendation    | Tgt Pxl | Date     |
|------------------------|-------------------|---------|----------|
| TD Cowen               | buy               | 16.00   | 08/15/24 |
| RBC Capital            | outperform        | 13.00   | 08/09/24 |
| National Bank Finan... | outperform        | 12.50   | 08/28/24 |
| BMO Capital Markets    | market perform    | 12.50   | 08/09/24 |
| Scotiabank             | sector outperform | 12.00   | 08/12/24 |
| Canaccord Genuity      | buy               | 12.00   | 08/09/24 |

Median analyst price target of \$12.50, still below pre-covid valuation metrics



Volatility prior to Covid was between 15-30 versus 35 today. Normalization of business, new NCIB and future dividend policy could lead to a drop in implied and realized volatility which would cause the bonds to become modestly less valuable. As such, we thought it was prudent to begin harvesting volatility by selling options.



July 2024

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.8% on the Class F Units during the month of July. Our Net/Gross Exposure at month-end was 80%/116% versus 72%/103% at the end of June.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% | 1.8% |      |      |       |      |      | 10.5% |

Fundamental Corporate Credit (~34% of NAV, 12 positions)

We made very few adjustments to our carry portfolio other than selling down the Canadian preferred shares we bought at lower levels the month earlier. Based on our positioning and risk overlay, we are now modestly net short USD high yield within our carry portfolio. We think longer duration ‘BB’ credits are rich and prone to a repricing from either a lift in underlying government bond yields or a widening of credit spreads. Additionally, we believe ‘CCC’ credit remains subject to very real default risk. Therefore, our focus is now on a small subset of the overall market...unique, well-seasoned “B-rated” paper, often secured, at yields between 8%-9%. The chart below highlights areas where we look for undervalued bonds:

| Category                   | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Example                                                                                                                           |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Orphan Issuers             | A company that has one small bond in its debt structure and therefore has less of a following compared to companies with large debt structures who are consistently tapping the primary issuance market.                                                                       | BlueLinx – Building Products<br>BXC 6% 11/29<br>Senior Secured Bonds<br>\$300mm O/S                                               |
| Orphan Industries          | A company that operates in a unique industry with few comparable bonds. Pricing credits in these ‘orphan industries’ is difficult and larger managers typically ignore these bonds due to size/scarcity issues.                                                                | Deathcare – Carriage Services<br>CSV 4.25% 05/29 Unsecured Bonds<br>\$400mm O/S                                                   |
| Non-Index Bonds            | Bonds that are not contained in major indices/ETFs and therefore are not followed by closet indexers. These bonds generally have less beta to the market, and are not frequently bought and sold via ETFs.                                                                     | Calfrac<br>CFWCN 10.875% 2/2026<br>Senior Secured 2 <sup>nd</sup> Lien Bonds                                                      |
| Deeply Seasoned            | Bonds that have been outstanding for many years where as they “age” become underfollowed or forgotten by the investment community. These bonds also exhibit less beta as they have generally rotated over time into the hands of investors with high conviction on the credit. | AerCap<br>Floating Rate Auction Rate Preferreds<br>\$100mm tranche<br>Issued in 1992                                              |
| Unique Structural Features | Securities with unique put, call and redemption features that are unrelated to the credit risk of the issuer and are difficult to value. Option features are often mispriced by credit investors.                                                                              | Junior capital securities from banks and<br>Hybrids corporate securities                                                          |
| Busted Convertibles        | Bonds transitioning from convertible arbitrage investors or pure equity investors to credit specialists as they become “busted.” This often creates a mispricing.                                                                                                              | Atlantic AY 4% busted converts traded<br>at a yield much higher than its longer<br>maturity 4.125% unsecured high yield<br>bonds. |

## **Event-Driven (~43%, 17 positions)**

### ***Summit Midstream {SUMMPL 9.50% 10/26 2<sup>nd</sup> Lien Bonds}***

We acquired a position in these bonds at an average price of 101.5 under the thesis that the Company would redeem them at some point during 2024-H2. The Company is going through a transition from an MLP to a C-Corp and these bonds were both high cost with a 9.50% coupon and had prohibitive covenants. During the month, the Company launched a tender offer at 102.875 and we tendered our entire position for a 14.2% IRR.

### ***Hawaiian Airlines {HA 11% 04/29 Senior Secured Loyalty Bonds}***

We participated in the Company's exchange offer whereby we agreed to exchange our 5.75% Loyalty Bonds for 82.5 points worth of new 11% Loyalty Bonds and a 17.5-point cash payment at Par. The new bonds will be redeemed at Par should the Alaska Airline merger close but could drop into the 70s or 80s if the Department of Justice decides to litigate the deal, and it ultimately fails. We paired the long bond position with a short position in the common stock of Hawaiian. The stock is trading at ~\$12.50 as of month end but is worth \$18.00 in cash should the deal close. If the deal breaks, the stock could trade to between \$4.00-\$8.00 or lower. We think the implied probabilities of the merger closing are materially different between the stock and the bonds, creating a relative value trading opportunity. Based on our best estimate of the trading prices of both securities, should the deal *close* or *break* with our hedge ratio of 10%-15%, we think its possible to create a trade where we could earn our required return under either scenario.

### ***Capital Structure Arbitrage – Financial Corporation***

We have had on a complex capital structure trade since October 2023 where we are:

- Long the 2024 maturing debt of a financial corporation
- Short the common equity
- Long out-of-the money puts to hedge the debt
- Long out-of-the money calls to hedge the equity short position.

With the carefully selected package of 4 securities, we were able to create a +10% running arbitrage yield with some minor basis risk. We were hedged from any change in the value of the corporation's assets while collecting the "carry" from the cash flow of the debt less the option premium and less the borrow cost on the short position. We have now unwound around half the trade which has generated ~110 bps of gross return for the Fund.

## **Liquidity Provision (~20%)**

The Fund has most of its liquidity on deposit at our Prime Broker at CORRA minus a spread but we look to buy commercial paper, T-bills, hard called investment grade bonds and High Interest Savings ETFs to improve the return where possible.

We made a nice return from our position in the short duration AAA asset-backed securities issued by Chip Mortgage Trust. The entire market was pricing the bonds assuming they would mature December 15, 2024. However, we knew from our experience that the issuer had to redeem them 5 months earlier to be in compliance with regulatory liquidity rules. We received our principal back early in July and generated a 9.7% return on a near riskless < 1-yr 'AAA' security.

## **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~18%, 9 positions)**

The Fund benefited from the price appreciation in our Cineplex convertible bond position. The common shares rose in price as investors finally realized the strength of the 2024-H2 movie slate and how much CGX has underperformed versus its US peer group. The math on CGX is straightforward, the average patron pays \$12.50 for a ticket and on average buys \$9.00 worth of concessions. The gross margin is roughly 50% per person on ticket and 75% on concessions, meaning the

average patron generates \$10.75 of gross margin per visit. Corporate and theatre-level overhead is largely fixed meaning that the marginal theatre visit drops \$10.75 of free cash flow to the bottom line. LTM attendance is 47.9mm versus 2019 attendance of 66.4mm. If we assume a scenario where attendance returns to even 80% of 2019 levels, this would mean an incremental \$56mm of free cash flow on a ~\$600mm market cap stock. The value of the common stock going forward will be driven by incremental attendance, which in turn is driven by the quality of the content. What several recent films, including Deadpool & Wolverine, have demonstrated is that the age-old relationship between good content and attendance for movie theatres is not yet broken.

### **Risk Overlay (-14%)**

Our Risk Overlay was a source of negative return on the month as a decline in interest rates caused a rally in certain securities that we are short.

### **Summary**

Our current portfolio positioning continues to have us carrying high cash balances along with a shorter duration bias. We are accepting *reinvestment risk* and trading it off for increased *optionality*. More than 30% of the portfolio will roll-off into cash in the next 3 months. We will continue our strategy this year of finding on average one very attractive high conviction event-driven trade per month and sizing it up according within our risk management framework. The Fund continues to slowly raise incremental capital and we will look to scale the Fund further. We see ample opportunity to scale our existing portfolio without diluting return.



**Letter XVII – June 2024**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.9% on the Class F Units during the month of June. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 72% and Gross Exposure was 103% versus 62%/105% at the end of May. Approximately 70% of the gross return YTD has been realized.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  | 1.9% |      |      |      |       |      |      | 8.5%  |

### **Fundamental Corporate Credit (~22% of NAV, 14 positions)**

The Fund took advantage of the sharp decline in Canadian-listed preferreds during the month and added a half dozen or so new credits. Many prefs were down 5%-10% intra-month. The downdraft was linked to redemptions from specialized preferred share funds plus retail investors worried about further rate cuts in Canada. Historically, rate reset preferreds and floating rate preferreds have declined in value during a declining interest rate environment. We prefer floaters and fixed rate preferreds with near-term reset dates where there is free optionality on a par redemption. Many floating rate preferreds are pricing in 200 bps or 8 rate cuts before they have running yields equivalent to their fixed rate cousins. To fund the rotation in our Fundamental Corporate Credit portfolio we exited the following positions largely on valuation metrics:

- *Argo International 7% - longstanding USD preferred position reached fair value @ \$24.90*
- *Dye & Durham - DNDCN 8.625% 29 – appreciated to 102 or ~8% yield with little convexity left*
- *Arko Corporation – ARKO 5.75% 29 – modest concerns about a levered balance sheet*

### **Event-Driven (~44%, 15 positions)**

#### ***Industrial Alliance {IAF.PR.B 4.60% Perpetual Preferred Share}***

We accumulated a large position in the subject preferreds over the course of the last 4 months with the thesis that IAG was going to call these prefs at \$25.00. Our due diligence of IAF's tax situation led us to conclude they could issue new interest-bearing LRCN bonds at a cheaper after-tax cost compared to continuing to pay 4.60% in dividends on the perpetuals. In addition, IAF changed where it issues junior capital securities from an OpCo to a HoldCo and our preferred was the last small piece of junior capital at the OpCo. IAF has been around since 1892 and is run by actuaries, given its core business is insurance. They are quite literally in the business of complex math calculations and counting basis points. As such, we thought there was a high probability that their treasury team would eventually recognize the merits of redeeming and replacing this preferred with an LRCN. Mid-month, IAF finally issued new interest-bearing LRCN notes at a 6.92% and called our preferred. *The position generated an IRR of ~50% and 26 bps of gross return for the Fund. We exited the position at near Par before month end.*

#### ***Closed End Fund Arbitrage***

We closed on two closed-end arbitrage positions where we were long a closed-end fund, short the exact underlying assets and captured a fixed discount to Net Asset Value. These positions act like fixed income as they are fully hedged with a *fixed terminal date* and *fixed terminal price*.

## ***Allied Properties (AP-U Unsecured Bonds and Trust Units)***

Our thesis on AP-U played out with Moody's downgrading the bonds to junk status. The bonds are leaving the investment grade indices and will migrate to high yield. While our event thesis has played out the bonds have not fully repriced yet. One unique feature of REITs who use ladder unsecured funding is that they usually have a material amount of unencumbered assets. In times of stress, a REIT can always sell or mortgage unencumbered assets to pay off near-term unsecured bond maturities. This is the situation AP-U finds itself in. However, over time the credit curve can become very steep as short-term maturities become "safe", but the longer-term maturity's collateral gets diluted. We have seen this in real-time in the US on several credits including SVC and OPI. As such, we think the "back-end" longer AP-U maturities are very prone to a downward reprice. This is especially true since AP-U's weighted average coupon on its existing unsecured bonds is 3.03%. If we "re-coupon" the bonds at a prevailing interest rate of 6.75% it results in more than doubling of AP-U's cash interest expense. Cash interest would go from ~\$79mm per year to \$176mm, an increase of \$97mm (*see Appendix*). AP-U will need interest rates and credit spreads to come down materially in the future or it may not be able to support its current dividend. The current plan is for AP-U to use its \$800mm unsecured 2027 pari-passu revolver to retire the next two maturities in the debt stack (2025 and 2026). The revolver would then be fully drawn at CORRA + 145 bps which is roughly 6.25%, only modestly less than where they would issue unsecured bonds today. While AP-U is well managed with a good set of assets including a premier land base, we do not think that bondholders and unitholders have worked through the math on what higher interest rate means for cash flow. This situation is not unique to AP-U, many other REITs, IG Telcos, Utilities cash flow will get slowly "munched down" over time as low coupon debt is replaced with high coupon debt on refinancing.

## ***REIT Credit***

Noteworthy during the month was Canadian office REIT, Slate Office {SOT-U} defaulting by failing to pay interest on its debentures. Market prices are telling us that SOT's portfolio has a ~95%-100% LTV while the accountants/appraisers are implying a ~73% LTV. Stated differently, there is a 25%-30% value discrepancy between book and market (*see Appendix*). The market is saying there is ~\$50mm of residual value after senior debt is paid while IFRS-driven NAV metric is close to \$450mm, an almost 10x difference. Many REITs are trading at steep discounts to NAV, but we now have an example of a REIT whose accounting book values are significantly higher than market value but yet it cannot service its debt obligations.

## **Liquidity Provision (~28%)**

The Fund drew down some of its liquidity to fund increased weights on some of our higher conviction event-driven trades but had a few trades liquefy at month-end. The Fund is scheduled to receive a significant amount of liquidity in the next 30-120 days as various event-driven trades reach their terminal end point and convert to cash.

## **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~19%, 8 positions)**

### ***Tidewater Infrastructure {TWNCN 8% 06/29 Subordinated Convertibles}***

We added this new position via what we considered a heavily dilutive stressed refinancing. TWN's value is primarily comprised of 3 assets: a) 69% stake in the common equity of Tidewater Renewables worth \$180mm, b) Brazeau River Gas Infrastructure assets that generate free cash flow, and c) a profitable and strategic Diesel Refinery in Prince George (bought from Husky in 2019 for \$215mm). The Company has less than \$75mm of bank debt ahead of these convertibles. We think the bonds are well-covered from a credit perspective and earn 8% while clipping a long-term call option on the business. The optionality lies in the ability to harvest cash flow from Tidewater Renewables' recently completed and ramped Biodiesel Facility as well as volatility in crack spreads.

## Risk Overlay (-14%)

The Fund remains short, long duration BB credit and has longer dated put options on banks and financials. We are also short two REIT equity securities currently under the assumption that both will eventually have to slash their dividend.

## Summary

The Fund's returns going forward in corporate credit are unlikely to be driven simply by a macro theme of credit being cheap but by idiosyncratic trades where we: a) have an edge and have done the research upfront, b) can be a "first mover" on a trade and, c) have the conviction to maximum size the position within our risk parameters. The combination of (a), (b) and (c) should allow the Fund to continue its trajectory of strong returns in an otherwise benign, goldilocks, coupon clipping corporate credit market.

## Allied Properties Senior Unsecured

|                         | Coupon | Split  |
|-------------------------|--------|--------|
| New 5-year Refi Coupon  | 6.50%  | 33.3%  |
| New 7-year Refi Coupon  | 6.75%  | 33.3%  |
| New 10-year Refi Coupon | 7.00%  | 33.3%  |
|                         | 6.75%  | 100.0% |

| Bond Ticker          | Maturity Year | Par Notional | Coupon | Current Market Yield | Proforma Refinance Coupon | Current Bond Cash Interest | Proforma Cash Interest | Incremental Cash Interest | Cumulative Incremental Cash Interest |
|----------------------|---------------|--------------|--------|----------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| APUCN 3.636 04/21/25 | 2025          | \$ 200       | 3.630% | 5.71%                | 6.75%                     | \$ 7.3                     | \$ 13.5                | \$ 6.24                   | \$ 6.24                              |
| APUCN 1.726 02/12/26 | 2026          | \$ 600       | 1.726% | 5.98%                | 6.75%                     | \$ 10.4                    | \$ 40.5                | \$ 30.14                  | \$ 36.38                             |
| APUCN 3.113 04/08/27 | 2027          | \$ 300       | 3.110% | 6.13%                | 6.75%                     | \$ 9.3                     | \$ 20.2                | \$ 10.92                  | \$ 47.30                             |
| APUCN 3.131 05/15/28 | 2028          | \$ 300       | 3.131% | 6.20%                | 6.75%                     | \$ 9.4                     | \$ 20.2                | \$ 10.85                  | \$ 58.15                             |
| APUCN 3.394 08/15/29 | 2029          | \$ 300       | 3.394% | 6.30%                | 6.75%                     | \$ 10.2                    | \$ 20.2                | \$ 10.07                  | \$ 68.22                             |
| APUCN 3.117 02/21/30 | 2030          | \$ 400       | 3.117% | 6.36%                | 6.75%                     | \$ 12.5                    | \$ 27.0                | \$ 14.53                  | \$ 82.75                             |
| APUCN 3.095 02/06/32 | 2032          | \$ 500       | 3.950% | 6.53%                | 6.75%                     | \$ 19.8                    | \$ 33.7                | \$ 14.00                  | \$ 96.74                             |
|                      |               | \$ 2,600     | 3.028% | 6.20%                | 6.75%                     | \$ 78.7                    | \$ 175.5               | \$ 96.7                   | \$ 96.7                              |

| Cash Flow Water Fall                                            | Free Cash Flow | New NOI | True FCF | Payout Ratio |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|---------|----------|--------------|
| FFO LQA (directly from AP-U MD&A)                               | \$ 323         |         | \$ 323   | 77.8%        |
| AFFO LQA (directly from AP-U MD&A)                              | \$ 300         |         | \$ 300   | 83.8%        |
| CFO LQA (AP-U Cash Flow Statement, add back working capital)    | \$ 237         | 71.4    | \$ 308   | 81.7%        |
| CFO LQA (from above less capitalized leasing costs)             | \$ 141         | 71.4    | \$ 212   | 118.6%       |
| Less: Incremental Cash Interest - Refi of 2025s Bonds at Market | \$ 135         | 71.4    | \$ 206   | 122.2%       |
| Less: Incremental Cash Interest - Refi of 2026s Bonds at Market | \$ 104         | 71.4    | \$ 176   | 143.1%       |
| Less: Incremental Cash Interest - Refi of 2027s Bonds at Market | \$ 93          | 71.4    | \$ 165   | 152.6%       |
| Less: Cumulative Refi of All Bonds at Market                    | \$ 44          | 71.4    | \$ 115   | 218.0%       |
| Dividend LTM (\$62.9mm per quarter)                             | \$ 252         |         |          |              |

## Slate Office Properties

| ACCOUNTING/ APPRAISAL                  | MARKET VALUE                             | Δ         |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Senior Debt \$ 1,017.6                 | Senior Debt \$ 1,017.6                   | \$ -      |
| Junior Debt \$ 158.0                   | Junior Debt \$ 23.7                      | \$ 134.26 |
| IFRS Fair Value \$ 1,621.5             | Equity Market Cap \$ 28.5                | \$ 417.37 |
|                                        | Enterprise Value \$ 1,069.8              | \$ 551.63 |
| Implied Total LTV 72.5%                | Implied Total LTV 97.3%                  | 24.8%     |
| Implied Senior LTV 62.8%               | Implied Senior LTV 95.1%                 | 32.4%     |
| Residual Portfolio Equity Value \$ 446 | Residual Portfolio Equity Value \$ 28.50 | \$ 417    |



**Letter XVI – May 2024**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 77 bps on the Class F Units during the month of May. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 62% and Gross Exposure was 105% versus 72%/117% at the end of April.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.6% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.1% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 14.7% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.8%  |      |      |      |      |       |      |      | 6.4%  |

Despite a positive return, the month was frustrating because of the increased dispersion in our portfolio. This led us to take our net exposure down to ~62% and have become more surgical in deploying capital in a concentrated fashion, given current valuations in the corporate credit markets. The primary market is showing early signs of fatigue as inflows into the asset class slow and supply picks up. We are positioning the Fund to take advantage of a steady stream of attractively priced short-term event-driven trades, while we wait patiently to rebuild our Core Carry portfolio.

One interesting development in 2024 has been the reemergence of convertible financing. CAD converts have traditionally been priced rich and distributed through retail channels. However, there are early signs that Companies who have legacy “retail” preferreds in their capital structure may have to tap the institutional market to refinance. Generically, the new clearing price for a non-investment grade 5-year subordinated convertible bond in Canada entails a coupon of between 7%-8% and a conversion premium of between 25%-30%. We view these terms as attractive to investors relative to straight debt. The fund now has approximately 10% of its capital in “balanced” convertible bonds across 3 issuers we have strong fundamental views around or are tied to upcoming catalysts.

### **Core Corporate (~25% of NAV, 8 positions)**

Our Core Corporate Carry portfolio continues to shrink as we trimmed the last of our low yielding assets. Given where risk-free rates and credit spreads are, we do not think it makes sense to hold medium-to-long duration credit assets yielding much less than 7.50%-8.0%. This “soft hurdle” is also driven by the increased ability to earn HSD IRRs on shorter duration event-driven trades. At month-end, net of our Risk Overlay, our exposure to USD HY is only ~6% of NAV. We have now made room to hunt for 2-3 new positions such as the new position we have in Cable One bonds:

#### ***Cable One {CABO 4% 2030 Senior Unsecured Bonds / CABO 1.125% 28 Senior Unsecured Busted Convertibles}***

We made our first *long* investment in the beleaguered US cable sector through the purchase of two Cable One (“CABO”) bonds. CABO is a smaller cable operator focused on premium service in rural areas of the United States. Results have been pressured by competition plus the uncertainty about how they intend to fund a “put option” granted to a joint venture partner as part of the original acquisition of another operator, Mega Broadband. We have followed CABO for awhile, liked management, but did not invest because we felt the price of the bonds was too high. After 18 months of being patient, we finally got an opportunity to buy bonds at 73 cents on the dollar to yield 9.75%. We were able to capture the “low tick” as the bond rallied 3 pts subsequent to month-end. While there is no guarantee the bonds don’t drift back below 73, in the short-term we feel like valuation levels are well-supported. We think the CABO 2030 and 2028 bonds are the cleanest shirts in a dirty TMT closet. *(more details in Appendix)*

### **Event-Driven (~32%, 17 positions)**

#### ***Alteryx {AYX 8.75% 03/28 Senior Unsecured Bonds}***

AYX was taken private by PE-sponsor Clearlake Capital. The bonds traded as high as 107 on the thesis that the sponsor would have to redeem the bonds at a make-whole price close to 109 in order to obtain the new acquisition financing. However, the Sponsor argued it was in compliance with its debt incurrence obligations under the indenture because of generous pro forma EBITDA add-backs. Therefore, they argued they only had an obligation to offer a 101 Change of Control premium. The bonds dropped to below 102 from 107 so we acquired a position. We ended up joining a Bondholder Group and signed what is called a "Cooperation Agreement". After two months of negotiation and under the threat of a technical default, the Sponsor agreed to redeem the bonds in December 2024 at 102 and pay a 1/8 Consent Fee. *We exited our position in the bonds for a 12.4% IRR.*

#### ***Atlantica {AY 4.125% 2030 Unsecured Bonds}***

We accumulated a position in AY's bonds at 97.50 after they announced a take-private transaction. The transaction is likely to take 6-9 months to complete but once completed, we think the sponsor will be required to redeem the bonds at a price of 101. AY has been shopped for ~5 years and ran a robust process over the course of the last year to find a buyer. AY's largest shareholder (AQN: ~42% ownership) is under pressure to sell the asset to the highest bidder regardless of price and has agreed to support the transaction. As such, we think the transaction is the highest and best offer and has a high probability of closing. *The IRR to our estimated March 1, 2025, closing date at the price we paid is ~9%.*

#### **Liquidity Provision (~38%)**

We continue to maintain a high amount of liquidity in the Fund. Our cash balances fluctuate substantially intra-month as we take advantage of tactical trading opportunities.

#### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~14%, 6 positions)**

This part of the portfolio is largely unchanged month-over-month. We continue to maintain a high bar before investing in lower tier credit given the increased propensity of stressed companies to complete transactions that disadvantage legacy creditors. We are now seeing an uptick in stress in illiquid private debt markets as mid-market private companies continue to struggle to cover their interest expense. Much of this is happening out of the view of the public markets. Other anecdotal signs of froth in the private credit markets:

- New "Synthetic PIK" structure that allows a borrower to pay its interest expense by drawing new separate debt
- Several private debt funds have outright gated or slowed the ability of investors to get their capital back
- A premier tech private equity sponsor company moved part of its Intellectual Property out of the reaches of a group of large sophisticated private lenders who originally financed the sponsor's LBO

Private Credit is starting to morph into simply non-mark-to-market 'CCC' bonds/loans, closely held by an ever expanding "club" of investors. The upshot is that this pool of capital should provide additional flexibility for stressed borrowers to refinance short-term maturities and provide an exit for short-duration public bond investors.

#### **Risk Overlay (-10%)**

Our Risk Overlay bucket was a source of negative return during the month. Our Risk Overlay is now largely composed of short positions in BB-rated corporate bonds and long-dated put options on select equity indices including Financials.

#### **Summary**




We are pleased with how we have positioned the portfolio. Our game plan remains the same, which is to avoid generic corporate credit "beta", hyper focus on short-term event-driven trades with high single digit IRRs/ low downside and underweight lower tier credit. As market conditions and prices change, we will adjust our focus accordingly.

## Cable One

### Capital Structure

| Tranche                     | Rank     | Rating(s) | Face (mm)       | Coupon       | Maturity  | Fixed Charges   | LTM Leverage | LTV           |
|-----------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------------|--------------|-----------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|
| Revolver                    | 1st Lien | Ba2/BB+   | \$ 238          | 7.175%       | 22-Feb-28 | \$ 17.1         |              |               |
| Term Loan B-2               | 1st Lien | Ba2/BB+   | \$ 238          | 7.672%       | 30-Oct-29 | \$ 18.2         |              |               |
| Term Loan B-3               | 1st Lien | Ba2/BB+   | \$ 747          | 7.672%       | 30-Oct-29 | \$ 57.3         |              |               |
| Term Loan B-4               | 1st Lien | Ba2/BB+   | \$ 778          | 7.444%       | 03-May-28 | \$ 57.9         |              |               |
| <b>Total Secured Debt</b>   |          |           | <b>\$ 2,001</b> | <b>7.52%</b> |           | <b>\$ 150.5</b> | <b>2.2 x</b> | <b>36.1%</b>  |
| Convertible                 | Unsec.   | NR        | \$ 575          | 0.000%       | 15-Mar-26 | \$ -            |              |               |
| Convertible                 | Unsec.   | NR        | \$ 345          | 1.125%       | 15-Mar-28 | \$ 3.9          |              |               |
| Unsecured Bond              | Unsec.   | BB-/B2    | \$ 650          | 4.000%       | 15-Nov-30 | \$ 26.0         |              |               |
| <b>Total Unsecured Debt</b> |          |           | <b>\$ 1,570</b> |              |           | <b>\$ 29.9</b>  | <b>4.0 x</b> | <b>64.3%</b>  |
| <b>Total Net Debt</b>       |          |           | <b>\$ 3,360</b> |              |           | <b>\$ 180.4</b> | <b>3.7 x</b> | <b>60.6%</b>  |
| Market Capitalization       |          |           | \$ 2,191        |              |           |                 | 2.4 x        |               |
| <b>Enterprise Value</b>     |          |           | <b>\$ 5,549</b> |              |           |                 | <b>6.2 x</b> | <b>100.0%</b> |

*EBITDA Margins, Gross Margins, Free Cash Flow has grown steadily for +10 years. Leverage has increased because of substantial common equity purchases which are now complete. FCF is likely to be diverted to debt reduction going forward.*



*Cable One bonds are priced substantially cheaper than many cable/fibre operators despite similar financial metrics and arguably better operating metrics.*

| Obligor             | Charter     | Comcast       | Frontier  | Cable One | Rogers       | Bell         | Videotron       |
|---------------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Rating              | BB-         | A-            | B+        | B+        | BBB-         | BBB+         | BBB-            |
| Bond                | CHTR 4.5 30 | CMCSA 4.25 30 | FYBR 6 30 | CABO 4 30 | RCICN 2.9 30 | BCECN 2.5 30 | QBRCN 3.125% 31 |
| Leverage            | 4.4 x       | 2.2 x         | 4.6 x     | 3.7 x     | 4.5 x        | 3.6 x        | 3.0 x           |
| Debt-to-Capital     | 68%         | 37%           | 60%       | 60%       | 59%          | 44%          | 54%             |
| G-Spread            | 346 bps     | 62 bps        | 457 bps   | 532 bps   | 136 bps      | 123 bps      | 144 bps         |
| Spread per Turn Lev | 79 bps      | 28 bps        | 99 bps    | 144 bps   | 30 bps       | 34 bps       | 48 bps          |



**Letter XV – April 2024**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 0.8% on the Class C units during the month of April. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 72% and Gross Exposure was 117% versus 76%/109% at the end of March. Our gross exposure is slightly higher than normal because of the anticipation of several Event-Driven trades running off next month.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD          |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|--------------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | <b>15.0%</b> |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 0.8% |       |      |      |      |      |       |      |      | <b>5.6%</b>  |

The downward price action in the credit markets in April was driven by the “higher for longer” interest rate narrative. This caused yields on government bonds to rise. Credit spreads were largely unchanged, so the negative performance to credit assets was largely driven by underlying risk-free rates and *not* a widening of credit spreads.

|       | US Treasuries | Investment Grade | High Yield | Russell 2000 | Credit Strategies |
|-------|---------------|------------------|------------|--------------|-------------------|
| YTD   | (3.26%)       | (2.93%)          | 0.52%      | (2.23%)      | <b>5.60%</b>      |
| April | (2.33%)       | (2.54%)          | (0.94%)    | (7.04%)      | <b>0.80%</b>      |

Source: Bloomberg

The Fund’s outperformance versus broader credit indices was driven by several factors:

- Large weighting in cash and cash equivalents of 24% entering the month and 28% exiting the month.
- Short positions in longer duration ‘BB’ high yield bonds including many new issues which exhibit more beta.
- Low interest rate duration.
- Broader market recognition of our thesis in Cineplex which is one of the Fund’s largest position.
- Tilt towards Canadian Dollar credit assets which performed better than US Dollar credit assets.

### **Core Corporate (~35% of NAV, 11 positions)**

Our Core Corporate Carry portfolio was largely unchanged month-over-month, but we did increase our weights in several long standing, higher conviction positions. We had completed most of the pruning of our USD High Yield risk last month. At month-end, when matched off against our Risk Overlay, our Net Exposure to USD HY is only ~5% of NAV, a record low.

*The yield on our Core Corporate portfolio is now ~9% with a duration of 2.6 years.*

### **Event-Driven (~37%, 23 positions)**

#### ***Tapestry {TPR 7.70% 11/30 Senior Unsecured Bonds}***

We added this position to the Fund after the FTC announced it is suing to block the merger between Tapestry (Coach/Kate Spade) and Capri (Michael Kors/Jimmy Choo/Versace). The FTC argues the combined entity would control too much of the “accessible luxury” handbag market. The lawsuit has been widely panned. The bonds were issued by TPR to pre-fund its cash bid and, as such, contain what is called a “Special Mandatory Redemption” or “SMR” provision. An SMR is a clause that is triggered if the acquisition fails to close within a prescribed time-period and requires the issuer to redeem the bonds at 101. By our math, if the deal closes, spreads could rally 25-50 bps and lead to a +10% holding period return. If we are wrong and the deal breaks, we likely get redeemed at 101 in 2024-Q4 or 2025-Q1. However, if this takes place, we will collect the 7.7% coupon along the way and then incur a capital loss on redemption. This scenario would lead to a low single digit IRR. We think the 2030 bonds are the best risk-adjusted way to play the TPR/CPRI merger transaction.

## **Canadian Bank Preferred Share Redemptions**

We took full advantage of favourable refinancing conditions for Canadian Bank junior capital securities by accumulating large positions in various Canadian Bank preferreds that we felt had a high probability of being redeemed on their next reset date. These include BMO.S, BMO.F, CM.Y, TD.M. The BMO.S was a particular big winner for the Fund given we bought the position between \$21.00-\$22.00 and it was just redeemed at \$25.00. However, we think that there is now too much speculation in prefs that have longer dated resets and low reset spreads. Rate Reset Preferreds are very negatively convex creatures. Making the blanket assumption too far into the future that an issuer will redeem its preferred shares, *based on conditions today*, is a dangerous trade. There is no guarantee that all Canadian Bank listed preferred shares will be called on the next reset date. There are a group of upcoming Bank preferreds such as CM.O, TD.B, RY.H, BMO.T, TD.A and BMO.W that have reset spreads between 222 bps and 232 bps, far below market. Speculators have driven prices up to mid-\$24 range with proforma dividend resets of ~6% even though the market is higher. If the LRCN and Institutional Pref market holds its current levels it is possible these get called. However, if we get a macro spread widening event such as the Regional Bank flare up in 2023, they have huge downside. Betting on these prefs for an *up +1, down -2 or more* payoff profile whilst twisting in the wind for much of 2024 is not a trade we will likely do at current trading levels.

*The IRRs on our Event Driven portfolio range between 7.5%-12.5% with an expected event duration of 5.6 months.*

## **Liquidity Provision (~28%)**

We now have 8.4% of the Fund in liquid 60/90-day AAA-rated asset backed securities with the majority of the balance of our cash earning close to either Fed Funds or Canada Overnight rates. The opportunity cost of holding cash in our view is quite low and the option value of holding cash is quite high. If the market backs up, we will reallocate to our Core Corporate portfolio.

## **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~14%, 7 positions)**

### ***Office Properties Trust {OPI 9% 03/2029 senior secured 1<sup>st</sup> lien bonds}***

We acquired a new position in the bonds as part of a “clean-up” trade where a large seller drove down the price of the bonds from 94 to 88.25, where the block finally cleared. We have followed this bond like a hawk since new issue and got our chance to buy a position at a nice discount. The bond is secured by a first lien on a portfolio of OPI’s top office assets. The assets have an appraised LTV of 52%, the weighted average lease term of 9.8 years, consistent 98% occupancy and the majority tenant exposure is to Governments. The implied GAAP NOI cap rate thru the market value of the bonds is 15%. The implied Cash NOI cap rate thru the par notional of the bonds is 11%. (*Appendix I*)

### ***Private Credit - the Apex Predator***

Private Credit is quickly becoming the *Apex Predator* asset class within corporate credit markets. A recent transaction by packaging company Ardagh saw them unexpectedly borrow ~\$1 billion in new debt from Apollo by pledging the assets of a subsidiary that was unencumbered under the existing bonds. The existing capital structure sold off sharply after the deal was announced with bonds down as much as 20 pts. With bond documentation weak over the last five years, we expect more stressed companies to exploit loose creditor documentation to raise new *PRIVATE* debt to the detriment of legacy *PUBLIC* bond holders. The combination of a fresh, large pool of private debt capital and loose bond documentation will likely lead to lower recoveries this cycle. The job of many smaller credit investors like us, who focus on public tradeable securities, will be to avoid becoming prey at the hands of large private debt investors.

*The yield on our Special Situations/Stressed portfolio (excluding our CGX convertible) is now ~11%.*

## Risk Overlay (-13%)

Recall from last month that we had been shorting new issues after they break higher on the secondary market. A new short position for us is a bond issued by Vail Resorts {MTN 6.50% 2032}, the ski resort operator. This bond is rated BB- and had an option adjusted credit spread (“OAS”) of only 121 bps where we shorted it, making it the 3<sup>rd</sup> tightest high yield bond in the +2000-bond high yield index. The BB Index itself had a credit spread of 186 bps when we shorted the bonds. Below is a sample of recently issued bonds where we used our new issue shorting strategy:

|                  | Issue Price | Peak    | Trough | Peak/Trough  |
|------------------|-------------|---------|--------|--------------|
| Sally Beauty     | 100         | 100.5   | 95.5   | 5.00 points  |
| Amer Sports      | 100         | 101.375 | 97     | 4.375 points |
| Red Rock Resorts | 100         | 101.5   | 97.875 | 3.625 points |

We also initiated a new short position in the 30-year credit spreads of Bell Canada. There appears to be a disconnect between what the equity markets are telling us vs. what the credit markets are telling us. The equity is at multi-year lows, while BCE’s credit spreads are at multi-year tight. Leverage has been creeping up at BCE and is now 3.6x versus 3.48x last quarter and they amended their corporate policy to have a higher leverage target (3.0x) and seem content to continue to have a +100% dividend payout ratio for the next couple of years. We believe it is a distinct possibility that they could drop to BBB (low) eventually if they do not de-lever to 3.25x. The common equity looks cheap relative to the credit to us.

## Summary

The Fund is walking a fine line between being cautious and disciplined with its capital, and trying to skillfully earn our required return. This is a tricky environment because one can get seduced by higher absolute yields only to have your heart broken by higher credit spreads down the road. We suspect that any rally in government bond yields will be met with credit spread widening. This would result in muted capital appreciation. Whiffs of Stagflation are now entering the narrative at month end, which is bad for longer duration credit assets. We still think it’s the wrong time to extend credit duration and lock in longer yields in the fixed income market.



## Appendix I

| City           | Square Feet      | Year Built/Renovated | Type                      | Primary Tenant Industry     | Credit Rating | Tenant | WALT       | Occupancy  |
|----------------|------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|--------|------------|------------|
| Atlanta        | 357,570          | 2020                 | Office                    | Other Business Services     | Not Rated     | Multi  | 12.0       | 100%       |
| Provo          | 411,662          | 2000                 | Office                    | Computer, Technology        | BB/Ba         | Multi  | 10.3       | 94%        |
| Silicon Valley | 96,415           | 2012                 | Office - R&D              | Communications              | B/B           | Single | 9.2        | 100%       |
| Sacramento     | 163,840          | 1988                 | Govt - Office             | State Government            | AAA/Aaa       | Multi  | 6.5        | 97%        |
| South Florida  | 135,819          | 1999                 | Office                    | Insurance                   | AA/Aa         | Single | 14.1       | 99%        |
| Silicon Valley | 65,840           | 2014                 | Office - R&D              | Communications              | B/B           | Single | 11.3       | 100%       |
| Silicon Valley | 68,243           | 2011                 | Office - R&D              | Aircraft                    | Not Rated     | Single | 7.2        | 100%       |
| San Antonio    | 99,986           | 2004                 | Office                    | Insurance                   | AA/Aa         | Single | 5.1        | 100%       |
| Austin         | 93,188           | 1999                 | Office                    | Computer, Technology        | AA/Aa         | Single | 5.8        | 100%       |
| San Diego      | 46,370           | 2020                 | Office                    | Government Contractors      | BBB/Baa       | Single | 7.5        | 100%       |
| Richmond       | 225,000          | 2011                 | Industrial - Distribution | Miscellaneous Manufacturing | Not Rated     | Single | 10.3       | 100%       |
| Sacramento     | 87,863           | 1992                 | Govt - Office             | State Government            | AAA/Aaa       | Single | 9.8        | 100%       |
| Boise          | 90,855           | 1996                 | Govt - Office             | U.S. Government             | AAA/Aaa       | Single | 8.1        | 100%       |
| Phoenix        | 66,743           | 2013                 | Office                    | State Government            | AA/Aa         | Single | 9.3        | 100%       |
| Boise          | 59,696           | 1997                 | Govt - Office             | U.S. Government             | AAA/Aaa       | Single | 8.1        | 100%       |
| Boise          | 30,401           | 2002                 | Govt - Office             | U.S. Government             | AAA/Aaa       | Single | 18.4       | 100%       |
| Burlington VT  | 26,609           | 2009                 | Govt - Office             | U.S. Government             | AAA/Aaa       | Single | 0.8        | 100%       |
|                | <b>2,126,100</b> |                      |                           |                             |               |        | <b>9.8</b> | <b>98%</b> |

## Appendix II

### Bell Canada Common Equity vs. 30-year Corporate Bond Spreads

*Stock at 10-year Lows but Credit Spreads at 10-year Tights*





## Letter XIV – March 2024

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 1.3% on the Class C units during the month of March. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 76% and Gross Exposure was 109% versus 76%/107% at the end of February.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% |      |       |      |      |      |      |       |      |      | 4.8%  |

Year-to-date the USD High Yield market is up 1.23% and a generic Hedge Fund Event Driven Index we track is up 0.72%. For Q1 2024, please see below for a breakdown of gains (gross of fees):

|                          |      |
|--------------------------|------|
| Interest Income          | 20%  |
| Eligible Dividend Income | 8%   |
| Foreign Dividends        | 2%   |
| Realized Gains           | 32%  |
| Unrealized Gains         | 38%  |
|                          | 100% |

### Core Corporate (36% of NAV, 12 positions)

We continue to de-risk our Core Corporate Carry portfolio. Less than 1/3 of the portfolio now sits in USD High Yield, the balance is in short-dated busted convertibles, preferred shares, aircraft-backed equipment trust certificates, investment grade obligors. For context, when high yield spreads were much wider in early 2023 we had significantly more exposure to USD High Yield in this sub-portfolio. However, we now think USD High Yield is one of the richer corporate credit asset classes, hence our flight to quality. We are not discouraged, as there are always pockets of opportunity to find attractive, higher yielding core assets in the multi-trillion-dollar corporate credit asset class.

### Event-Driven (~30%, 19 positions)

The opportunity set in event-driven credit is the best we have seen in terms of *frequency* of opportunities since the Fund's inception. We added at least a half dozen new positions to the Fund in March at attractive IRRs, including a few short positions.

We added a short position in an investment grade REIT that we think will get downgraded to junk and cause forced selling by investment grade index funds. Investment grade bonds usually trade on "spread" not yield/price like high yield bonds. Once a credit gets downgraded to junk it is most likely to be evaluated on a yield or price basis, likely causing this bond to trade down due to its position on the credit curve.

We unwound our Long Videotron/Short Cogeco pairs trade at a 23 bps credit spread differential having put in on at around 100 bps. We think eventually QBRN bonds trade tight to CCACN bonds but elected to leave the last 20 bps or so for someone else as the risk/reward no longer justifies the position.

We were actively trading Inter Pipeline {IPLCN} investment grade debt during the month. DBRS put them on Negative Credit watch because of issues at their Heartland petrochemical facility. This caused spreads to blow out 25 bps. We "bought the credit spread wides" across the 2034, 2044 and 2051 bonds when it was alleged that there had been zero

“long-only/real money” buyers. We then sold our position roughly 13 bps tighter a few days later for a capital gain. This was a repeat of a trade we did last year where AT&T CAD Long bonds blew out after a WSJ article about lead in their cables. Capturing 10-20 bps moves in investment grade long bonds can be a profitable venture given the duration of the bonds allowing for quick 1-3 point capital gains.

**Liquidity Provision (~24%)** - We continue to hold a healthy weight in cash and cash equivalents.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~19%, 6 positions)**

We made no changes to this portfolio in March. However, we generated significant gains from our ~5% position in the busted convertible bonds of Dye and Durham {DNDN 3.75% 26}. We started buying the bonds in the mid 70s last year. The credit has been subject to a cornucopia of events in the last few quarters (see Appendix). As each event unfolded and new information revealed, the probability of getting Par back early increased. When probabilities change...prices should change. At each node, we did not take profits but in fact increased our position at incrementally higher prices. We now expect to get close to Par back on our position shortly. Round trip the position generated 130 bps of gross return. This is a good example of a situation where we have been able to take multiple bites of the same apple by sticking with a position.

### ***Telecommunications, Media, Cable Satellite***

Pain continues to spread in this corner of the credit markets, we only point it out because perceived credit risk often starts in certain sectors or names but tends to spread like a disease. Several *Mêlée à Trois* are breaking out across several TMT credits as secured bondholders, unsecured bondholders and common equity holders battle each other to grab whatever they can on declining enterprise values. Being a small creditor in a distressed situation is a treacherous proposition this credit cycle compared to prior ones, as the trend has been towards companies pursuing “Liability Management Exercises” rather than simply filing for Chapter 11. These LMEs often prejudice smaller, passive investors as large, distressed investors attempt to box out other bondholders in their respective classes and cut side deals for themselves with management for better bond terms. Common equity holders are also using the threat of insolvency to cram down distressed exchanges and force hair cuts onto bondholders. The latest flare up is Altice France, the management team told investors they would have to participate in “discounted transactions” to help the company slash its debt. Then rumours circulated that secured bondholders were trying to wipe out the unsecured holders as part of a restructuring. A tranche of unsecured bonds traded down from 70 cents to 30 cents.


### **Risk Overlay (-9%)**

We continue to short sell selective USD High Yield new issues that have traded above par “on the break” purely on investor demand driven by inflows not fundamentals. We added to our long-dated out of the money put positions on Canadian Banks to hedge out a portion of the tail-risk in a few of our preferred share exposures.

### **Summary**

The opportunity to deploy capital remains robust despite macro tightening in corporate credit spreads. Credit markets being wide open has been a catalyst for refinancing debt maturities, M&A, asset sales and other corporate events that typically occur at the tail-end of a bull market. Opportunities are beginning to emerge on the short-side for the first time in awhile, which is very exciting. Pure fund flows and passive indexers have driven certain credits to overvalued territory. USD corporate credit remains rich to CAD credit, so we have shifted some of our exposures out of the US into Canada. In addition, select preferred shares and convertibles look cheap to us relative to straight corporate debt. We continue to outright avoid many sectors including TMT, Retail, CCCs and LBO Debt. Regardless of overall macro conditions, the Fund is small and nimble enough to find and execute on event-driven opportunities while we await better entry points to reallocate to our Core Corporate Carry portfolio.

## Appendix – Dye & Durham (DNDCN 3.75% 2026 Unsecured Convertibles)



| Date      | Event                                                                        | Price (before) | Price (after) |
|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| 24-Jul-23 | Offer to purchase a portion of the bonds at between 50-65 cents for cash     | 78.50          | 78.63         |
| 20-Oct-23 | Offers to exchange a portion of bonds to new 2028 bonds at a discount to par | 75.25          | 75.00         |
| 13-Nov-23 | Announces strategic review of non-core assets to accelerate deleveraging     | 75.00          | 74.75         |
| 07-Dec-23 | Revised exchange offer, increases size                                       | 75.25          | 75.50         |
| 05-Jan-24 | Revised exchange offer, increases size again                                 | 75.13          | 75.50         |
| 17-Jan-24 | Issues \$126mm of common stock with proceeds to reduce debt                  | 76.25          | 88.00         |
| 15-Mar-24 | Changes to Board of Directors                                                | 91.00          | 92.00         |
| 20-Mar-24 | Announces the refinancing of the existing credit facility and 2026 bonds     | 92.00          | 98.00         |
| 01-Apr-24 | Announces proposed \$500mm of new secured bonds                              | 97.50          | 98.50         |
| 01-Apr-24 | Intends to make an offer by way of a SIB to purchase all the 2026 bonds      | 97.50          | 98.50         |



**Letter XIII – February 2024**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a net return of 0.83% on the Class C units during the month of February. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 76% and Gross Exposure was 107% versus 86%/92% at the end of January.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD          |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|--------------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | <b>15.0%</b> |
| 2024 | 2.6% | 0.8% |      |      |       |      |      |      |      |       |      |      | <b>3.4%</b>  |

Approximately half of the month’s return came from the realization of our thesis on Cineplex (“CGX”). CGX convertibles, and secured bonds, have been the largest position in the Fund since late 2023. We were part of a small group of creditors that were taken private after we proposed a balance sheet restructuring transaction to the Company, and its Bankers, last year. We agreed to reduce our non-callable convertible bond principal by ~31% at a cash price of 102.35 and then take back a new convertible with a 7.75% coupon and 25% conversion premium. In addition, we agreed to help refinance the existing 2<sup>nd</sup> lien bonds with new secured bonds, thereby redeeming our bonds at a premium. All told, the transaction generated ~75 bps of gross return for the Fund. Additionally, we think the new convertible could be worth more than where it’s currently trading given several expected catalysts in 2024.

### **Core Corporate (41% of NAV, 16 positions)**

We continue to trade up in quality within our Core Corporate Carry portfolio. As high yield credit starts to trade inside of 7% with a credit spread of < 300 bps we are trimming risk. Currently ~50% of the sub-portfolio is in Investment Grade obligors including 12% in short-duration AAA-rated asset-backed securities.

We begrudgingly sold our long-standing position in the secured bonds of BlueLinX {BXC 6% 11/29}. The bonds railed to a yield less than 7% and a credit spread of 275 bps. While the Company has more cash than debt, we were somewhat concerned that the risk of them completing a larger cash acquisition was not properly priced in.

### **Event-Driven (~25%, 19 positions)**

**PGT Innovations {PGTI 4.375% 29}**: We sold our position after the HSR regulatory review period expired, causing the bonds to trade up. This compressed our expected IRR to the closing date to less than 6.50%. Our IRR on the position was 10.3% on a relatively straightforward and clean risk arbitrage trade.

**Advance Autoparts {AAP 29s & 30s}**: We sold our position in the 2029s and are now short the 2030s. It has been a strange time trading AAP bonds. AAP got downgraded to BB+ by S&P last year, and one week before earnings in Feb they were downgraded by Moody’s to Baa3(neg), still investment grade. However, one large high yield ETF takes the “average” credit rating for inclusion. As a result, it caused forced buying of AAP bonds at what we think are rich levels: a) ~6% yield and b) < 190 bps credit spread. We sold the high yield ETF our long position in the 29s and then shorted them the 30s.

**Carriage Services {CSV 4.25% 05/29}**: The Company announced earnings, and while they had multiple transaction proposals, they elected to shelve the Strategic Review and maintain status quo. Our thesis was that a takeover by a larger death care company would trigger a 101 Change of Control. We quickly sold our position for a gain as the quarter was better than expected. Our IRR was ~9.4% on the position which we initialized at the Fund’s inception.

**First Quantum {FMCN 2025s and FMCN 2026s}**: announced a comprehensive recapitalization of the Company with new equity, copper prepay agreement and new debt to refinance short-term bond maturities. We were taken out of our short-end positions at par subsequent to month-end, earning a high single digit return on the position.

**Hawaiian Airlines {HA 5.75% 01/26}**: We are back in the Hawaiian leisure travel business. When the US court decision came down killing the SAVE/JETBLU merger deal, HA's bonds traded down to 91.5. We re-bought our position and then shorted some common stock against it. We think the bonds are implying a much lower probability of the deal closing when compared to the common equity. The implied probabilities are mismatched and there is a much better "upside/downside" in the bonds versus the stock. For those interested, the judges ruling on the SAVE/JETBLU provides interesting insight into the US airline industry: <https://assets.bwbx.io/documents/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/rOI7x4YbSJ0/v0>

We have a closed-end arbitrage position that has caused some negative Fund performance this month. We are long a closed-end fund and short the exact amount of the underlying assets. The closed-end fund is under strategic review with an outcome expected by April. Our thesis is that actions will be taken to close the discount. The discount to NAV is now 40% versus ~25% when we initiated this trade.

**Liquidity Provision (~24%)** The Fund had ~24% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end up from 14% at the end of January.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~16%, 7 positions)**

**Weight Watchers {WW 4.5% 29 Secured Bonds}**: We purchased a small weight [no pun intended] when the bonds dropped from 66 cents to 49.5 cents, where we bought our bonds, and then rallied back up to 53.5. WW is over-levered and has a challenged legacy business model. However, their new CEO is attempting to digitize a business anchored by its very popular app, and become a conduit for the public to obtain weight-loss drugs. We thought the risk-reward was in our favour at 49.5 cents and the Company has a long liquidity runway. Quarterly results were inline with our expectations, but we were surprised by the announcement that Oprah Winfrey was leaving the Board and donating all her stock to the National Museum of African American History and Culture. We realized we had it wrong and sold our bonds crystalizing a 6 bps loss for the fund.

### **Risk Overlay**

We were very active in our hedging this month accumulating short positions in a handful of securities. One strategy we have now employed is shorting new issues after they break higher in the secondary market. Capital inflows have created a frothy primary market. One of the benefits of shorting new issues, especially ones with long settlement times, is we don't have to pay the coupon and borrow costs on the bonds. New issue bonds have a lot of market beta to them, so they become cheap market shorts.

**Sally Beauty {SBH 6.75% 03/32}**: SBH sells beauty products. Sales and margins have been declining. The Company is 2.5x levered and will use FCF to buy back stock. The bonds were issued at 100 and we shorted them just above that.

**American Sports {AS 6.75% 02/31}**: AS is a 4x levered sporting goods company that sells branded products such as Arc'teryx, Salomon, Wilson, and Louisville Slugger. The bonds traded up to 101.25 after being issued and we shorted them.

### **Summary**

Corporate credit markets are richer today than they were last month. Money is flowing into a frothy primary market but against widening dispersion across sectors/ratings/tenors. Corporate credit investing is often about *exclusion not inclusion* as outperformance is driven by the bonds and sectors you do not buy, rather than the ones you do buy. One factor in our positive performance has been our avoidance of "hot zones" such as US Cable, Satellite, Telecommunications & Media which is ~15% of the USD High Yield Index and has had negative returns year-to-date. We have taken a long look at the sector and have followed it closely over 2023 and decided there is far too much risk relative to the possible return at this juncture. (see Appendix below)

## Appendix –US Cable, Satellite, Telecommunications & Media

High Yield indices have had muted performance so far this year in part because of the substantial negative returns for a handful of large sectors. The USD TMT sector was once considered one of the highest quality “low beta” sectors within the high yield market but has now turned into a killing field. The industry is mature with competition increasing while balance sheets are very levered. In a nutshell, the way video content is: 1) *created*, 2) *distributed* and 3) *consumed* continues its rapid change. A sampling of “buzz phrases” from news article about the industry:

*cord cutting, cord shaving, cord-nevers, streaming wars and joint ventures, writer’s strikes, actor’s strikes, sports content inflation, fixed wireless access, fiber to the home, fiber overbuilding, network convergence, levered buyouts, asset stripping, creditor-on-creditor violence, Chapter 11, conventional advertising declines, regulatory subsidy expiry, stock buy backs, failed asset sales, distressed exchanges, death of linear TV and regional sports networks, artificial intelligence*

The charts below show a summary of the subsectors as well as key obligors:

| Sector        | YTD Return | Credit Spread | Yield  |
|---------------|------------|---------------|--------|
| USD HY Index  | +0.21%     | 331 bps       | 7.89%  |
| Broadcasting  | (3.15%)    | 474 bps       | 9.22%  |
| Cable TV      | (3.72%)    | 601 bps       | 10.44% |
| Entertainment | (0.90%)    | 593 bps       | 10.57% |
| Media         | (0.17%)    | 540 bps       | 9.94%  |
| Telecom       | (0.39%)    | 561 bps       | 10.10% |

| Obligor         | Par Value (Bonds) | Market Value | Price | Comment                                                               |
|-----------------|-------------------|--------------|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dish            | \$13.2 bn         | \$10.1 bn    | 76    | Mounting subscriber losses. Creditor lawsuits for asset-stripping.    |
| Charter (HY)    | \$27.2 bn         | \$23.7 bn    | 87    | Negative broadband adds. Levered merger with Altice?                  |
| Charter (IG)    | \$54.3 bn         | \$45.6 bn    | 84    | Potential downgrade to junk. Massive capex program.                   |
| Cablevision     | \$20.1 bn         | \$16.1 bn    | 80    | Extremely levered unsustainable capital structure.                    |
| Cable One       | \$1.57 bn         | \$1.24 bn    | 79    | Fixed Wireless Access becoming a competitive threat.                  |
| Sinclair Broad. | \$1.5 bn          | \$1.1 bn     | 77    | Cord cutting, structural shift in advertising to digital from linear. |
| Gray TV         | \$3.6 bn          | \$2.7 bn     | 76    | Cord cutting, highly levered balance sheet                            |
| AMC             | \$1.8 bn          | \$1.4 bn     | 80    | Content inflation, linear advertising declines, levered               |
| Frontier        | \$7.9 bn          | \$7.5 bn     | 95    | Overbuilding fiber network with levered balance sheet                 |
| Paramount       | \$14.7 bn         | \$12.2 bn    | 83    | Company is up for sell resulting in any number of permutations        |
| Lumen/LVLT      | \$6.4 bn          | \$5.7 bn     | 90    | Over-levered. Asset-stripping and value leakage amongst creditors     |
| iHeart Radio    | \$3.0 bn          | \$2.1 bn     | 71    | Extremely levered unsustainable capital structure.                    |

The elephant in the room remains Charter Communications. CHTR is ~4.5x levered and is experiencing a rapid decline in cable subscribers on account of fixed wireless access competition and cord cutting. Should CHTR be downgraded to junk status, ~\$54 billion of investment grade bonds would need to find a home in the high yield market. The sheer size of this rotation may cause prices to decline within the sector making any bottom-up security selection futile. We also see the potential for contentious defaults at DISH, Cablevision/Altice, Lumen/LVLT, iHeart and perhaps a broadcaster as well. At present we think the sector is too risky to get involved in despite what appears to be beaten up prices and juicy yields. To the indexer or closet indexer, exposure to this sector is required which is why the sector is starting to weigh on index returns. This situation highlights one of the problems with indexing in the high yield bond market. *The more debt a company issues, and the more leverage it incurs, the larger the resulting index weight becomes and thus the more investors need to buy the debt!* This is somewhat paradoxical to equity indexing, where the healthier the Company, the larger the equity market capitalization, and thus the higher weight in the index.



## Letter XII – January 2024

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, generated a 2.6% net return on the Class C units during the month of January. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 86% and Gross Exposure was 92% versus 88%/102% at the end of December.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD          |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|--------------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | <b>15.0%</b> |
| 2024 | 2.6% |      |      |      |       |      |      |      |      |       |      |      |              |

Roughly half of the month's returns came from three material positions that benefited from specific events:

- Brookfield Office Preferreds – downgrade, index rebalancing event, NCIB, +71 bps to Fund's performance
- Dye and Durham – raised common equity, exchange offer, board refreshed, +69 bps
- Carroll's Restaurants – take-over by Restaurant Brands International ("RBI"), +39 bps

We also now have 5 convertible bond positions in the portfolio. One of them is busted, 3 of them are "balanced" convertibles where we are comfortable with the underlying business and think there are events on the horizon which could lead to capital appreciation in the underlying common stock.

### Core Corporate (32% of NAV, 14 positions)

We made the tactical decision to exit certain positions during the month largely on valuation concerns. This is the lowest aggregate positioning we have had in our Core Corporate Carry portfolio since the inception of the Fund.

#### *Canadian Bank LRCN*

We sold our two positions in USD Canadian Bank LRCN paper {TD 8.125% & BNS 8.625%} and replaced them with cheaper dividend-paying Royal Bank CAD paper. We think over the fullness of time that "eligible dividend" prefs in Canada will trade at a much higher valuation than their "interest bearing" cousin the LRCN. While both instruments are essentially identical, investors in Canada are ignoring the large tax advantage of eligible dividends versus interest income. Most managers are benchmarked and compensated based on gross returns, so they have little incentive to buy dividend prefs at a modestly lower yield to interest bearing instruments. The former, provides materially better after-tax returns to the end user.

#### *Carrols Restaurant Group – Senior Unsecured Bonds {TAST 5.875% 07/29}*

Carrols agreed to sell themselves to RBI in an all-cash deal. RBI made the strategic decision to take on the large group of Burger King Restaurants themselves, to renovate them and then rebrand them in piece meal fashion. As a result of the deal, the bonds will be called at ~102.375 on closing. We elected to exit the position at ~102. We accumulated the position in the low 80s, so the trade resulted in a ~22% gross return. We made a mistake not owning more of this bond as it was a high conviction position.

#### *Other sales*

We sold our bonds in Titan International {TWI 7% 04/28}, Vector Group {VGR 5.75% 02/29} and Cars.com {CARS 6.375% 11/28}. These were all long standing positions bought at much lower prices over 2023 where we feel the current valuations of the bonds are stretched.

We added a fixed income closed end fund position that is trading at around 10% discount to fair value with a 10% yield.

## Event-Driven (~33%, 19 positions)

We added four new positions this month. Given the robust opportunity set, we continue to reduce our Core Corporate Carry positions in favour of trades that are tethered to hard events such as M&A, refinancing, index rebalancing, and asset sales. We have a few larger positions where we are excited about the possibility of creditor friendly actions in the next 3-6 months.

## Liquidity Provision (~14%)

The Fund had ~14% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end up from 10% at year-end.

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~16%, 7 positions)

### *Dye and Durham Senior Unsecured "Busted" Convertibles DND CN 3.75% 26*

We quietly accumulated a large position in the subject bonds over 2023 at between 75-78 cents on the dollar. DND's core business provides "sticky" software to legal professionals. We viewed the bonds as being mispriced relative to the true credit risk and there had been large ongoing sellers of the bonds for most of the year. The market was concerned about leverage, a short maturity profile, and a top-heavy debt structure. However, from our experience you can't walk around the USD leveraged finance market without tripping over dozens of 4x-6x levered software businesses of an inferior nature to DND. We had a differentiated contrarian view that the debt structure was financeable/fixable. DND refreshed its Board and completed an exchange offer. We elected to not participate in the offer as we viewed it to be unattractive versus simply holding onto the existing bonds, and finally DND raised common equity. As a result, the bonds traded up 7-9 points. Instead of taking profits, we added to the position in the low 80s. The bonds are now at 88 bid and its possible the Company uses the common equity proceeds to buy back these bonds in the open market or via an SIB. If nothing happens, we are happy to hold them to maturity. In the low 70s, these bonds were one of the cheapest risk-adjusted securities we invested in during 2023.

### *Brookfield Office Properties {BPO} / Brookfield Property Partners {BPY} Preferred Shares*

It was hand-to-hand combat trading BPO Prefs all month. Our mission was to exit the month with a 3% weight in what we believe are the cheapest four preferreds within the BPO complex. As we described last month, an S&P downgrade caused the prefs to be deleted from the main preferred share index. We flattened our position as soon the announcement occurred to wait for lower prices on the index rebalance day when one of the large pref ETFs needed to sell a large position. However, it became clear from how the prefs were trading that other investors were waiting for the event to get liquidity on the long side. We pivoted and started aggressively accumulating our position instead of trying to buy in the Market on Close "MOC". We are now content with our positioning after a daisy-chain of 238 trades in the BPO complex. We are likely to sit back and collect the dividends for the time being unless there is a meaningful appreciation in value in the securities.

## Risk Overlay

We continue to add to our long-dated out of the money put options on Canadian banks and short position in the ZPR.

## Summary

*Actual Credit Risk* is the highest when *Perceived Credit Risk* is the lowest. Perceived credit risk continues to decline as evidenced by tightening credit spreads and low asset volatility. It is easy to say that the credit markets are too frothy looking at a time series of historical data but a more nuanced look at the data suggests a more balanced distribution of possible future outcomes (see Appendix). We are investing cautiously but pragmatically knowing we are not macro forecasters. The opportunity set is very robust to start the year, especially in the Event-Driven sphere, and we continue to slowly raise additional capital while trying not to dilute existing investors returns. However, most of if not all of our trades are 5x-10x scalable from current levels.


## Appendix – Relative State of Credit Market

The graph below shows a histogram of daily high yield credit spreads going back to 1997. Compared to interest rates and stocks returns, credit spreads tend to exhibit more mean reversion. The probability distribution of credit spreads is “right skewed” with a mean credit spread of 538 bps and the median credit spread is 470 bps versus the current spread of 345 bps. Many prognosticators like to show a time series graph of credit spreads and point out how low they are versus the “average” credit spread over say 20 years. They may be falling victim to a few statistical bias’s inherent in the data:

- **Estimator Bias:** *Distance from the Median* is the more important metric than *Distance from the Average*. The median represents the “typical state” or “most likely state” of the credit markets. The average is skewed and captures short periods of time where credit spreads spike extremely high on little volume.
- **Quality Bias:** The composition of the high yield market has consistently improved in credit quality over the last decade with “BB” weights consistently increasing and “CCC” weights consistently declining.
- **Price Bias:** Dollar prices are lower today than in past periods meaning the expected recovery from defaults (on a pct. basis) all else equal should be higher versus other periods where bonds trade at a premium to Par. The difference in returns between a 90-dollar bond and a 105-dollar bond that defaults and recovers 40 cents is significant and this means one needs less credit spread to compensation for the total expected loss.
- **Size and Diversification Bias:** The high yield market is bigger, more liquid and more diversified compared to say 10-15 years ago which means risk premiums should be lower. Industry concentration risk, which has plagued the market in the past, is less today than it was 5, 10 and 20 years ago.

Therefore, while valuations are on the high end we are no where near on the tight end of high yield credit spreads. We are more likely hovering around just the 2<sup>nd</sup> quartile of richness factoring in the above. The table below shows a cocktail napkin forward 1-year return calculations for the high yield index should credit spreads move to various scenarios. Even a reversion to the median or mean over 1 year, returns on the asset class are likely to be positive albeit muted.

Histogram of Daily High Yield Credit Spreads since 1997





**Letter XI – December 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, returned 1.6% net of fees on the Class C units during the month of December and posted an 15.0% return for the full year ended 2023. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 88% and Gross Exposure was 102% versus 60%/113% at the end of December.

|      | Jan  | Feb  | Mar  | Apr  | May   | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct   | Nov  | Dec  | YTD   |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 2023 | 4.4% | 1.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | -0.1% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% | -1.4% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 15.0% |

The returns in 2023 can be attributed across wide variety of asset classes, sub-strategies, industries and idiosyncratic situations. For the benefit of investors, we have provided a return attribution summary in the Appendix. By position, approximately 85% of our trades had a positive contribution to performance. This is what we call “batting average” or “hit ratio” and our goal is to maintain this above 80%. The source of negative returns came from three idiosyncratic investment mistakes plus our market or “beta” hedges. 85% of the return attribution came from longs and ~15% from short positioning. Finally, around ~59% of the return can be attributed to our event-driven strategy despite it being between 15%-30% of our NAV through the year.

### **Core Corporate (48% of NAV, 20 positions)**

Our positioning remains largely unchanged. We exited our position in G-III Apparel’s 7.875% 08/25 bonds during the month after they appreciated in value to 100.75 or 6.59% yield-to-worst. The bonds are currently call protected at 101.969 but the call price steps down to 100 in August. We saw little upside from current trading levels. As a general rule we start to trim our holdings as they start to trade close to or above the call price and become negatively convex.

### **Event-Driven (~25%, 14 positions)**

The Fund added four new event-driven positions. Three related to an ongoing theme in the credit markets we have identified while the fourth is a fairly straight forward risk arbitrage position.

#### *Asset Sales to Deleverage Balance Sheet*

One theme that we have focused on recently are situations where a corporation has had business performance issues, possibly been downgraded from investment grade to high yield and are now selling assets to deleverage the balance sheet. These situations can result in potential capital gains to bondholders from refinancing front-end bonds earlier than expected, debt reduction via a premium priority tender or simply the credit event leads to a tightening of credit spreads.

|                | Advanced Auto Parts {AAP}<br><i>Auto Parts Retailer</i>                                                                                                                                              | Goodyear Tire {GT}<br><i>Tire Manufacturer</i>                                                                                                                        | Walgreens {WBA}<br><i>Drug Store Chain</i>                                                                                        |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Business Issue | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Downgraded to junk by S&amp;P in September 2023</li> <li>Chronically low margins versus peers</li> <li>Botched integration of an acquired business</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Over-levered balance sheet</li> <li>Sprawling sub-optimal portfolio of businesses</li> <li>Bloated cost structure</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Downgraded to junk by Moody’s December 2023</li> <li>Sub optimal cost structure</li> </ul> |
| Thesis         | Company will sell its Worldpac Wholesale parts business and Canadian Carquest operations and use proceeds to de-lever its balance sheet and return to Investment Grade                               | Company will sell its Chemical Business, Dunlop Tire Brands and Off-Road equipment tire business and use proceeds to reduce leverage by \$1.5 billion from 4x to 2.5x | Company will sell all or a portion of its UK Boots pharmacy business and use proceeds to reduce debt via a priority cash tender   |

## *PGT Innovations Inc. – PGTI 4.375% 10/29 Senior Unsecured Notes*

We accumulated the position after PGTI agreed to be acquired by Masonite {DOOR} for cash and stock. The bonds will get refinanced upon closing of the transaction. This is a plain vanilla risk arbitrage situation where we like the upside/downside as the Company is now subject to an all-cash “topping bid” by Miter Brands adding to the probability of a Change of Control

### Liquidity Provision (~10%)

The Fund had ~10% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end down from ~41% entering the month. We used the cash to fund a handful of new event-driven positions as well as added to our Special Situations/Stressed Credits.

### Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~16%, 7 positions)

#### *Citadel Income Fund {CTF-U}*

Over the course of 2023 we accumulated a position in the closed-end investment fund {CTF-U}. CTF-U’s simple strategy was to invest in a portfolio of liquid blue-chip public securities. Our average purchase price was at a significant discount to CTF-U’s Net Asset Value (“NAV”). We fully-hedged the position by shorting the underlying portfolio thus locking in a fixed “discount to NAV”. We only entered the trade once we believed there was a high degree of certainty that the Fund would be effectively liquidated. Another large holder, Saba Capital, called a Special Meeting giving us more confidence in a terminal end date. The Manager of the Fund, Artemis, delayed calling the Special Meeting then finally set a date only to cancel it again as they were reluctant to liquidate the Fund and give investors their capital back at NAV. After much back and forth and a contentious negotiation, the Manager agreed to allow for a 70% redemption right at NAV. We tendered all our units and received roughly 90% of our capital back at NAV and then quickly liquidated the remaining units we held. The net result was a ~50 bps realized gain for the Fund on a relatively small position.

#### *Brookfield Office Properties {BPO} / Brookfield Property Partners {BPY}*



We entered the month net long BPO preferred shares, but we quickly reduced our net exposure to zero once BPY was downgraded to junk by S&P. This was a tactical trading decision. The net result of our decision to reduce the exposure was that we experienced no losses on the position during the month while many BPO preferreds ended up down over 20%. In total, we have made 34 bps of gross return trading our BPO position in 2023 but it has been frustrating given the amount of time spent on it. We now enter 2024 with limited net exposure to the name and have now taken the credit back into the workshop to tinker with it further. We expect to have some combination of long/short positioning in a subset of the over 30 different tradable securities within the 6-layer capital structure at some point in 2024.

### Risk Overlay

We unwound our HYG Option structure over the month which cost the Fund as the liquid credit indices rallied into year-end.

### Summary

2023 was a strong year for the corporate credit asset class, and we are confident in our positioning leading into 2024. The static yield of the portfolio is still high at north of 8%, and we have several event-driven trades that we think will monetize into positive performance during Q1. Despite the near-term rally in credit assets, the potential for equity-like returns with less risk is still present.



Breakdown of Return Attribution by Sub-Strategy

| Sub-Strategy                       | % of Gross Return |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Core Carry                         | 30.1%             |
| Event-Driven                       | 58.6%             |
| Liquidity Provision                | 3.3%              |
| Risk Overlay                       | -2.9%             |
| Special Situations/Stressed Credit | 10.9%             |
| <b>Total</b>                       | <b>100.0%</b>     |

Breakdown of Return Attribution by Positioning

| Long/Short   | % of Gross Return |
|--------------|-------------------|
| Long         | 84.5%             |
| Short        | 15.5%             |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>100.0%</b>     |



**Letter X – November 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, ended November with a Class C NAV of \$11.075 and has paid \$0.24 in distributions year-to-date. This compares with \$10.822 at the end of the prior month and the inception NAV of \$10.00. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 60% and Gross Exposure was 113% versus 77%/93% at the end of October. This has been our lowest net exposure since the inception of the Fund.

Corporate credit assets have appreciated in value significantly during the month of November due to the narrative around a continuing decline in inflation and the flow through to lower underlying interest rates. However, the month has brought further evidence that the economy is slowing, and credit conditions continue to tighten. The consumer is weakening and is spending less on discretionary items while high interest rates are having an acute impact on businesses with high financial leverage and/or high working capital needs. Therefore, we are being cautious on adding incremental credit risk.

### **Core Corporate (49% of NAV, 21 positions)**

Our Core Corporate portfolio, which is designed to provide a steady stream of interest and dividend income to the Fund while minimizing default risk, has now gone through several earnings seasons. We are happy with how all of our credits are performing. We provide a summary example as an Appendix of how we monitor all of the credits in the portfolio.

#### *Abercrombie & Fitch Senior Secured Bonds {ANF 8.75% 07/25}*

We think there is near zero credit risk in this bond, yet we earn 6.20% for a ~10 month holding period. This return might seem low, but the Company has been redeeming bonds at 102.188 recently and is in a negative net debt position with \$649mm of cash plus a \$360mm undrawn ABL against this lonely \$250mm bond, the only debt in the capital structure. ANF can easily just pay off the bond with cash from the balance sheet at anytime. If they call the whole bond tomorrow, we earn a 25% IRR, if they call it after the next quarterly report, we earn a 11.5% IRR. Buying relatively safe shorter duration credit instruments with mid-single digit running yields that have potential upside optionality is a key tenant of the Fund's investment strategy.

### **Event-Driven (~16%, 10 positions)**

#### *AltaGas Fixed Rate Reset Preferred Shares {ALA.PR.E}*

A larger contributor to the Fund's Q4 performance has been our long position in ALA.PR.E. We began accumulating the preferred shares under \$23.00 with the thesis that the Company was going to call these "listed dividend preferreds" and replace them with pari-passu "institutional interest-bearing hybrids". Unlike bonds, corporations cannot use preferred share dividends to shield income from taxes but often must pay what is called the "Part 6.1" tax. The preferred shares were scheduled to reset at about ~7% whereas new hybrid debt would have to be issued at ~9%. We did the math with an understanding of ALA's tax situation and concluded they were better off calling the preferred share and issuing new bonds. They ended up issuing new bonds and redeemed our preferred share at \$25.00.

With the ALA news, several preferred shares with near-term reset dates rallied under the speculation of windfall profits from being called out at \$25.00 rather than reset. We initiated short positions in a few preferred shares we view as have a low probability of being called early based on our understanding of: a) the level an issuer can issue new bonds, and b) the issuer's complex tax situation. One surprising theme for some of our investments this year has been the ability to exploit a deeper understanding of the tax situation of the *issuer* of a security and the tax situation of the end *purchaser*.

### *GoEasy Callable Unsecured Bonds {GSYCN 5.375% 12/24}*

GoEasy is a Canadian public company focused on consumer financing. We accumulated a position in the 2024 bonds between 97.5-98.5 on the thesis that GSY was going to refinance the bond in late-November before they became “current”. The Company finally launched a successful refinancing, and we sold the bonds at ~100 for a mid-teens IRR.

### **Liquidity Provision (~41%)**

The Fund had ~41% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end. We are in the midst of drawing down some of the cash to fund a handful of new event-driven positions and scaling some of our existing higher conviction positions.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~14%, 8 positions)**

#### *Cineplex Subordinated Convertibles {CGXCN 5.75% 09/25}*

The Fund has a new position in the convertibles of Cineplex. Our thesis is that CGX would sell a non-core asset(s) to pay down its 1<sup>st</sup> lien credit facility prior to the first “hard” call date on our bonds (09/2024). This would then free up secured borrowing capacity to refinance our convert with a new first lien bond. The converts we own are called “balanced”. They pay a decent yield but still have some equity optionality left in them. We believe we purchased the position at, or near what is called the “bond floor”. We are paying little for ~1-2 years of optionality left while earning around a 7.5% yield. The bonds can be converted to common stock at the holders’ option at a price of \$10.94 or the bonds can be “flushed” to common shares at the Company’s option at \$13.67. We have a positive fundamental view on the recovery of CGX after it bloated its balance sheet to stay alive during Covid. Free cash flow is essentially back to where it was pre-covid, a strong management team is committed to deleveraging to ultimately reinstate the dividend. We think there could be material capital appreciation if we are patient, but we have little company on our thesis as the market has largely ignored the substantial positive actions CGX has taken in the last 6 months and discounted possible future actions to reduce its financial risk. If the current valuation persists, it is also possible that an en-bloc buyer emerges at some point in the future.

#### *Hawaiian Airlines {HA 5.75% 2026 Loyalty Bonds}*

After month-end, Alaska Air agreed to buy Hawaiian Air for \$18 cash, a +300% premium. Our bonds traded up ~14 points or ~17% and we sold the entire position before 8am in the morning, the first trade of the day on the bonds. We did not envision Hawaiian getting taken over, as our thesis was that the bonds were just mispriced and well covered by the Company’s assets. Turns out Alaska Air did the same math we did and saw tremendous residual common equity value. We are now evaluating a long bond short stock position as we think the merger faces strong political and regulatory headwinds with an 18-month close ... for now we quietly watch the controversial deal.

### **Risk Overlay (-19%)**

We have on a zero cost Put Spread Collar on the High Yield ETF HYG. We are short 75 Calls, Long 72 Puts and Short 69 Puts. We also reinstated a short position in the units of a Canadian REIT we are convinced needs to cut its distribution.

### **Summary**

There are data points abound suggesting corporations are beginning to sober up to the reality of higher financing costs. Many corporations are now enacting creditor friendly actions such as:

- Selling assets to pay down expensive floating rate debt (OTEX, NWH-U, AX-U, CGX)
- Reducing distributions to common equity holders (REITs)
- Refinancing short-term debt with longer term debt (GSYCN, +Many Others)
- Reduction in share buybacks and limiting growth via acquisition (ACQCN)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (HA)

These actions should benefit bondholders and create event-driven opportunities for the Fund in 2024.

# NEWGEN

## ASSET MANAGEMENT




### Titan International (TWI)

| Capital Structure         |          |           |           |           |           |               |              |        |
|---------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|--------------|--------|
| Tranche                   | Rank     | Rating(s) | Face (mm) | Coupon    | Maturity  | Fixed Charges | LTM Leverage | LTV    |
| European Credit Facility  | 1st Lien |           | \$ 34     | 6.80%     |           | \$ 2          |              |        |
| Revolving Credit Facility | 1st Lien |           | \$ -      | L+125 bps | 28-Oct-26 | \$ -          |              |        |
| Other                     | 1st Lien |           | \$ 8      | 6.80%     |           | \$ 1          |              |        |
| Senior Notes              | 1st Lien | B-/B2     | \$ 400    | 7.00%     | 30-Apr-28 | \$ 28         |              |        |
| Total Secured Debt        |          |           | \$ 442    |           |           | \$ 31         | 2.0 x        | 39.4%  |
|                           |          |           |           |           |           |               |              |        |
| Total Unsecured Debt      |          |           | \$ -      |           |           | \$ -          | 2.0 x        | 39.4%  |
| Total Net Debt            |          |           | \$ 282    |           |           | \$ 31         | 1.3 x        | 25.2%  |
| Market Capitalization     |          |           | \$ 835    |           |           |               |              |        |
| Enterprise Value          |          |           | \$ 1,121  |           |           |               | 5.2 x        | 100.0% |

| Liquidity        |            |    |     |
|------------------|------------|----|-----|
| Revolver Commit  | 2026-10-01 | \$ | 125 |
| Utilized         |            |    | -   |
| Availability     |            |    |     |
| Letter of Credit |            |    | 7   |
| Cash             |            |    | 160 |
| Total Liquidity  |            |    |     |
| 277              |            |    |     |

| Credit Ratings |         |        |         |
|----------------|---------|--------|---------|
|                | Secured | Issuer | Outlook |
| S&P            | B-      | B-     | Stable  |
| Moody's        | B2      | B2     | Stable  |
| Fitch          |         |        |         |
| DBRS           |         |        |         |

| Relative Value       |         |         |         |         |
|----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Bond Ticker:         | AXL     | GT      | TEX     | TWI     |
| Utilized             | 6.875%  | 5.000%  | 5.000%  | 7.000%  |
| Coupon               | 7/2028  | 7/2029  | 5/2029  | 4/2028  |
| Maturity             | Sr Uns  | Sr Uns  | Sr Uns  | 1st Li  |
| Ranking              | 400 mm  | 5 mm    | 600 mm  | 399 mm  |
| Par Notional         | B       | B+      | B+      | B       |
| Tranche Ratings      |         |         |         |         |
| Bond Price           | 91.02   | 91.85   | 92.92   | 97.447  |
| YTW                  | 8.76%   | 6.27%   | 6.57%   | 7.64%   |
| Workout Date         | 7/2028  | 7/2029  | 5/2029  | 4/2028  |
| STW                  | 453 bps | 256 bps | 236 bps | 340 bps |
| OAS                  | 443 bps | 255 bps | 222 bps | 303 bps |
|                      |         |         |         |         |
| LTV                  | 71%     | 60%     | 11%     | 26%     |
| Net Leverage (LTM)   | 1.4 x   | 1.1 x   | 1.0 x   | 1.3 x   |
| Spread per Turn Lev. | 133 bps | 73 bps  | 234 bps | 262 bps |



| Financial Profile (\$ mm USD)                      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |          |
|----------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
|                                                    | FY2016   | FY2017   | FY2018   | FY2019   | FY2020   | FY2021   | FY2022   | FY2023 | Q3-2021 | Q4-2021 | Q1-2022 | Q2-2022 | Q3-2022 | Q4-2022 | Q1-2023 | Q2-2023 | Q3-2023 | LTM      |
| Revenue                                            | \$ 1,265 | \$ 1,469 | \$ 1,602 | \$ 1,449 | \$ 1,259 | \$ 1,780 | \$ 2,169 |        | \$ 450  | \$ 488  | \$ 556  | \$ 573  | \$ 531  | \$ 510  | \$ 549  | \$ 481  | \$ 402  | \$ 1,941 |
| Cost of Goods Sold                                 | -1,127   | -1,301   | -1,404   | -1,320   | -1,130   | -1,543   | -1,809   |        | -390    | -425    | -469    | -463    | -443    | -433    | -453    | -395    | -336    | -1,616   |
| SG&A                                               | -155     | -161     | -146     | -148     | -140     | -142     | -155     |        | -35     | -36     | -39     | -37     | -34     | -45     | -40     | -40     | -39     | -166     |
| Non-Cash Adjustments & One-Time Items              | 62       | 60       | 59       | 56       | 57       | 51       | 58       |        | 12      | 13      | 12      | 11      | 11      | 23      | 11      | 13      | 12      | 58       |
| EBITDA                                             | 46       | 67       | 111      | 37       | 46       | 147      | 264      |        | 38      | 40      | 59      | 85      | 65      | 54      | 66      | 38      | 38      | 218      |
| Company Adjusted EBITDA                            | 47       | 73       | 119      | 38       | 54       | 135      | 253      |        | 35      | 36      | 57      | 82      | 61      | 53      | 59      | 41      | 153     |          |
| Maintenance Capex                                  | -42      | -33      | -39      | -36      | -22      | -39      | -47      |        | -10     | -15     | -8      | -12     | -13     | -14     | -12     | -16     | -14     | -51      |
| EBITDA less Capex                                  | 4        | 35       | 72       | 1        | 25       | 108      | 217      |        | 28      | 25      | 52      | 73      | 52      | 40      | 55      | 43      | 25      | 220      |
| Cash Taxes Paid                                    | -6       | 5        | -12      | -10      | -12      | -16      | -24      |        | -4      | -6      | -2      | -7      | -19     | 4       | 4       | -9      | -5      | -23      |
| After-Tax Unlevered FCF                            | 2        | 30       | 60       | -10      | 12       | 92       | 193      |        | 24      | 20      | 50      | 67      | 33      | 44      | 51      | 34      | 20      | 161      |
| Cash Interest Paid                                 | -34      | -38      | -31      | -33      | -29      | -35      | -32      |        | -9      | -10     | -1      | -15     | -1      | -15     | -1      | -15     | -0      | -33      |
| Free Cash Flow ("FCF")                             | -36      | -8       | 29       | -42      | -17      | 57       | 161      |        | 16      | 10      | 49      | 51      | 8       | 44      | 50      | 19      | 19      | 124      |
| Dividends, Share Repurchases & Other Distributions | -1       | -1       | -1       | -1       | -1       | 0        | -25      |        | 0       | 0       | 0       | 0       | -25     | 0       | -1      | -5      | -13     | 0        |
| Excess Free Cash Flow                              | -37      | -9       | 28       | -43      | -18      | 57       | 136      |        | 16      | 10      | 49      | 51      | -17     | 44      | 48      | 14      | 7       | 124      |
|                                                    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |          |
| Gross Margin % (RHS)                               | 11.0%    | 11.5%    | 12.4%    | 8.9%     | 10.3%    | 13.3%    | 16.6%    |        | 13.4%   | 12.8%   | 15.6%   | 19.1%   | 16.5%   | 15.0%   | 17.4%   | 17.9%   | 16.4%   | 16.7%    |
| EBITDA Margin % (LHS)                              | 3.6%     | 4.6%     | 6.9%     | 2.6%     | 3.7%     | 8.3%     | 12.2%    |        | 8.4%    | 8.2%    | 10.7%   | 14.9%   | 12.2%   | 10.6%   | 12.1%   | 12.1%   | 9.6%    | 11.2%    |
| Total Funded Debt (Gross)                          | 506      | 451      | 461      | 505      | 465      | 485      | 446      |        | 482     | 485     | 522     | 485     | 447     | 446     | 437     | 434     | 431     | 446      |
| Cash                                               | 148      | 144      | 82       | 67       | 117      | 98       | 160      |        | 95      | 98      | 98      | 117     | 117     | 160     | 164     | 194     | 212     | 160      |
| Market Capitalization (millions)                   | 606      | 769      | 279      | 218      | 298      | 684      | 963      |        | 570     | 684     | 919     | 946     | 762     | 963     | 638     | 725     | 842     | 835      |
| Enterprise Value (000s)                            | 964      | 1,076    | 659      | 656      | 645      | 1,071    | 1,249    |        | 957     | 1,071   | 1,343   | 1,314   | 1,092   | 1,249   | 931     | 965     | 1,061   | 1,121    |
|                                                    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |          |
| Total Net Leverage (LTM)                           | 7.8 x    | 4.6 x    | 3.4 x    | 11.8 x   | 7.5 x    | 2.6 x    | 1.1 x    |        |         |         |         | 1.7 x   | 1.3 x   | 1.1 x   | 1.0 x   | 1.0 x   | 1.0 x   | 1.3 x    |
| Fixed Charge Coverage (LTM)                        | 1.3 x    | 1.8 x    | 3.6 x    | 1.1 x    | 1.6 x    | 4.3 x    | 8.3 x    |        |         |         |         | 6.5 x   | 9.4 x   | 8.3 x   | 8.6 x   | 7.9 x   | 7.1 x   | 6.2 x    |
|                                                    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |          |
| Debt-to-TEV                                        | 37%      | 29%      | 58%      | 67%      | 54%      | 36%      | 23%      |        | 40%     | 36%     | 32%     | 28%     | 30%     | 23%     | 29%     | 25%     | 21%     | 26%      |
| Equity-to-TEV                                      | 63%      | 71%      | 42%      | 33%      | 46%      | 64%      | 77%      |        | 60%     | 64%     | 68%     | 72%     | 70%     | 77%     | 71%     | 75%     | 79%     | 74%      |
| (PPE - Net Working Capital)-to-Debt                | 1.6 x    | 1.8 x    | 1.7 x    | 1.4 x    | 1.4 x    | 1.4 x    | 1.7 x    |        | 1.4 x   | 1.4 x   | 1.4 x   | 1.5 x   | 1.2 x   | 1.7 x   | 1.8 x   | 1.9 x   | 1.9 x   | 1.5 x    |
| EV/EBITDA                                          | 21.1 x   | 16.0 x   | 5.9 x    | 17.6 x   | 13.9 x   | 7.3 x    | 4.7 x    |        |         |         |         | 5.9 x   | 4.4 x   | 4.7 x   | 3.4 x   | 4.0 x   | 4.9 x   | 4.5 x    |



**Letter IX – October 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, ended October with a Class C NAV of \$10.822 and has paid \$0.20 in distributions year-to-date. This compares with \$11.014 at the end of the prior month and the inception NAV of \$10.00. Our net exposure at month-end was 77% and gross exposure was 93% versus 85%/100% at the end of September. A sampling of monthly returns across the credit spectrum is shown below:

| Canadian Governments | Investment Grade (CAD) | US High Yield BB | US High Yield B | US High Yield CCC | Canadian Preferreds | Russell 3000 Equity Index |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| 0.42%                | 0.41%                  | (0.59%)          | (1.14%)         | (3.41%)           | (3.36%)             | (2.65%)                   |

Two themes are currently permeating through the corporate credit markets, *decompression* and *dispersion*. *Decompression* is when lower quality credit spreads widen relative to higher quality credit spreads. The credit spread delta between CCC and BB paper widened from 581 bps to 650 bps during the month. *Dispersion* is when the range of credit spreads within the market is expanding reflecting an increased divergence in credit fundamentals by issuer. Both themes should bode well for the Fund's opportunity set as a concentrated actively managed bottom-up long/short credit manager.

### **Core Corporate (47% of NAV, 20 positions)**

#### *Savers Value Village {EVRGRN 9.75% 04/2028} Senior Secured Bonds*

Our only new position in our core portfolio is the secured bonds issued by Savers {SVV}. SVV is the largest for-profit thrift store operator in North America, with a substantial presence in Canada under the "Value Village" brand. SVV recently went public, but has been around since 1954. The business has been performing well and the model is generally resistant to economic contractions. The bonds yield over 9% and we think the Company will redeem 10% of the bond issue per annum at 103 (above the current trading price) as they are in deleveraging mode and the coupon on the bond is high.

### **Event-Driven (~17%, 13 positions)**

#### *Northwest Healthcare Properties REIT 2023 Subordinated Convertible*

We worked with NWH-U to extend the upcoming convertible 2023 debenture. The existing bond, if approved by bondholders at a special meeting, will be extended by 15 months and re-coupon'd to 10%. We exited the position near Par for a profit after the transaction was publicly announced and will collect a 2% fee in December should the amendment pass.

#### *Algonquin Power Fixed-to-Floating Subordinated Notes*

We had the thesis that AQN would call this bond shortly after it reset because the fixed rate coupon was set to "reset" at LIBOR + 368 bps (9.34%). Even though AQN is in a strategic review with a weak balance sheet, this floating rate debt is very expensive capital, and the equity market has been punishing AQN for having too much higher cost floating rate debt.

#### *Vista Outdoor {VSTO 4.5% 03/2029} Senior Unsecured Bonds*

VSTO agreed to sell its ammunition business to a European company that is also in the ammo business. We accumulated a position in the bonds in the mid 90s. Should the transaction close as scheduled, we think the Company will be required to redeem the bonds at 102.25 to consummate the transaction. If for whatever reason the transaction fails, the Company is likely to proceed with spinning off its ammunition business, rather than selling it for cash and is committed to paying down debt while either corporate action plays out. The business is fundamentally strong, and we think the downside on a break in one-year is mid-to-high 80s. Adding to the intrigue, a second European company that owns the Colt firearm business has been accumulating common stock in VSTO suggesting a possible 2<sup>nd</sup> suitor. The upside/downside outcomes might be symmetric, but the probabilities are not.

**Liquidity Provision (~23%)** - The Fund had ~23% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~13%, 8 positions)**

#### *Brookfield Office Properties {BPY/BPO}*

The preferreds we own traded down from 36 cents on the dollar to 28 cents on the last day of the month. We added to our position as there was a month-end forced seller who needed liquidity. Brookfield's private real estate arm is a complicated beast. Based on how BPY finances its properties and their corporate structure, we think they have long enough runway to ride out a commercial real estate recession without suspending the dividends on preferred shares. Based on the 18% running yield at our purchase price of 28 cents, our entire original investment could be paid back as dividends in only 5.5 years.

#### *AerCap Floating Auction Rate Preferred (\$50mm Legacy International Lease Finance Corporation security from 1992)*

We were redeemed out of our position at Par during the month. This position had been one of the best trades so far in the Fund. We accumulated the position in the mid 90s and the preferreds carry at approximately LIBOR x 2.75 or 14%-15% running yield for the duration of our investment. The original face of the prospectus is shown below.

#### *Hawaiian Airlines / Hawaiian Brand Intellectual Property / Hawaiian Miles Loyalty {HA 5.75% 01/2026} Secured Bonds*

After completing a detailed credit analysis on HA, we concluded the bonds were attractively priced in the mid 80s and accumulated a small position. The Company has substantial liquidity consisting of +\$1.1 billion of cash and a portfolio of unencumbered aircraft valued at \$580mm including 14 highly valued A321 neo aircraft. At the bond's current market value, the hard assets cover the bonds 2x but are also formally backed by cash flows from HA's loyalty program which is designed to be bankruptcy remote. The bonds are the only substantial debt in the Company's capital structure. The bonds are trading at a depressed price because of a series of issues beyond HA's control: a) Maui Wildfires, b) Slow return of Japanese travellers post-Covid, c) grounded airplanes due to an issue with Pratt & Whitney engines, d) overall negative sentiment on airlines. Our thesis is that HA is a very well-run airline with a loyal affluent customer base that has substantial liquidity to see a recovery through and ultimately refinance the subject bonds. Tactically, we decided to cut our risk in half and crystallized a small loss on the position while we wait for lower prices to reaccumulate. At current prices, the IRR to January 2025 refinancing is 38%.

**Risk Overlay** – We were quiet during the month and still hold ~1-year out of the money put options on Banks/Financials. Shortly after month-end, HYG has spiked substantially so we have now layered in a January 2024 72/69 Put Spread.

### **Summary**

While the Fund's performance was negative during the month it performed inline with the liquid indices that proxy the market risk of the underlying portfolio. Even after crystalizing some losses during the quarter, which will help offset some embedded capital gains accumulated within the Fund year-to-date, the portfolio has so far gained back all of last month's losses in the first five days of November. The portfolio ex-cash has a yield approaching ~10% with plenty of liquidity to opportunistically add risk going forward.

# PROSPECTUS



## INTERNATIONAL LEASE FINANCE CORPORATION

### 500 SHARES OF MARKET AUCTION PREFERRED STOCK, SERIES A 500 SHARES OF MARKET AUCTION PREFERRED STOCK, SERIES B Liquidation Preference \$100,000 Per Share

Dividends on the Market Auction Preferred Stock (the "MAPS") are cumulative from the Date of Original Issue and are payable when, as and if declared by the Board of Directors of International Lease Finance Corporation. The Initial Dividend Payment Date and Initial Dividend Rate will be February 2, 1993 and 3 1/2% per annum for the Series A MAPS, and February 9, 1993 and 3 1/2% per annum for the Series B MAPS. Thereafter, dividends will be payable at the Applicable Rate in effect from time to time when, as and if declared on each subsequent Dividend Payment Date which is, subject to certain exceptions, every seventh Tuesday for the Standard Dividend Period of 49 days, subject to certain exceptions, commencing on the prior Dividend Payment Date. Under certain circumstances, the Company may specify that a Dividend Period be a Short Dividend Period (50 to 364 days) or a Long Dividend Period (one year or longer).

After the Initial Dividend Period, the Applicable Rate for each Dividend Period will be determined on the basis of Orders placed in an Auction conducted on the Business Day preceding the commencement of a Dividend Period, subject to certain exceptions. In each Auction each Existing Holder will indicate its desire (i) to continue to hold shares of a Series without regard to the Applicable Rate that results from such Auction, (ii) to continue to hold shares of a Series if the Applicable Rate that results from such Auction is equal to or greater than the rate bid by such Existing Holder and/or (iii) to sell shares of a Series without regard to the Applicable Rate that results from such Auction. Potential Holders may submit bids in which they will offer to purchase shares of a Series if the Applicable Rate that results from such Auction is equal to or greater than the rate bid by such Potential Holder. The Applicable Rate that results from an Auction for any Dividend Period will not be greater than a rate per annum (the "Maximum Applicable Rate"), determined by reference to the credit ratings of the MAPS, that is a percentage of the Applicable "AA" Composite Commercial Paper Rate, in the case of a Standard Dividend Period or a Short Dividend Period of 183 days or less, or a percentage of the Applicable Treasury Bill Rate, in the case of a Short Dividend Period of 184 days to 364 days or the Applicable Treasury Note Rate in the case of a Long Dividend Period. The Maximum Applicable Rate may range from 150% to 275% of such rates, and on the date of delivery of MAPS is anticipated to be 300% thereof. The percentages used to calculate the Maximum Applicable Rates within rating categories are subject to increase by the Company. If the Company fails to make timely payments to the Auction Agent of the full amount of any dividend on the MAPS or the redemption price of MAPS called for redemption, the Applicable Rate will not be based on the results of an Auction but instead will be the Default Rate, unless such failure to pay is cured within three Business Days.

Shares of MAPS may be transferred only in whole shares and pursuant to a Bid or a Sell Order placed in an Auction, to or through a Broker-Dealer or to a person that has delivered a signed Master Purchaser's Letter to a Broker-Dealer. Prospective purchasers should carefully review the Auction Procedures described in this Prospectus (including its Appendices) and should note that (i) a Bid or Sell Order constitutes a commitment to purchase or sell shares of MAPS based upon the results of an Auction, (ii) Auction participation will be through telephonic communications, (iii) settlement for purchases and sales will be on the Business Day following an Auction and (iv) ownership of MAPS will be maintained in book-entry form by or through the Securities Depository.

Each Series of MAPS is redeemable on any Dividend Payment Date for such Series, in whole or in part, at the option of the Company, at \$100,000 per share, plus accrued and unpaid dividends.

**THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ANY STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION NOR HAS THE COMMISSION OR ANY STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPECTUS. ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.**

#### PRICE \$100,000 PER SHARE

|                 | Price to<br>Public(1) | Underwriting<br>Discounts and<br>Commissions(2) | Proceeds to<br>Company(3) |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Per Share ..... | \$100,000             | \$1,375                                         | \$98,625                  |
| Total .....     | \$100,000,000         | \$1,375,000                                     | \$98,625,000              |

(1) Plus accrued dividends, if any, from the Date of Original Issue.

(2) The Company has agreed to indemnify the Underwriters against certain liabilities, including liabilities under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

(3) Before deduction of estimated expenses for the account of the Company of \$270,000, of which \$125,000 will be paid by the Underwriters.

Each Share of MAPS is offered, subject to prior sale, when, as and if accepted by the Underwriters named herein, and subject to approval of certain legal matters by Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, counsel for the Underwriters. It is expected that delivery of the MAPS will be made on or about December 15, 1992, through the facilities of The Depository Trust Company, against payment therefor in immediately available funds.

**MORGAN STANLEY & CO.**  
Incorporated

**LEHMAN BROTHERS**

December 8, 1992



## **Letter VIII – September 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, ended September with a Class C NAV of \$11.014 and has paid \$0.16 in distributions year-to-date. This compares with \$11.031 at the end of the prior month and the inception NAV of \$10.00. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 85% and Gross Exposure was 100% versus 82%/106% at the end of August.

|                     | Price | Yield-to-Worst | Cash Yield | Credit Spread | Rate Duration |
|---------------------|-------|----------------|------------|---------------|---------------|
| Portfolio           | 92.3  | 9.5%           | 7.4%       | 409 bps       | 2.0 years     |
| USD HY Index        | 88.1  | 8.9%           | 6.8%       | 394 bps       | 3.5 years     |
| CAD Aggregate Index | 88.8  | 4.9%           | 3.4%       | 64 bps        | 7.0 years     |

### ***Interest Rate Exposure***

The major theme in the fixed income market in September was the sharp decline in the value of government bonds, which forms the basis for pricing most risk assets. The Canadian Corporate Bond Index was down ~3% last month and is now negative on the year, while generic high yield bonds were down about 2% with losses spilling into October. Many corporate credit investors piled into longer duration credit assets this year, with the thesis that yields had peaked, and spent much of their “dry powder” during the first 9 months of the year. As a result, the bid for longer duration credit assets is fragile.

The Fund does not actively try to “hedge” its interest rate exposure by shorting government bonds. While we are aware of what is going on in the government bond market, we have no advantage in forecasting nor edge in trading interest rates. We therefore manage our interest rate exposure via old-fashioned security selection. Our response to managing interest rate volatility, in the context of a corporate credit portfolio, has been as follows:

1. Larger weighting in cash/cash-like instruments which in some cases compete with yields on longer corporates
2. Allocation to floating rate instruments such as perpetual floating rate preferreds linked to LIBOR/CDOR/PRIME
3. Avoidance of longer duration credit assets like 7–10-year investment grade bonds which we think are over-valued
4. Preference for higher coupon, lower dollar price, shorter maturity securities
5. Focus on event-driven opportunities which usually have a short terminal value of between 30-360 days.

As a result of our security selection, not macro interest rate forecasting, we avoided losses in the Fund for the month of September and are reasonably positioned for further rate volatility going forward. The opportunity cost of how we manage interest rate risk is that we are likely to forgo gains should there be a massive rally in the government bond market from here forward. In addition, it is possible that higher rates start to create a negative feedback loop which widens credit spreads. When rates rise, it makes refinancing debt more expensive which grinds into cash flow available to service a Company's fixed charges.

### **Core Corporate (45% of NAV, 21 positions)**

We sold a majority of our ‘AAA’-rated asset-backed securities at a modest gain to fund the purchase of more aggressive credit risk positions elsewhere in the portfolio. The composition of our Core Corporate Carry portfolio is largely unchanged month-over-month, but has taken modest mark-to-market losses associated with the broader sell-off in risk assets.

## Event-Driven (~26%, 16 positions)

### *Northwest Healthcare Properties REIT*

The largest contributor to our positive performance in September was a capital structure relative value trade in *Northwest Healthcare Properties REIT*. The Company cut its dividend, as we expected, which was a negative outcome for the units but a positive outcome for bondholders. We were positioned for the event.

### *Videotron versus Cogeco*

We have a long position in longer-duration Videotron {QBRCN} bonds against a short position in longer Cogeco bonds {CCACN}. Fundamentally, we think QBRCN is a superior credit to CCACN. However, the legacy at QBRCN of acquisitions, a holdco/opco structure and regional concentration in Quebec cable has kept rating agencies from upgrading the Company to investment grade. Our thesis is that QBRCN finally gets upgraded in 2024 and the bonds rally as they enter the IG index. Meanwhile, CCACN's bonds are one of the worst performing corporate bonds in Canada in 2023 having been issued with a coupon of 5.299% they are now trading below 93. There is a clear mispricing of credit risk we intend to exploit.

| Bond               | Price          | Yield        | Credit Spread | Duration         | Rating             |
|--------------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------|
| QBRCN 3.125% 01/31 | 78             | 7.04%        | 293 bps       | 6.2 yrs.         | Ba2/BB+(pos)       |
| CCACN 2.991% 09/31 | 81             | 6.03%        | 195 bps       | 6.8 yrs.         | BBB-               |
| <b>Difference</b>  | <b>(3 pts)</b> | <b>1.01%</b> | <b>98 bps</b> | <b>-0.6 yrs.</b> | <b>1.5 notches</b> |

Our interest rate risk is matched and the "credit beta" is largely hedged given the correlation between the two credits. If we are correct and the credit spreads converge, we think we can make ~5-6 points with limited capital at risk.

**Liquidity Provision (~13%)** - The Fund had ~13% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end.

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~15%, 8 positions)

### *Carroll's Restaurant Group Senior Unsecured Bonds {TAST 5.875% 07/29, yield of ~9.50%}*

After following TAST for years, we finally decided to accumulate a full position in the Company's bonds after becoming convinced that the turnaround of Burger King in the US had sustainable momentum. We are kicking ourselves we didn't buy the bonds earlier in the year at lower prices, but we didn't have the conviction at the time. TAST is the largest Burger King franchisee in the US. As part of our research, we met with the Chairman of Restaurant Brands International {RBI} which is the "franchisor" of Burger King. RBI in late 2022 decided to stem the decline in the BK brand by launching a *Reclaim the Flame* campaign. Specifically, they are helping BK franchisees by providing funds for advertising and restaurant refurbishment. The Company is capable of de-levering through internal FCF and has a long liquidity runway to allow time for the turnaround of the BK brand and revamp of the restaurant network in the US.

## Risk Overlay

We purchased long dated out-of-the money put options on several indices including *Equal Weight Canadian Banks*, *TSX 60* and *US Financials*. Longer dated out-of-the money volatility is cheaper on a relative basis to shorter-dated near-to-the money protection. These positions are designed to hedge a handful of preferred share positions we currently hold.

## Summary

The volatility in the government bond market is concerning and is quickly becoming the dominant theme in the pricing of risk assets globally. Our game plan, in response to this volatility, is to stay the course with our current portfolio construction. We have no intention of extending duration to reach for return, as current opportunities in our area of focus are plentiful. The yield-to-worst on our portfolio is approaching 10% with a duration ~2 years. The broader sell off in fixed income in 2023-Q4 could provide a strong setup for outsized returns in 2024.

# NEWGEN

## ASSET MANAGEMENT

**Letter VII – August 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, ended August with a Class C NAV of \$11.03 and has paid \$0.12 in distributions year-to-date. This compares with \$11.01 at the end of the prior month and the inception NAV of \$10.00. A rough estimate of the breakdown of the Funds YTD gains: ~37% Interest Income, 17% Dividend Income and 46% Capital Gains, the majority of which have been realized. Our Gross and Net Exposures at August month-end were 106%/82% versus 102%/82% at the end of July.

|              | Price | Yield-to-Worst | Cash Yield | Credit Spread | Rate Duration |
|--------------|-------|----------------|------------|---------------|---------------|
| Portfolio    | 92.7  | 8.09%          | 6.85%      | 334 bps       | 2.05 yrs.     |
| USD HY Index | 89.2  | 8.51%          | 6.65%      | 372 bps       | 3.47 yrs.     |

| Positive Performance                              | Performance Detractors                |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| IamGold IMGCN 5.75% 10/28 Unsecureds (short)      | Brookfield Office Preferred Shares    |
| Calfrac CFWCN 10.875% 03/26 2 <sup>nd</sup> Liens | Cars.com CARS 6.375% 11/28 Unsecureds |
| Glatfelter GLT 4.75% 11/29 Unsecureds             | Canadian Floating Rate Preferreds     |
| ‘AAA’ Asset-Backed Securities                     |                                       |

### **Core Corporate (50% of NAV, 24 positions)**

We continued the process we started in July of “high-grading” our Core Corporate Bond portfolio and now have ~20% of the sub-strategy in AAA asset-backed securities and ~37% invested in investment grade obligors. We exited the following positions almost exclusively for valuation reasons, however, concerns about a weakening consumer entered our thinking:

| Company                   | Ticker                      | Industry                                    |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Dave & Busters            | PLAY 7.625% 11/25 Secureds  | Casual Restaurants                          |
| Winnebago Industries      | WGO 6.25% 07/28 Secureds    | Recreational Vehicle Manufacturer           |
| Concrete Pumping Holdings | BBCP 6% 02/26 Secureds      | Concrete Pumping Services                   |
| Vista Outdoor             | VSTO 4.50% 03/29 Unsecureds | Branded Sporting Goods and Outdoor Products |
| Great Canadian Gaming     | GCCN 4.875% 11/26 Secureds  | Casino Gaming                               |

Our strategy of overweighting ‘B’-rated shorter duration secured bonds early in the year has served us well year-to-date and we monetized gains on most of the positions over the last two months. We view the above-mentioned credits as having simple but strong business models, generally well-managed, modestly levered and they all generate decent free cash flow relative to their debt load. We will gladly buy back all the positions at the right price at some point in the future.

### **Event-Driven (~26%, 11 positions)**

Corporate activity picked up during the month and a bunch of new opportunities has led to us having to ration the portfolio and remove lower conviction and/or lower IRR positions in favour of better ideas. Two examples of names we have added:

#### ***Algonquin Power***

We have been studying Algonquin Power very closely for the last 12 months. AQN has a very complex debt structure and has been forced to put its renewables business up for sale and may ultimately look to monetize its large stake in Atlantica {AY} as well. The net result is the Company is shrinking and needs to bring its debt structure inline with its remaining

assets under the constraint of a mandate from the Board of Directors to maintain an IG rating. We think we have found the cheapest instrument in the entire capital structure that will benefit from the corporate actions ahead.

### ***Michael Kors / Capri Holdings***

We accumulated a position in Capri Holdings {KORS 4% 11/24} bonds after the Company agreed to a friendly all-cash take-over by Tapestry {TPR}. We think the merger has strong strategic and financial merit. The pay-off profile of these bonds is asymmetric with little downside should the merger not occur or be delayed. However, if the deal closes quickly our understanding of the financing arrangements is that TPR will need to redeem these bonds early which could result in a +8% IRR. The core risk to the deal not closing is the perceived overlap between the two woman's handbag businesses. The combined entity will have a large market share, and based on how you define the "handbag market," regulatory authorities could take the view that there is too much concentration given that the combined entity controls brands such as Coach, Jimmy Choo, Michael Kors, Kate Spade and Versace.

### **Liquidity Provision (~16%)**

The Fund had ~16% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~13%, 6 positions)**

We monetized our position in the bonds of Glatfelter {GLT 4.75% 11/29}. GLT makes a variety of products such as feminine hygiene solutions, tea bags, face masks and sanitary wipes often using what is called "non-woven" technology [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonwoven\\_fabric](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonwoven_fabric). For a variety of reasons, the Company entered 2023 with a stressed balance sheet. We bought the bonds at ~64 3/8 cents with the view that the capital structure was stable and new management would execute its new turnaround strategy to improve margins and de-lever the Company. After reporting its Q2 in early August, the Company lowered its fiscal year guidance, so we decided to exit the position but sold the bonds at 69.5 for a +9% gain when you include the coupons. We will revisit if the bonds drop back into the low 60s which we view as closer to fair value.

We accumulated a position in Calfrac {CFWCN 10.875% 02/26} senior secured 2<sup>nd</sup> lien bonds at ~90 cents in July and now expect them to be refinanced anytime between September 2023 and March 2024. The bonds are currently only callable at 102.72 but the call price steps down to 100 in early 2024. If not called, we will continue to clip the ~11% coupon on a performing credit waiting to get refinanced out.

We have one closed-end fund arbitrage position that added to our monthly gains. We are actively engaged with Management of the Fund to improve some of the structural features and help close the gap between the market price to the Fund's Net Asset Value. We hope to have similar success here as we had trading Brookfield Select Opportunities Fund {BSO-U} and Canso Credit Income Fund {PBY-U} earlier in the year.

### **Risk Overlay**

We were quiet in our Risk Overlay strategy during the month.

### **Summary**

We have made some significant changes to the portfolio over the last two months. We have shortened the credit duration of the portfolio, improved its credit quality, and monetized gains in fully valued securities. We have shifted our focus to shorter-term opportunistic event-driven opportunities and are waiting for better entry points in the credits we have surveillance on.



## **Letter VI – July 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, ended July with a Class C NAV of \$11.81 before YTD distributions or \$11.01 net of YTD distributions versus the inception NAV of \$10.00. A rough estimate of the breakdown of the Funds YTD gains: ~33% Interest Income, 15% Dividend Income and 52% Capital Gains. Dividends and capital gains provide far superior after-tax returns versus a pure interest income “carry” strategy. Our Gross/Net Exposure at month-end was 102%/82% versus 88%/78% last month as we increased our short positions.

|                      | Price | Yield-to-Worst | Cash Yield | Credit Spread | Duration |
|----------------------|-------|----------------|------------|---------------|----------|
| Overall Fund**       | 93.7  | 7.56%          | 6.71%      | 295 bps       | 2.2 yrs. |
| Core Corporate Carry | 91.4  | 7.89%          | 7.02%      | 349 bps       | 3.5 yrs. |
| High Yield Index     | 89.5  | 8.41%          | 6.61%      | 372 bps       | 3.5 yrs. |

*\*\*Includes our relatively large cash weighting as well as event-driven positions bought for short-term capital gains not yield.*

### **Core Corporate (~47% of NAV, 22 positions)**

We sold our positions in Great Canadian Gaming {GCCN 4.875% 2026} and Open Text {OTEXCN 3.875% 2029} as they became too rich relative to the credit risk to justify holding. At yields between 6.50%-6.75% for a high yield bond we would rather own higher grade credit assets as this point in the cycle. We booked a modest gain on those two positions. We then rotated the capital into very cheap short duration AAA asset-backed securities trading at a discount to par. This is what we call a “yield give up” where we reduce yield but improve the credit quality and liquidity of the portfolio.

One bond added that we think is mispriced is Chip Mortgage Trust {HEQCN 1.503% 11/24}. These bonds are AAA-rated asset-backed securities tied to low LTV Reverse Mortgages. The business is unique and not well understood. We bought the bonds at 93.91 to yield ~8.05% to the July 2024 call date. Our due diligence revealed that for regulatory purposes these bonds need to be retired in advance of their maturity date meaning a return of principal would occur sooner than the market was pricing thus boosting the IRR of the position. The chart below highlights the stark difference in after-tax returns from bonds trading below par to those trading at par or above which is part of the reason we like them:

|                                | HEQCN 1.503% 11/24 Bond | Typical Par Bond |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| Price                          | 93.91                   | 100              |
| Yield                          | 8.05%                   | 8.05%            |
| Interest Income / Capital Gain | 1.503% / \$6.09         | 8.05% / \$0.00   |
| Taxes Paid**                   | \$2.27                  | \$4.15           |
| After-Tax Return on Capital    | 5.67%                   | 4.15%            |

*\*\*Tax is calculated based on Interest Income at 50% and Capital Gains at 25%*

The main point of this table is that we would need to buy a 1-year par bond at around a 11.3% yield in order to achieve an after-tax return equivalent to the after-tax return of the bonds we bought at a yield of 8.05%. Put differently, the after-tax return is around 1.50% better for the discount bond versus the par bond.

We now expect to have close to 10% of the Fund in short duration, low dollar price AAA-rated asset-backed securities. While not fancy, we think these AAA securities are some of the best risk-adjusted positions in the portfolio. Additionally, with much of the return set to be generated from capital gains, these bonds have an after-tax return that is equal to or better than par high yield bonds. Should the overall credit markets back up to more desirable levels we will sell these securities to fund new purchases of higher yielding and possibly longer duration credit assets.

## Event-Driven (~21%, 14 positions)

We monetized a significant position in the credit-focused closed end fund *Canso Credit Income Fund*. After a careful study of the Fund's underlying portfolio, we accumulated a position in Q2 at a discount to the Fund's NAV. We used the Fund's annual redemption privilege to redeem our position at NAV which generated a capital gain for the fund. In addition, we took advantage of propensity of the Fund Manager to buy a portion of the redeemed units during what is called the "Recirculation Period". After redeeming our Units mid-month for cash, we then accumulated a new long position and then sold them into the Manager's bid at a premium to the market value prior to the Recirculation Date.

We traded AT&T CAD Long "Maple" Bonds during the quarter. We may have bought the "low tick" during one of the really dour days for AT&T following the WSJ article about contaminated lead cables. We sold them for a gain several days later.

## Liquidity Provision (~19%)

The Fund had ~19% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end.

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~13%, 9 positions)

We added one new credit to the portfolio, a busted convertible from a technology company at a yield of 14.25%. The Company is free cash flow positive with an LTV of ~55% but has a levered balance sheet and shorter maturity portfolio. At present, we feel we have the maximum weighting in our Special Situations/Stressed bucket. Net of shorts, this portion of the portfolio yields mid-teens and is highly idiosyncratic with none of the positions in any major indices.

## Risk Overlay

In lieu of rolling our various options structures for July, we elected to short a handful of "high beta" high yield bonds to help neuter some market risk in the portfolio. Due to our large cash position and relative conservative positioning in our Core Corporate Carry bucket we didn't feel the need to spend premium during July. The decision saved the fund some money as liquid credit indices rallied during the month.

## Summary

Corporate credit markets had a decent rally in July. Government bonds yields are now selling off so far in August. At the same time, corporate bond yields remain sticky which spits out tighter credit spreads from the bond math equation. The "soft-landing" narrative has taken hold in corporate credit just like it has in equities. However, there is an old adage in corporate bond investing...*more people have died chasing yield than by the barrel of a gun*. While tempting to chase yield, we are not incrementally adding generic risk to the portfolio given current market conditions. Our game plan in the months ahead:

- Focus on event-driven opportunities that are agnostic to overall macro conditions and whose prices and IRRs are anchored to idiosyncratic events.
- Look for "up in quality, yield give up" trades within our Core Corporate Carry strategy to improve credit quality.
- Maintain healthy liquidity to add risk on "back-ups" in the market from rising spreads or rising underlying rates.
- Attempt to trade the positions we own for advantage and extract a liquidity premium.

One advantage of the Fund's mandate is that we can move along the credit spectrum. We own 1-year AAA asset-backed securities yielding ~6% but also own obscure floating rate perpetual preferred shares yielding > 15%. The end goal is to find the best risk-adjusted return per unit of credit risk. This has naturally drifted us towards a bit of a "credit barbell" portfolio construction. Given our size, there are plenty of opportunities to deploy capital and scale our portfolio.



## **Letter V – June 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, ended June with a Class C NAV of \$10.97 pre-distribution or \$10.93 post the \$0.04 distribution we paid mid-month. This compares to \$10.86 at the end of the prior month and the inception NAV of \$10.00. Our \$0.04/unit distribution in June represents a 4.80% cash yield based on the inception NAV of \$10.00. A rough estimate of the breakdown of the Funds YTD gains: ~37% Interest Income, 18% Dividend Income and 45% Capital Gains, the majority of which have been realized. Dividends and capital gains provide far superior after-tax returns versus a pure interest income “carry” strategy, so we factor tax efficiency into our investment decisions. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 78% and Gross Exposure was 88% versus 77%/85% at the end of April.

| Price | Yield-to-Worst | Cash Yield | Credit Spread | Duration  |
|-------|----------------|------------|---------------|-----------|
| 91.75 | 8.09%          | 7.15%      | 360 bps       | 2.5 years |

### **Core Corporate (50% of NAV, 22 positions)**

| Positive Performance                           | Performance Detractors                           |
|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Arko Corp. – ARKO 5.125% 11/29 Unsecureds      | Argo Group 7% Preferred Share                    |
| Carriage Services – CSV 4.25% 05/29 Unsecureds | Victoria’s Secret – VSCO 4.625% 07/29 Unsecureds |
| GIII Apparel – GIII 7.878% 08/25 Secureds      | OI Glass – OI 6.625% 05/27 Unsecureds            |

We exited our positions in Victoria’s Secret (poor quarter/trends) and OI Glass (valuation). Our position in the Deathcare company Carriage Services (“CSV”) appreciated in value during the month as the Company became subject to an all-cash take-over by Canadian company Parklawn (“PLC”). We have followed the Deathcare space for awhile and were originally attracted to the credit fundamentals of CSV. The position has now turned into an event-driven trade, so we have moved it to that bucket. There is uncertainty on whether PLC’s Brookfield-backed bid will succeed. Other permutations see Service Corp. (“SCI”) as a White Knight or a private equity sponsor buys CSV as a platform to roll up more funeral homes/cemeteries. On many of the nodes along our probability tree we see higher values that where the bonds are trading. Therefore, we did not sell the position after it rallied 4 points from 82 to 86 but in fact added to it. There is a reasonable probability the bonds see a 101 Change of Control Offer or stay outstanding but become the Obligor of a higher quality credit. It is not too often a large-scale Deathcare concern comes for sale we think it will be a prized cow at the auction.

### **Event-Driven (~20%, 12 positions)**

Added Intercontinental Exchange {ICE 3.65% 25} at a price of ~98. These bonds will receive 101 if ICE’s take-over of Black Knight is blocked in federal court as the FTC is challenging the merger or simply the bid expires on November 4th. The upside if we are correct is an IRR of 11.40%. The downside is a ~0%-1% IRR consisting of a 1 pt loss on the bond less interest income waiting for the outcome of the event. We think the odds of the deal breaking are far greater than 50/50

Added Cablevision {CSCHLD 5.25% 06/24} at a price of ~93.5 to yield 13.2%. CSCHLD issued new bonds in April to pre-fund the refinancing of our bonds. Our bonds are not callable, and the interest expense associated with the Company’s revolver drawings is higher than the coupon on the bonds so the Company elected to pay down its revolver instead with the intent to redraw it on maturity. The position is not without risk as the Company is distressed and could try to do a coercive exchange to avoid paying cash to retire the bond at maturity.

We are in the midst of monetizing two very large and profitable event trades in July, one involving the sale of a preferred share position we own back to the Company that issued it and the other a closed end credit arbitrage trade.

## Liquidity Provision (~22%)

The Fund had ~22% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end but this number can fluctuate throughout the month depending on the short-term event-driven trading opportunities. As an example, at various points during the month we carried 5% cash awhile waiting for events to play out and liquify.

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~8%, 8 positions)

We had a long bonds/short stock capital structure arbitrage trade in a Speciality Finance company that we are now unwinding. We intended to hold the position longer, but the bonds rallied 5-6 points from where we bought them, and the stock dropped over 10% and as a result we made our desired return and will look to recycle the capital elsewhere.

## *Floating Rate Perpetual Preferreds*

One corner of the credit markets that has piqued our curiosity has been floating rate perpetual preferred shares issued by investment grade companies. These securities typically pay a quarterly dividend based on some floating rate index plus a credit spread. Investors go to great lengths to find assets whose cash flows *increase* with rates & inflation by buying bridges, ports, tolls roads to earn 8%-12%. We think this asset class offers similar characteristics as the longer inflation stays elevated the higher the likelihood that short rates stay elevated which means the higher the cash flow from the security. Thinking about portfolio construction, these securities provide a nice offset to the fixed rate assets in the Fund.

We currently have 8% of the Fund invested in floating rate perpetual preferreds across 5 credits. In many cases the yields are so elevated than even a half dozen or so rate cuts still make them cheaper to their comparable fixed rate equivalents.

| Credit             | Price<br>(in bond terms) | Cash Yield   | Pre-Tax Interest<br>Equivalent Yield | Floating Rate Index | S&P Family Credit<br>Rating |
|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| Media/Tech         | 52 cents                 | 9.4%         | 12.2%                                | Canada Prime x 70%  | BBB                         |
| Pipeline           | 58                       | 11.8%        | 15.3%                                | T-Bills plus Spread | BBB+                        |
| Financial Services | 61                       | 10.7%        | 13.9%                                | T-Bills plus Spread | A+                          |
| Real Estate        | 39                       | 12.5%        | 16.3%                                | Canada Prime x 70%  | BBB-                        |
| Aviation           | 96                       | 15.0%        | 12.8%                                | LIBOR x 2.75        | BBB                         |
| <b>Total</b>       | <b>61 cents</b>          | <b>11.9%</b> | <b>14.1%</b>                         |                     |                             |

## Risk Overlay

The Fund is currently net long corporate credit which means we are inherently short volatility as one can think of a corporate bond as a put option on a company's assets. Corporate credit spreads have historically been correlated to equity volatility and the correlation grows stronger as equities decline in value. A sharp decline in the equity markets alongside a spike in volatility often occurs alongside a widening in credit spreads. Therefore, a long position in volatility is a good market hedge for corporate credit. At the beginning of June volatility collapsed so we initiated a modest long position in the VIX Index to hedge some of the *market* not credit risk of the Fund. In addition, we bought a VIX 20/30 "call spread" that would benefit if VIX spiked above 20 but stayed below 30. Both hedges have gone against us in June as volatility was on a steady decline all month, but the offset was capital gains on our core corporate positions.

## Summary

Opportunities in the corporate credit markets continue to be open at depth. We like our positioning in our Corporate Carry bucket and will continue to clip coupons and collect dividends. The task at hand in the months ahead will be refilling our event-driven pipeline with new opportunity as existing trades roll-off and liquefy.



## **Letter IV – May 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, ended May with a Class C NAV of \$10.854 compared to \$10.862 at the end of the prior month and the inception NAV of \$10.00. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 77% and Gross Exposure was 85% versus 68%/87% at the end of April.

### **Core Corporate (53% of NAV, 20 positions)**

A quick summary of our Core Corporate carry portfolio. A notable metric is our high allocation to senior secured bonds.

| Price | Yield-to-Worst | Cash Yield | Credit Spread | Duration   | Credit Rating | Secured % |
|-------|----------------|------------|---------------|------------|---------------|-----------|
| 90.38 | 8.37%          | 6.94%      | 452 bps       | 3.78 years | BB-           | 44.6%     |

| Positive Performance                 | Performance Detractors            |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Titan International TWI 7% 04/28     | Carriage Services CSV 4.25% 05/29 |
| TD Bank TD 8.125% 10/82              | Vector Group VGR 5.75% 02/29      |
| Winnebago Industries WGO 6.25% 07/28 | Canadian Floating Rate Preferreds |

### **Exited Positions**

We sold our position in SeaWorld {SEAS 5.25% 2029} bonds at 91.25 to yield 7% simply on bond valuation relative to credit risk. SeaWorld is very well managed and has a good balance sheet but has a yet to be unveiled plan to build hotels on its amusement properties which could see leverage rise. However, at the right price these bonds could re-enter the portfolio.

### **New Positions**

We initiated a position in the \$400mm senior secured 1<sup>st</sup> lien bonds of G-III Apparel {GIII 7.875% 2025}. GIII is a well managed 3<sup>rd</sup>-generation apparel business started in 1956 that has been public since 1989. The Company sources and markets apparel under brand licenses such as Donna Karan, Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger and Karl Lagerfeld. The Company has: a) no material debt other than the subject bonds, b) \$650mm undrawn credit facility, c) \$175mm of cash, d) +\$700mm market cap, e) \$675mm of accounts receivable and \$709mm of inventory, f) generated ~\$200mm of Free Cash Flow in FY2023. At a 10.5% yield for what is likely to be a 1.5-year duration bond given the propensity of high yield companies to refinance one year in advance of a maturity we think the bonds are good value and therefore accumulated a position.

### **Event-Driven (~29%, 12 positions)**

#### ***Ford Motor Credit Canada ("FMCC")***

We initiated a position in one of FMCC's unsecured bonds with the thesis that they will be upgraded to Investment Grade in late-2023/early-2024. The bonds we own by our math are the cheapest of the dozens of FMCC bonds issued globally across multiple currencies. We bought the bonds with a credit spread of 392 bps which compares to ~285 bps for a similar bond in USD and ~315 bps in GBP. GM Financial, the nearest comparable to FMCC, is investment grade and trades with a credit spread of between 165-195 bps for a similar maturity instrument.

If we assume that FMCC is upgraded to investment grade by March 31, 2024, and the bonds tighten to +50 bps above GM Financial then we could see a +2.50% capital gain plus the 7.375% running coupon for a 1-year total return of ~9.9%.

## *First Horizon Bank ("FHN") / TD Bank Risk Arbitrage*

We purchased FHN bonds under the thesis that TD Bank would ultimately acquire FHN but at a "recut" equity price. Part of our conviction was the motivation on both sides to see a deal through to completion was high, albeit at a lower equity price. We bought our FHN bonds at a credit spread of ~340 bps compared to similar TD Bank debt trading at ~170 bps at the time. Should the take-over have been completed, FHN's bonds would have eventually traded at a similar credit spread and generated a 10% capital gain plus a running coupon of ~6%. Unfortunately, we were wrong as the transaction failed, reportedly based on a yet to be disclosed issue the US regulators had with TD bank anti-money laundering compliance. Once our thesis was wrong, we made the decision to exit the position as tactically as possible. We waited for other risk arbitrage sellers to exit over the first week after the deal broke and the bonds rallied 16 pts off the low and we sold the entire position crystalizing a loss for the Fund.

## Liquidity Provision (~23%)

The Fund had 23% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end but this number can fluctuate throughout the month.

## Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~6.3%, 6 positions)

We added two new positions during the month, one short and one long.

### *Mining Company*

The Company is currently developing a new mine and surprised the market by obtaining new 2<sup>nd</sup> lien financing with a group of distressed lenders at a high effective cost of ~14%. The new shorter maturity loan is ranked senior to the bonds and has a maintenance covenant. This transaction is what we call "getting primed". We shorted the unsecured bonds at a yield of <11% and given they mature outside of the new financing and are lower ranked in priority in theory they should trade at a higher yield than 14%. The short is a cheap option on the mine failing to start up which could lead to a covenant breach but most importantly, the bonds should not trade at a materially lower yield than were the new debt was raised.

### *Specialty Finance*

We bought the bonds in a Specialty Finance company at a yield of ~16% and a price < 80 cents. We partially hedged the position with a short position in the common stock as we think there is a disconnect in the valuation of the two parts of the capital structure.

## Summary

Corporate defaults are rising, and credit conditions are tightening. Avoidance of defaults will be key to outperformance in the months ahead. Credit selection is the process of *exclusion* not *inclusion* (i.e., it is the bonds you don't buy that matter more than the bonds you buy). Some prognosticators believe high yield credit spreads are too tight given where we are in the cycle, and we have some sympathy for that argument. A reasonably bad scenario is that spreads widen 200 bps but this likely means a decline in government yields as they are often negatively correlated. If government yields decline by 100 bps this would imply a net rise in high yield bond yields from ~9% to 10% and a 3.7% capital loss on the High Yield Index. However, the running yield on high yield is ~6.7% or 58 bps per month with a yield-to-worst of ~9%. So practically, using the simple scenario math above, if you think credit spreads are too tight and want to "time the market" you need spreads to really blow out in the next 6 months or so to be better off simply holding onto the asset class and accepting the net return of "carry less capital loss" while avoiding the friction costs of buying and selling. *We are being cautious and prudent but the opportunity cost of being too negative on corporate credit is quite high at these elevated yields.*



### **Letter III – April 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, ended April with a Class C NAV of \$10.86 compared to \$10.79 at the end of the prior month and the inception NAV of \$10.00. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 80.0% and Gross Exposure was 91.5% versus 67.5%/87.4% at the end of March.

### **Core Corporate Carry (44% of NAV, 19 positions)**

A quick summary of our Core Corporate carry portfolio:

| Price | Yield | Credit Spread | Duration  | US/Canadian |
|-------|-------|---------------|-----------|-------------|
| 91.1  | 8.04% | 435 bps       | 3.8 years | 61%/39%     |

| Positive Performance             | Performance Detractors            |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Carriage Services CSV 4.25% 2029 | Arko Corporation ARKO 5.125% 2029 |
| Baytex Energy BTECN 8.75% 2027   | Floating Rate Preferreds          |
| Canadian AT1 Securities          | N/A                               |

### **Arko Corporation**

Arko, a US convenience store operator, launched a competing bid to acquire Travel Centers of America ("TA"), after TA agreed to sell itself to BP plc. The complex competing bid would see Arko lever-up and use most of its debt capacity to finance the transaction. The bonds traded down from 84 down to 81 cents to yield 9%. After reviewing the bid, we felt it was unlikely Arko could finance the proposed acquisition which was opposed by TA itself. We took the opportunity to add to our existing position as we like the management team of Arko and while they are no doubt acquisitive, they are good operators. We think the M&A risk is already priced into the credit at 9%.

### **Event-Driven (~29%, 12 positions)**

We closed four event-driven positions during the month:

#### ***Brookfield Select Opportunities Fund ("BSO-U") – Credit-Focused Closed End Fund Liquidation***

On December 19, Brookfield, BSO's Fund Manager, issued a press release stating the following: *"the investment manager, is considering various strategic alternatives for the Fund given its small size. This includes, reducing the Fund's quarterly distribution in 2023, a potential reorganization into another fund or liquidation of the Fund. PSG will provide an update once it determines to advance one of these strategic options and expects to be in a position to do so by the end of the first quarter 2023."*

BSO was trading at \$5.55 at the time even though its NAV was only \$1.76 as the Fund never adjusted its distribution downward as the income from the underlying portfolio declined. Investors flocked to its ~30% yield even though much of the distribution was return of capital. The Fund's own disclosure stated that it paid out way more than they earned. We shorted BSO in Q1 awaiting the event and on March 14 Brookfield announced they were liquidating the Fund and holders would receive the NAV by the end of April. We took a second bite at the apple when the Units traded down to as low as

\$1.25 even through the NAV was \$1.58. We covered our short position and went long the Units on the same day and continued to buy aggressively right up until the Liquidation Date. The Fund received \$1.605 in cash on April 25.

#### *Rogers Communications - RCICN 5.25% 2082 Junior Subordinated Bonds – Index Event*

RCI issued investment grade “hybrid” bonds in February 2022 to finance part of the Shaw acquisition. It was widely known that the credit rating of these bonds would be downgraded to high yield following the closing of the transaction. As expected, on April 6, the bonds were formally downgraded by Moody’s and S&P. The downgrade caused *forced selling* by investment grade index funds and as a result we bought some bonds at an attractive level from an indexer. Then at the end of the month, the bond formally entered a high yield index which then caused aggressive *forced buying*. We then sold the bonds to another indexer at a higher level than where we bought them.

#### *Maxar Technologies – MAXR 7.75% 06/27 Senior Secured 1st Lien Bonds – Make-Whole Redemption*

We accumulated the bonds at an average price of ~105.125 after a thorough read of the bond indenture indicated that as part of the take-private transaction the private equity sponsor would have to redeem the bonds using its “make-whole” privileges. The bonds were redeemed at ~106.5 and we collected a 7.75% coupon while waiting for the redemption.

#### *Seaspan - SSW 6.50% 2026 Senior Unsecured Euro-dollar Bonds – Change of Control Offer*

Our position was redeemed at a price of 101 following a Change of Control Offer. Atlas Corporation, the Parent of Seaspan, was taken private on March 28<sup>th</sup> and as a result the Company was required to offer us a redemption price of 101.

### **Liquidity Provision (~25%)**

The Fund had 25% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end but this number can fluctuate throughout the month based on our active trading. We purchased a “hard-called” IG bond during the month at a 6% 30-day yield.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~7%, 4 positions)**

We finally found a few opportunities to deploy capital within this sleeve. We acquired a position in a security tied to the commercial real estate market at an interest equivalent running yield of ~17%. Having had a bearish position in commercial real estate credit for most of the year we now think opportunities are beginning to emerge on the long side. The constant negative sentiment on commercial real estate, particularly office, has caused a wash out in securities prices across a wide range of credits even though the balance sheet structures, and asset quality vary widely. In addition, we purchased a 1<sup>st</sup> lien secured bond from a performing credit that yields 15%. This was done via the primary market, a first for the Fund.

### **Risk Management Overlay**

- We have maintained our short position in USD investment grade credit spreads because of an expected busy month of primary issuance that could see credit spreads widen from April levels.
- We did not roll our bearish HYG option structure on expiry but instead replaced it with a short position in HYG. HYG is trading at ~50 bps premium to NAV.

We are currently focused on scaling two attractive event-driven trades and harvesting a handful of what we think are profitable existing event-driven trades scheduled to roll-off in the next 3 months.



## **Letter II – March 2023**

The NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a corporate credit-focused liquid alternative strategy, finished the quarter-ending March 31<sup>st</sup> with a Class C NAV of \$10.79 compared to \$10.56 at the end of prior month and the inception NAV of \$10.00. Our Net Exposure at month-end was 67.5% and Gross Exposure was 87.4%

### **Core Corporate Carry (47% of NAV, 21 positions)**

Our *Core Corporate Carry* sub-strategy positioning remains unchanged from the prior month. We are tilted towards B+ rated senior secured and unsecured paper from US mid-market publicly traded companies. We continue to prefer this part of the credit universe as we think the flight to quality (“BB”) has investors trading off *lower* credit risk for *higher* interest rate risk. Contrarily, we are shunning the lower end of the high yield market (“CCC”) which while much less correlated to interest rates is very exposed to default risk. We are aligning the portfolio to have a reasonable balance between *interest rate risk* and *credit risk* until we have a clearer picture of where we are in the rate/credit cycle. We favour simple businesses that are FCF positive with no near-term debt maturities. A quick summary of our Core Corporate carry portfolio:

| Price | Yield | Credit Spread | Duration   | US/Canadian |
|-------|-------|---------------|------------|-------------|
| 90.3  | 8.09% | 434 bps       | 3.75 years | 49.9%/50.1% |

| Positive Performance         | Performance Detractors   |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Canadian Bank AT1 securities | Titan International      |
| Arko Corporation             | Bluelinx                 |
| Cars.com                     | Floating Rate Preferreds |

All our positions except for one bond were purchased on the secondary market and many of the positions we own are “well seasoned” meaning they have been outstanding for a reasonable period. We have been adding to existing positions when Credit ETFs are selling for liquidity.

### **Banking Crisis and Canadian Bank AT1s**

The Fund entered the recent Banking Crisis with ~20% cash, no leverage, de minimis exposure to Banks and *zero* positions (long or short) in very volatile “risk-free” governments bonds. When the Banking Crisis started to unfold mid-month, we dropped what we were working on to focus on the headline grabbing Bank AT1 market. We first sold the very small exposure we had in CAD AT1 securities and rotated into a large weighting in two USD Canadian Bank AT1 from TD and BNS that we view as being the cheapest two bonds out of the dozens of AT1 securities issued by Canadian Banks. We actively traded our AT1 positions throughout the month and as a result the largest contributor to Fund’s Core Corporate Carry sub-strategy was our position in TD’s 8.125% 82 USD AT1 security.

|                                 | BNS 8.625%<br>USD | BNS 7.023%<br>CAD | TD 8.125%<br>USD | TD 7.283%<br>CAD |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Price (March 16 <sup>th</sup> ) | 100.625           | 99.23             | 99.5             | 101.14           |
| Yield-to-Next Call (2027)       | 8.55%             | 7.11%             | 8.34%            | 6.98%            |
| Spread-to-Next Call (2027)      | 487 bps           | 423 bps           | 466 bps          | 392 bps          |
| Yield-to-Maturity               | 8.22%             | 7.30%             | 7.93%            | 7.10%            |
| Spread-to-Maturity              | 453 bps           | 405 bps           | 430 bps          | 405 bps          |

<sup>1</sup>As a reminder, the Fund does not sell short government bonds on a levered basis to buy bonds issued by Banks.

### **Event-Driven (~20%, 12 positions)**

Our Event-Driven sleeve continues to be the largest driver of returns for the Fund year-to-date. We closed three positions during the month:

- Long IAA 5.50% 2027 bonds against a short position in new issue Ritchie Brothers unsecured bonds. The take-over of IAA by RBA closed successfully, and our bonds bought at ~98.25 were redeemed at 102.75 and we covered the RBA short before settlement.
- Long Intercontinental Exchange ICE 3.65% 2025 with Special Mandatory Redemption. Exited the position after ICE agreed to continue to fight the FTC to close the merger with Black Knight. Our thesis was that the deal was going to break, and we would receive 101 on our bonds.
- Long First Quantum Unsecured Bonds. Company had a positive resolution with the Panama Government around the economic terms and conditions associated with its flagship Cobre Panama Mine and we exited the position bought during the early stages of the dispute.

### **Liquidity Provision (~30%)**

The Fund had 30% of its NAV in cash and cash equivalents at month-end but this number can fluctuate throughout the month based on our active trading.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~2%, 2 positions)**

Our positioning remaining unchanged as we wait patiently for companies with stressed balance sheets that need capital to come to the primary market. We are currently working on a credit file where we think we can deploy some of the Fund's capital into a senior secured performing credit at a 15% yield. The bogey for us to deploy the Fund's capital into more stressed or special situation credits remains very high.

### **Risk Management Overlay**

- We entered the month with a short position in a *Commercial Real Estate* security as a general risk hedge because of our general worries about the CRE market. However, we ended up monetizing the hedge as the price of the security deteriorated rapidly as the banking Crisis unfolded.
- We initiated a macro short position in US investment grade cash credit spreads during the beginning of the Banking Crisis that helped protect the Fund against a market decline.
- Our bearish option structure on Blackrock's HYG ETF remains intact.

The opportunity set in credit is robust and we hope the ongoing volatility associated with the Banking Sector continues as it opens up more active trading opportunities and gives us a chance to add to our core positions at lower prices.



## **Letter I – Feb 2023**

Today marks the second month for the NewGen Credit Strategies Fund, a **credit-focused liquid alternatives strategy** launched on January 1<sup>st</sup>. The current Net Asset Value (“NAV”) for the Class C units is \$10.5463 versus our Inception NAV of \$10.00.

A quick summary of the portfolio:

### **Core Corporate Carry (~49% of NAV)**

Our *Core Corporate Carry* sub-strategy is now yielding 7.9%, has a credit spread of 369 bps and a duration of 3.7 years across 22 positions. The portfolio is tilted towards B+ rated senior secured paper from US mid-market publicly traded companies. Examples below:

1. Dave & Busters
2. Bluelinx
3. Winnebago Industries
4. Titan International
5. Vector Group
6. Cars.com

We also have a modest allocation to floating rate preferred shares as well as investment grade junior capital securities from Canadian Banks.

### **Event-Driven (~27%)**

Our *Event-Driven* sleeve has been the largest driver of returns for the Fund year-to-date. One example is a short position in a Closed End Credit Fund that is trading above NAV. While a small focus of the overall portfolio, we see some opportunities in Closed End Credit Funds that primarily hold corporate credit assets trading at material discounts or premiums to their NAV. Another contributor was our trade in the bonds of Resolute Forest Products. We purchased the bonds in January at 99-99.25, clipped some coupon and sold them between 102-102.40 following the announcement that the Company was going to call the bonds as we expected. We anticipate that many of our Event-Driven trades will roll off between 30 and 180 days with several positions tied to situations where a Company or successor entity is required to retire their bonds prior to maturity at a pre-determined price on a defined timeline. We will then look to reload on what we anticipate will be a busy year for corporate events.

### **Liquidity Provision (~17%)**

We are maintaining plenty of liquidity in the Fund at present for two reasons;

1. Ample cash and cash equivalents allow us quickly to fund *Event-Driven* trades that typically occur at random on a daily basis (i.e. an announced merger or asset sale). Often for *Event-Driven*

trades, we need to react within 30 minutes of a press release and having liquidity to build a position without selling something else quickly is important and we don't anticipate using leverage in the Fund.

2. We are being paid reasonably well at present to hold near cash securities relative to longer duration credit assets. Our *Liquidity Provision* portfolio currently yields close to 5% and is composed of cash sitting at our Prime Brokerage account, High Interest Saving Account ETFs and near-term fixed rate corporate bonds.

### **Special Situations/Stressed Credit (~4%)**

We only have ~4% of the portfolio in *Special Situations/Stressed Credit*. We don't anticipate allocating materially more capital to this sub-strategy at present because we anticipate further credit stress on lower rated credit moving forward. Outside of one isolated position, we hold no debt in private companies, no LBO debt and no CCC high yield paper. Despite seemingly attractive yields on 'CCC' paper, we think there is more pain ahead as lower rated companies struggle to cover their interest payments especially ones with a large component of floating rate debt in their debt structure.

### **Risk Management Overlay**

We were active in trading listed options tied to liquid credit indices such as the Blackrock's HYG high yield ETF. We have on a bearish options structure that helped cushion some of the market risk for the month of February from our *Core Corporate Carry* portfolio. We took the opportunity to roll forward our option structure an additional month at almost no cost during the largest negative down day in credit so far this year.

### **Summary**

We are excited about the first few months of the Fund and the opportunity set ahead. The Fund is fully operational with a fully ramped up portfolio ready to be scaled. While we are cautious on the current corporate credit valuations, we continue to find opportunities daily to generate reasonable returns either through corporate events or mispriced bonds under-appreciated by larger credit managers or index funds. The high yield market in North America has +\$1.4 trillion of bonds outstanding across +2,500 issuers and there are tens if not hundreds of press releases and earnings reports on a daily basis to sift through. The Fund is small and nimble enough to deploy capital and take advantage of mispriced corporate credit securities.